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Introduction
The given thesis includes three independent chapters which all contribute to the the-
ory of public economics. They are linked, theoretically, by the fact that an information
asymmetry is included in the presented environment. In the rst two chapters agents are
assumed to hold private information on their preferences. Making use of a mechanism
design approach, applications such as a bilateral trade problem, the provision of a pub-
lic good and the design of an optimal income tax schedule are studied. More precisely,
Chapter 1 relates discrete and continuous formulations of the independent private val-
ues model and derives conditions under which these two behave qualitatively the same.
Chapter 2 studies how a Mirrleesian income tax model is aected by the assumption of
arbitrary directions of redistribution and addresses the question how the corresponding
optimal income tax schedules should be designed. In the third chapter individuals are
incompletely informed about the characteristics of a public good. Only incomplete in-
formation on the good’s productivity and governmental contributions are available such
that salience becomes a driving factor for individual behavior and hence, the provision
of the good.
A common aim of all three chapters is to disentangle and evaluate the eects of infor-
mation asymmetry in the respective setting. In an environment as considered in the rst
two chapters, individuals being privately informed about preferences yields a social cost.
Thus, only a second-best situation can be reached where welfare is lower compared to a
full information environment. However, this is not true in a situation as studied in Chap-
ter 3. Here, the information asymmetry can be exploited by a benevolent government to
improve welfare compared to a situation with complete information. Conclusively, the
eects of information asymmetry on welfare and optimal allocations are non-trivial and
depend on the considered environment.
Chapter 1 The rst chapter is based on joint work with Felix Bierbrauer and Désirée
Rückert. It studies two representative applications – the bilateral trade problem and
the provision of a public good – in dierent formulations of the independent private
values model. In this workhorse model of mechanism design, agents are privately in-
formed about their preferences. In our setup, consumers are privately informed about
the marginal benet of consumption, while producers are privately informed about the
marginal cost of production. Typically, in the independent private values model, those
"types" are drawn from a continuum with a corresponding atomless distribution. We
contrast this continuous formulation with a discrete specication and compare the im-
plementability of ecient outcomes.
At rst, necessary and sucient conditions for the implementability of a social choice
function are derived for the discrete specication of the model. Secondly, we study how
1
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the implementability of a social choice function varies in the parameters of the model,
e.g. the number of types or the number of individuals. For this purpose, we dene a
measure which quanties how costly it is to implement ecient outcomes.
Regarding the two applications, contrary observations are made with respect to the
question whether the implementability of ecient outcome is the same in both the con-
tinuous and the discrete formulation. While the impossibility result of Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990) on the provision of public goods preserves in any model with discrete
types, this is not true for a private good setting. The impossibility result by Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) for the bilateral trade problem with a continuum of types does not
extend to a setting with discrete types. We deliver parameter constellations that allow
to eciently trade a private good. The nal section in this chapter provides conditions
under which discrete and continuous formulations of the independent private values
model behave approximately the same.
Chapter 2 In the second chapter, a discrete version of the Mirrleesian income tax
model is used to study welfare maximizing tax schedules under the assumption of ar-
bitrary redistributive preferences of the planner. An economy with three productivity
types is studied and the welfare function is a weighted Utilitarian. Redistributive pref-
erences are reected by the welfare weights assigned to the three productivity types,
respectively. The model does not put any assumptions on these welfare weights and,
hence, covers every possible redistributive preference that can be expressed by a Utili-
tarian welfare function. Typically, models building on Mirrlees (1971) consider welfare
weights that decrease in productivity. This yields optimal redistribution towards the
poor, formally given by downward binding incentive constraints.
For weights that are non-monotonic, the set of binding incentive constraints is a priori
unknown and has to be identied. A perturbation argument is used to assign binding
incentive constraints to given welfare weights. The results are aggregated in two formal
conditions which partition the set of welfare weights into four subsets (and its bound-
aries) according to the pattern of binding incentive constraints.
Having identied the binding constraints for each subset, allows to state a reduced
form of the original welfare maximization problem. Optimal allocations are derived by
a rst order approach. The corresponding optimal marginal tax rates are such that it is
never optimal to overly encourage low-skilled individuals to work or to discourage high-
skilled individuals from work which is equivalent to non-negative marginal tax rates for
low-skilled and non-positive tax rates for high-skilled. The median type’s optimal tax
rate can have either sign depending on the direction of redistribution. Furthermore,
depending on the specic form of preferences bunching can occur. Though, given that
preferences fulll the single-crossing condition, some types of bunching can be ruled
out for further specied welfare weights.
The chapter concludes by discussing the relation of welfare maximizing and second-
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best Pareto ecient allocations.
Chapter 3 The third chapter is based on joint work with Frederik Thenée. It investi-
gates how the provision of a public good is aected by salience. Two types of salience
are studied: rstly, individuals are assumed to be incompletely informed about the qual-
ity of the public good and, hence, responsive to salience. More precisely, individuals
are assumed to underestimate the marginal benet of a contribution to the public good.
Secondly, the salience of taxes has an impact on the individuals’ behavior as they are
assumed to misperceive governmental contributions to the public good. The analysis
focuses on incompletely salient taxes where individuals underestimate the amount of
public contributions. In a model similar to Bergstrom et al. (1986) or Andreoni (1990)
the interplay of public and private contributions to charity is analyzed, in particular
with regard to salience as a driving force of behavior.
Chapter 3 can be subdivided in two main parts. The rst is dedicated to the investi-
gation of individual equilibrium behavior as a function of various factors such as public
contributions, salience – in both of it dimensions – and the quality of the public good.
The second part evaluates these results and delivers a normative approach to public good
scenarios where not only the provision level of the public good but also the induced wel-
fare is considered.
As real world observations would suggest, private equilibrium contributions increase
in the perceived quality of the public good and decrease with the level of perceived pub-
lic contributions. Furthermore, as public contributions are only an imperfect substitute
for private contributions, the aggregate provision level increases in public contributions.
This increase in the provision level alleviates the underprovision of the public good re-
sulting from free-riding.
However, an increase in the aggregate provision is not equivalent to an increase in
welfare. Opposed to voluntary contributions, taxes do not create a warm glow. So,
crowding out private ones, public contributions come at the cost of a destroyed warm
glow. To evaluate the overall eect on welfare, the negative eect of a destroyed glow
has to be contrasted with the positive eects of reduced free-riding and increased aggre-
gate contributions. It can be shown that the positive eect never outweighs the negative
when taxes are perfectly salient. Only by their non-salience public contributions to a
public good are potentially benecial. To identify conditions when this is actually the
case, crowding-in as dened by the concomitant increase of public and private contri-
butions is introduced as an indicator. Under the assumption of a welfare maximizing
government, it can be shown that it depends on the trigger of crowding-in whether the
increase in taxes raises welfare or not: if an increase in the good’s salience is the rea-
son for higher equilibrium contributions, increased taxes are never optimal. Contrary,
if crowding-in is caused by an increase in the good’s quality, higher taxes are poten-
tially welfare increasing. Raising taxes is actually benecial if the problem of free-riding
3
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became more severe by the quality shock.
For exposition, we study the public good "charity".
4
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On the independent private values model
– A unied approach
1.1 Introduction
The independent private values model is an important workhorse model for the the-
ory of mechanism design. In this model, economic agents are privately informed about
their characteristics, typically preferences or costs, and, moreover, the characteristics
of dierent agents are modeled as the realizations of independent random variables. In
addition, an individual’s payo does not depend on the types of other individuals. This
framework has been applied to study a wide range of allocation problems. These include
the allocation of indivisible private goods (auctions), the provision of pure or excludable
public goods, the regulation of externalities, the problem of partnership dissolution, or
redistributive income taxation.
The seminal papers in this literature are based on the assumption that, for each agent,
there is a continuum of possible types and that the corresponding probability distribution
has no mass points and a monotone hazard rate. Moreover, the typical approach is to
use the envelope theorem for a characterization of incentive compatible social choice
functions. In this paper, we develop an alternative characterization of implementable
social choice functions based on the assumption that the set of possible types is discrete.
More specically, our analysis proceeds as follows.
We rst provide necessary and sucient conditions for the implementability of a so-
cial choice function. For our characterization, we introduce the notion of a minimal
subsidy. It is dened as the dierence between the maximal payment that one can ex-
tract from individuals in the presence of incentive and participation constraints, and the
payment that would be required in order to ensure budget balance. That is to say, the
minimal subsidy is the amount of money an external party would have to provide so as
to make a given social choice function compatible with the requirements of incentive
compatibility, voluntary participation, and budget balance. However, we do not assume
that such an external party is actually available. Consequently, a social choice function
can be implemented if and only if the minimal subsidy is negative. We then apply our
characterization to clarify conditions under which the famous impossibility results by
5
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Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) extend to a model
with a discrete set of types. Second, we provide a comparative statics analysis of how a
change in exogenous parameters – such as the number of individuals, or the number of
possible types per individual – aect the minimal subsidy. This allows us, for instance,
to check whether a change in the economic environment makes it more or less dicult
to implement an ecient provision rule for public goods. A nal contribution of our pa-
per is to spell out the conditions under which a model with a large but discrete number
of types behaves approximately in the same way as a model with a continuum of types.
These results are derived in a model in which many consumers, who have private in-
formation about their preferences, benet from the provision of a private or public good.
Their payos are quasi-linear in the transfers they need to pay for the good. Further,
many rms, which have private information about their costs, prot from the produc-
tion of goods. Firm prots are quasi-linear in the revenues they receive for producing
the good. Consumers’ consumption is bounded by the total output that is made available
by the rms. To derive the minimal subsidy, we proceed as follows: The social choice
function can be divided into a transfer and consumption rule for consumers and a rev-
enue and production rule for rms. First, we hold the consumption rule for consumers
xed and derive the maximal transfers that consumers are able to make if incentive com-
patibility constraints and participation constraints need to be respected simultaneously.
Similarly, we hold the production rule xed for rms and derive the minimal revenue
that rms are willing to accept if again incentive compatibility constraints and participa-
tion constraints need to be respected. The dierences between the maximal consumer
transfers and the minimal rm revenues is the minimal subsidy. If the minimal sub-
sidy is positive, i.e., the mechanism runs a decit, then the specied consumption and
production rules are not implementable. Contrary, if the minimal subsidy is negative,
the implementation of the social choice function is possible. For the characterization of
maximal consumer transfers and minimal rm revenues we use techniques developed
in the non-linear pricing literature (e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978)).
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We rst derive necessary and sucient conditions
for the implementation of a social choice function. For the characterization of the rst
condition, we consider the problem of maximizing consumers’ transfers and the prob-
lem of minimizing rms’ revenues, taking only a subset of incentive compatibility and
participation constraints into consideration. Specically, we consider the participation
constraints of the consumer with the lowest valuation for consumption and the incen-
tive constraints that prevent consumers to communicate lower preferences. Similarly,
we take into consideration the participation constraint of the rm with the highest costs
of production and the incentive constraints that prevent rms from exaggerating their
costs. The expression that arises from this relaxed problem, where only a subset of con-
straints is considered, provides a lower bound on the minimal subsidy. Thus, a necessary
condition for the implementation is that the minimal subsidy of this relaxed problem is
6
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negative. Second, we derive a sucient condition, which assures that the lower bound of
the minimal subsidy can be reached. This condition is stated for monotone consumption
and allocation rules so that the consumption rule and the production rule are monotone,
so that consumers with higher willingness to pay for the good consume more than con-
sumers with a lower willingness to pay; and similarly, rms with lower costs produce
more output than rms with higher costs.
These conditions have the following implications: rst-best consumption and provi-
sion rules are monotone. Therefore, rst-best implementation is possible if and only if
the minimal subsidy is negative. When the rst-best provision rule is not implementable,
monotonicity of the consumption and provision rules can be achieved when the distribu-
tion of agents’ types satises a monotone hazard rate assumption. Hence, consumption
and production plans that maximize a social surplus function subject to the constraint
that the minimal subsidy is negative, are monotone and therefore implementable. To
derive the necessary condition, the monotonicity of hazard rates does not play a role.
We present a version of the impossibility results of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), when
consumers have a discrete number of types. Our specication uses only the necessary
condition to derive this result. We do not require the assumption of a monotone hazard
rate that was imposed by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) in order to attain the impossi-
bility result. Hence, our result holds under less restrictive assumptions.
We provide comparative static results that show how the minimal subsidy varies with
the number of types and the number of agents. In particular, we can compare the com-
parative static properties of the minimal subsidy in a private good setting with a public
good setting. A change in the number of agents aects the minimal subsidy in both set-
tings dierently. In a public good setting, an increase in the number of consumers leads
to a positive minimal subsidy, so that it is impossible to eciently provide the public
good. Contrary, when a private good setting is considered, an increase in the number
of buyers and sellers leads to a negative minimal subsidy. An increase in the number
of types, on the other hand, increases the minimal subsidy, so that in the private good
setting, as well as the public good setting, impossibility results occur when the number
of types grows large.
In order to understand how parameter changes aect the minimal subsidy, we decom-
pose the eect of a change in parameters in the surplus measure and the measure for
information rents separately. We show that when each agent has a binary type set, then
parameters can be found such that ecient bilateral trade is possible. Further, if only
two consumers are considered, parameters can be found such that the public good can
be provided eciently. We show that the ability to reach possibility results hinges on the
observation that parameters need to be chosen in such a way that the surplus measure
is bigger than the information rents that need to be guaranteed. This raises the question
how (i) the agent’s type parameters, (ii) the probability weights on types (iii) the number
of types and (iv) the number of agents inuence the minimal subsidy. In particular, we
7
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show that the possibility results that are derived with a binary type set ’approach’ the
impossibility results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) if the number of types increases and if the new types are introduced in such a way
that the nite type set lies dense in the innite type set, i.e., every point of the innite
type set can be approximated by a point of the nite subset of types. We demonstrate
that the minimal subsidy in the discrete setting converges to the minimal subsidy in the
continuous setting if the environments are aligned.
Based on these observations, we study general convergence results. We specify what
we mean by one environment approaching another environment, so that results in a
continuous setting and a discrete setting coincide. Therefore, we dene an environment
that allows us to compare and relate dierent economies, e.g. the discrete and the con-
tinuous bilateral trade economy. Each of the economies is characterized by four decisive
factors for implementability: the number of agents, the number of types, the probabil-
ity distribution and the parameter constellation. Formally, we can approximate ’similar’
economies by adjusting the single components; i.e., as we increase the number of types
and adjust the probability distribution, we transfer the discrete bilateral trade setting
into the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). If the components are adjusted
’appropriately’, we say that one economy will converge to the other economy. To re-
late and analyze implementability results of dierent settings, we calculate the minimal
subsidy and study what drives the possibility to attain ecient implementation in each
economy. We give general insights on how dierent applications of the independent
private values can be linked.
The reminder is organized as follows. The next section contains a more detailed dis-
cussion of the literature. Section 1.3 provides counterparts to Myerson and Satterth-
waite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) impossibility results. Section 1.4 intro-
duces the model. To motivate our more general analysis in subsequent sections, Section
1.5 presents necessary and sucient conditions for the implementation of social choice
functions and characterizes rst-best and second-best provision rules. Section 1.6 dis-
cusses comparative statics properties of the bilateral trade problem and the public good
provision problem. Further, this section studies the impact of increasing the number
of agents on the possibility result. Section 1.7 then shows how the discrete type setting
converges to the continuous type setting and analyzes the convergence in our examples.
The last section contains concluding remarks. Preliminary proofs are in Part 1.A of the
Appendix. Part 1.C introduces further applications.
1.2 Related literature
The independent private values model has been applied to study a wide variety of alloca-
tion problems, from the allocation of indivisible private goods (auctions), to the bilateral
trade problem, the provision of pure or excludable public goods, the regulation of exter-
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nalities, the regulation of a monopolist, or the problem of partnership dissolution.
In auction theory, the independent private values model is central. The seminal pa-
per that introduced the second-price auction and the revenue equivalence theorem is
Vickrey (1961). Optimal auctions for risk neutral bidders with independent types are
derived in Myerson (1981), Riley and W. (1981), Harris and Raviv (1981) (see McAfee
and McMillan (1987), for further references). Che and Gale (2006) show that the revenue
equivalence theorem does not need to apply when the number of buyer types is nite.
Further, for the example of bilateral trade, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have
shown that if the buyer’s preferences and the seller’s costs are private information and
voluntary participation needs to be assured, ecient trade is not possible. They intro-
duce the notion of the minimal subsidy and thereby provide a measure of how severe
the impossibility result is. We will show that this impossibility result does translate into
a model with many nite types. For few nite types, however, parameters can be found
such that ecient bilateral trade is possible; i.e., the minimal subsidy is negative. A
special case of our setup is the paper of Matsuo (1989), who provides conditions under
which eciency in the bilateral trade example can be reached for discrete distributions
with two types.
The possibility to achieve ecient public good provision as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
in an independent private values model has rst been established by D’Aspremont and
Gerard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979). This literature has not taken voluntary partici-
pation into account. Güth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989) and Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) have shown that if preferences for public goods are private information, so that
incentive compatibility constraints need to be considered and if at the same time volun-
tary participation need to be guaranteed, then rst-best ecient public good provision
cannot be achieved. We will show that this impossibility result does not rely on the as-
sumption that preferences for public goods are continuously distributed by showing that
the impossibility extends to a setup with an arbitrary discrete type set. The provision of
a non-rival, but excludable good is studied in Güth and Hellwig (1986), Hellwig (2003),
Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004).
The independent private values model has also been applied to study the dissolution
of partnerships, see Cramton et al. (1987). They look at situations where each of several
agents possesses a fraction of a good and assume a continuous symmetric distribution
of agents’ valuations. They show that an ecient reassignment of shares is possible if
initial shares are suciently equal distributed. However, when a single agent possesses
all shares of the partnership, then the same arguments as in Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) apply and an ecient dissolution is impossible. Hence, whether the partnership
can be dissolved eciently relies on the initial shares of the partnership. As a corollary
of our analysis of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) with discrete types, we show that
if the number of types is nite, then parameters can be found such that the partnership
can always be dissolved eciently, even when shares are unevenly distributed.
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Hellwig (2007) provides separate characterizations of optimal income taxes for a model
with a discrete set of types and for a model with a continuum of types. He argues that
for all steps in the proof for the continuous type set there exists an analogous step for
the discrete type set. The strategy of our paper is dierent in that we analyze the im-
plementation of social choice functions for an arbitrary number of discrete types. We
investigate the implication of this modeling choice by approximating the continuous
type set.
Kos and Messner (2013) provide a general characterization of implementable alloca-
tion rules. They describe bounds on the set of transfers that implement an allocation
rule. They do refrain from any assumption on the agent’s type set and utility function.
The work of Kos and Messner (2013) is related to this paper in that it makes use of mini-
mal subsidies to evaluate whether implementation of social choice functions is possible.
Opposed to them, we make more specic assumptions that allow us to elaborate more
clearly on necessary and sucient conditions for implementation. Further, it enables us
to do comparative statics analysis.
The specication of the independent private values model with a nite number of
types is well suited for directly testing mechanisms in the laboratory. Bierbrauer et al.
(2015) use this specication to test whether mechanism that are robust to agents’ prob-
abilistic beliefs (see Bergemann and Morris (2005)) fail when agents have social prefer-
ences.
1.3 Motivating examples
This section contains motivating examples, which illustrate the diculty of extending
the impossibility results by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postle-
waite (1990) to models with a discrete set of types. Throughout, we will use these two
examples to illustrate conceptual issues that arise.
1.3.1 The bilateral trade problem
In the private good setting, there is one buyer and one seller. The seller produces
y ∈ [0, 1] units of a good. The buyer can purchase q ∈ [0, 1] units of the good. The
buyer’s utility is given by u(θ, q, t) = θq − t, so that θ is the buyer’s valuation for the
good and t is the transfer the buyer has to pay for the good. The seller’s prot is given
by pi(δ, y, r) = r − δy, so that δ is the cost of producing the good and r is the rev-
enue the seller receives for providing the good. The quantity that is consumed by the
buyer is equal to the quantity produced by the seller, so that for all (θ, δ) ∈ Θ × ∆,
q(θ, δ) = y(θ, δ) ∈ [0, 1]. Further, it is assumed that trade is voluntary and, in the
absence of trade, both parties realize a utility, respectively a prot of 0. We dene for
the buyer a function Q : Θ 7→ [0, 1], where Q(θk) = E(δ)[q(θk, δ)|θl]. This gives the
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conditional expectation over the probability that the buyer gets the good, in case that
he announces type θk but having a true type θl. The conditional expected value of the
transfers T (θk), and the conditional expected values of revenues R(δl) and produced
quantity Y (δl) for the seller are dened analogously. The seminal analysis of the bi-
lateral trade problem by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) has focused on the question
whether there exists a Pareto ecient or surplus-maximizing social choice function that
is incentive-compatible for the buyer,
θlQ(θl)− T (θl) ≥ θlQ(θk)− T (θk) , ∀ θl, θk ∈ Θ , (1.1)
incentive-compatible for the seller,
R(δl)− δlY (δl) ≥ R(δk)− δlY (δk) , ∀ δl, δk ∈ ∆ , (1.2)
and compatible with the budget requirement,
E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] ≥ E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] . (1.3)
Surplus-maximization requires that the function q : Θ × ∆ → [0, 1] is chosen so as to
maximize
E(θ,δ) [(θ − δ)q(θ, δ))] .
Hence, surplus-maximization requires that
q(θ, δ) =
{
0, if θ < δ ,
1, if θ > δ .
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) analyzed the bilateral trade problem under the as-
sumption of an atomless distribution functions with a monotone hazard rate1, and es-
tablished the following impossibility result.
Proposition 1.1. Myerson and Saerthwaite (1983): If the buyer’s valuation for the
good is independently drawn from the intervals [θL, θH ] and the seller’s costs for the good
are drawn from the interval [δL, δH ] with strictly positive densities, such that the intervals
[θL, θH ] and [δL, δH ] are not disjunct, then there is no Bayesian incentive compatible social
choice function that is ex post ecient and gives every buyer type and every seller type
non-negative expected gains from trade.
We change the assumption of atomless type distributions and show: when the buyer’s
and the seller’s type set is discrete, then ecient trade is possible for some parameter
constellations.
1The hazard rate for the buyer is dened as f(θ)1−F (θ) , where the cumulative distribution function of the
random variable is denoted by F and f is the density; for the seller, the hazard rate is dened as p(δ)P (δ) ,
respectively. The monotone hazard rate assumption assumes these to be non-decreasing.
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Figure 1.1: Binary type set
0 = δL δH
θL θH = 1
Assume that each agent’s type occurs with equal probability. For certain parameter
constellations, e.g.
θs = 0 , θb =
1
8
, θ¯s =
7
8
and θ¯b = 1 ,
the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) impossibility result is obtained. Consider the fol-
lowing relaxed problem: The mechanism designer is interested in maximizing expected
surplus, subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (1.1) and (1.2) and subject
to the constraints that gains from trade have to be non-negative. The following Table
gives a solution to this relaxed problem.
Table 1.1: Positive minimal subsidy
(q, r, t) θs θ¯s
θb
(
1, 3
8
, 1
8
)
(0, 0, 0)
θb
(
1, 4
8
, 4
8
) (
1, 7
8
, 5
8
)
The maximal expected transfer that the buyer is willing to make is E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] =
5
16
. The minimal expected revenue the seller is willing to accept is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] =
7
16
. Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem violates the budget constraint in (1.3).
The minimal subsidy that is necessary for ecient bilateral trade is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] −
E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = 18 .
Contrary, for the following parameter constellation
θs = 0 , θb =
1
3
, θ¯s =
2
3
and θ¯b = 1 ,
the social choice function, which species (q, t, r) for all possible type combinations,
in Table 1.2 leads to ecient bilateral trade and satises the conditions in (1.1), (1.2),
(1.3) and assures non-negative payos.2 Whenever the buyer’s marginal valuation for
the good is higher than the seller’s marginal costs, the good is exchanged. The maximal
2See Observation 1.1 below, for a proof.
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expected transfer that the buyer is willing to make is E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = 12 . The minimal
expected revenue the seller is willing to accept is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)] = 13 . Hence, the budget
constraint in (1.3) is satised. The minimal subsidy that is necessary for ecient bilateral
trade is E(θ,δ) [r(θ, δ)]− E(θ,δ) [t(θ, δ)] = −16 .
Table 1.2: Negative minimal subsidy
(q, r, t) θs θ¯s
θb
(
1, 1
3
, 2
3
)
(0, 0, 0)
θb
(
1, 1
3
, 2
3
) (
1, 2
3
, 2
3
)
1.3.2 Public good provision
An indivisible public good is either provided or not. There are I = {1, . . . , n} consumers
and one producer. The utility function is taken to be linear so that u(θi, q, t) = θi q − t,
where q = 1 if the public good is provided, and q = 0, otherwise. The producer’s cost
function is taken to be publicly known. If the public good is produced, the costs are equal
to nc, where c is the per capita cost of public-goods provision. Since the cost function is
known, the producer’s incentive compatibility constraints are irrelevant, and a state of
the economy is exclusively dened by the vector of preference parameters θ. When the
public good is not provided, all consumers realize a utility of zero.
The analysis of public good provision by Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) has focused
on the question whether there exists a Pareto ecient social choice function that is
incentive compatible, so that the incentive constraints in (1.1) are satised for all i, and
that satises the resource requirement
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
≥ nc E(θ)[q(θ)] , (1.4)
where n denotes the number of consumers.
Surplus maximization requires that the function q : Θn 7→ [0, 1] is chosen so as to
maximize
E(θ)
[(
n∑
i=1
θi − nc
)
q(θ)
]
.
Hence, surplus maximization requires that
q(θ) =
{
0, if 1
n
∑n
j=1 θi < c ,
1, if 1
n
∑n
j=1 θi > c .
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If the average valuation of a consumer exceeds the per capita costs, E(θ)[θi] > c, then
the public good should be provided. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) analyze the public
good provision under the assumption of atomless distribution functions with a mono-
tone hazard rate. They show that if the number of consumers grows without limit, public
good provision is zero under any social choice function that is incentive compatible and
respects participation constraints.
Proposition 1.2. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990): If the consumers’ valuation for the
public good are independently drawn from the intervals [θL, θH ]with strictly positive densi-
ties and the per capita costs are such that θL < c < θH , then limn→∞prob (q(θ)n > 0) = 0,
for any mechanism in the sequence of mechanism satisfying incentive compatibility con-
straints, voluntary participation and expected budget balance.
With many consumers, if the average valuation is higher than the marginal per capita
costs, then the ecient amount of public good provision will be almost surely equal to
1, yet the amount that is going to be implemented will be almost surely equal to 0, under
any mechanism that respects consumers’ voluntary participation.
Consider now the case where consumers have a binary type set and assume that
each consumer’s type occurs with equal probability. For all parameter constellations
θLi < c < θ
H
i , there is no social choice function, which maximizes surplus and satises
incentive compatibility constraints, ensures non-negative utility for all consumers and
fullls the budget requirement (see Proposition 1.5 below). With private information on
public good preferences, consumer i’s transfers have to be chosen such that the incentive
compatibility constraints in (1.1) are satised. However, when the number of consumers
grows large, a consumer’s impact on the public good provision becomes insignicant.
If no consumer has an impact on the provision, then incentive compatibility constraints
imply that the transfers have to be similar. Thus, the maximal transfers per capita is θLi ,
which is smaller than the per capita costs of public good provision.
1.3.3 Comparison of private and public good.
Assume that there are two consumers and that each consumer type occurs with equal
probability. For the following parameters, θb = 1, c = 3 and θ¯b = 10, there is a social
choice function, which maximizes surplus, satises incentive compatibility constraints
in (1.1), assure voluntary participation and fullls the budget requirement in (1.4). By
contrast, for θb = 1, c = 3 and θ¯b = 6, there is no social choice function, which
maximizes surplus and fullls all constraints.3 It depends on the parameters whether we
have an impossibility result or not. With many individuals, the Mailath and Postlewaite
(1990) result extends to a model with a discrete type set. As has been shown by Gresik
and Satterhwaite (1989), the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) result does not extend
3See Observation 1.4 below, for a proof.
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to a model with a large number of buyers and sellers. This raises the following more
general questions: what impact does the number of agents have on the impossibility
results, and what impact does the assumption on the type set have? To address these
questions we will develop a general framework in the subsequent section.
1.4 The model
Consumers. There is a nite set of consumers, I = {1, ..., n}. The preferences of
consumer i are represented by the utility function
ui(θi, qi, ti) = v(θi, qi)− ti ,
where qi denotes i’s consumption of a public or private good and the function v gives
the utility of consumption. It depends on a preference parameter θi that belongs to a
nite ordered set of possible preference parameters Θi = {θ0i , θ1i , ..., θsi }, with θ0i < θ1i ,
etc. for every i ∈ I . The monetary payment of consumer i is denoted by ti.
The function v is assumed to have the following properties. Zero consumption gives
zero utility: for all θi ∈ Θ, v(θi, 0) = 0. The lowest type does not benet from con-
sumption: for all qi, v(θ0i , qi) = 0,∀ i ∈ I . For all other types, the marginal benet
from increased consumption is positive and decreasing, so that for all θi > θ0i and all qi,
v2(θi, qi) > 0
4 and v22(θi, qi) ≤ 0. The marginal benet of consumption is increasing in
the individual’s type, so that θ′i ≥ θi implies that v2(θ′i, qi) ≥ v2(θi, qi).
The consumer privately observes θi. From the perspective of all other agents it is a
random variable with support Θi and probability distribution fi = (f 0i , ..., f si ) where
fi(θi) takes the value f li if θi = θli. The cumulative distribution is given by Fi(θi), such
that Fi(θi) takes the value
∑l
k=0 f
k
i , if θi = θli. The random variables (θi)i∈I are inde-
pendently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). We write θ = (θ1, ..., θn) for a vector of all
consumers’ taste parameters and θ−i for a vector that lists all taste parameters except θi.
Producers. There is a set of producers, J = {1, ...,m}. Each producer contributes to
the supply of a public or private good. The contribution of producer j is denoted by yj
and comes with production costs k(δj, yj), where δj is a cost characteristic of rm j that
belongs to the nite ordered set ∆j = {δ1j , ..., δrj} of possible technology parameters.
We assume that δ1j < δ2j etc. ∀ j ∈ J . The prot of producer j is given by
pij(δj, rj, yj) = rj − k(δj, yj) ,
where rj is producer j’s revenue, or, equivalently, a monetary payment to producer j.
4The index 2 denotes the partial derivative with respect to the second argument; v2(θi, qi) = ∂v(θi,qi)∂qi .
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The function k is assumed to have the following properties. Zero production is cost-
less: for all δj ∈ ∆j , k(δj, 0) = 0. The marginal costs from increased production is
positive and increasing, so that for all δj and all yj , k2(δj, yj) > 0 and k22(δj, yj) ≥ 0.
The marginal cost of production is increasing in the rm’s type, so that δ′j ≥ δj implies
that k2(δ′j, yj) ≥ k2(δj, yj).
The technology parameter δj is privately observed by producer j. From the perspec-
tive of all other agents, it is a random variable with support ∆j and probability distri-
bution pj = (p1j , ..., prj) where pj(δj) that takes the value plj if δj = δlj . The cumulative
distribution is given by Pj(δj), such that Pj(δj) takes the value
∑l−1
k=1 p
k
j if δj = δlj . The
random variables (δj)j∈J are i.i.d. We write δ = (δ1, ..., δm) for a vector of technology
parameters and δ−j for a vector that lists all technology parameters except δj .
The consumers’ preference parameters and the rms’ cost parameters are taken to
to be independent random variables. We will also refer to a vector (θ, δ) that lists all
taste and cost parameters as a state of the economy. The set of all states is given by
(Θni )i∈I × (∆mj )j∈J .
Social choice functions/ Direct Mechanisms. A social choice function or direct
mechanism consists of a consumption and a payment rule for each consumer i and a
production and revenue rule for each producer j. The consumption rule is a function
qi : Θ
n ×∆m 7→ R+, that assigns to each state of the economy a consumption level for
consumer i. Analogously, ti : Θn ×∆m 7→ R species i’s payment as a function of the
state of the economy. The production and revenue rule for producer j are, respectively,
given by yj : Θn ×∆m 7→ R+ and rj : Θn ×∆m 7→ R.
A social choice function is implementable as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if there is a
game with Bayes-Nash equilibrium, so that the equilibrium allocation of this game co-
incides in each state of the economy with the allocation stipulated by the social choice
function. For the given setup, the revelation principle holds, so that we can without loss
of generality limit attention to the implementation of a social choice function via a di-
rect mechanism that induces a game in which truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we say that a social choice function is incentive-compatible if truth-telling is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism.
Incentive-compatibility. Incentive-compatibility for consumer i holds, provided that
for each θli ∈ Θi and for all θki ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θki | θli, qi(θ−i, θki ))− T (θki ) , (ICC)
where V (θki | θli, qi(θ−i, θki )) := E(θ−i,δ)
[
v(θli, qi(θ−i, θ
k
i , δ))
]
is the expected consump-
tion utility for type θli of consumer i in case of announcing θki to the mechanism designer,
given that all other consumers and producers reveal their preferences and technologies.
Analogously, T (θki ) := E(θ−i,δ)
[
ti(θ−i, θki , δ)
]
is i’s expected payment in case of reporting
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a preference parameter θki . The expectations operatorE(θ−i,δ) indicates that expectations
are computed with respect to the random variable (θ−i, δ). By contrast, the realization
of θi is known when computing this expectation.
Likewise, incentive-compatibility for rm j requires that for all δlj ∈ ∆j and for all
δkj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δkj )−K(δkj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δkj )) , (ICF )
whereR(δkj ) := E(θ,δ−j)
[
rj(θ, δ−j, δkj )
]
is j’s expected revenue in case of reporting a cost
parameter δkj , and K(δkj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δkj )) := E(θ,δ−j)[k(δl, yj(θ, δ−j, δkj ))] is the expected
cost for type δlj of rm j in case of announcing δkj to the mechanism designer.
Participation Constraints. We will assume that social choice functions have to respect
a lower bound on the utility that consumers realize and the prots that are realized by
producers. Formally, we require that for all i and for all θli ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ ui , (PCC)
where ui denotes a lower bound for the expected utility of consumer i. Likewise, for all
j and δlj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ pij , (PCF )
where pij is a lower bound for the expected prot of rm j.
The interpretation of these participation constraints depends on the application at
hand. For instance, we may think that the implementation of the given social choice
function replaces a status quo outcome and moreover requires a unanimous consent of
all consumers and producers. In this case, ui and pij would, respectively, be interpreted as
consumer i’s and producer j’s payo in the status quo. Alternatively, in a model in which
a government has coercive power, such a consent may not be needed but producers may
have the possibility to shut down, so that a social choice function has to provide them at
least with the level of prots that they would realize in this case. By choosing ui and pij
arbitrarily small, we can also capture situations for which participation constraints are
irrelevant.
Physical constraints. For many applications we assume that the consumers’ consump-
tion is bounded by the total output that is made available by the producers. Denote total
output by Y (θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ). If we consider an allocation problem involving pri-
vate goods, then it has to be the case that, for all (δ, θ),
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) ≤ Y (θ, δ). If the
good is non-rival and non-excludable then, for all i and all (δ, θ), qi(δ, θ) = Y (δ, θ). If
the good is non-rival, but excludable, then, for all i and all (δ, θ), 0 ≤ qi(δ, θ) ≤ Y (δ, θ).
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We capture all these cases by postulating that, for all (θ, δ),
(qi(θ, δ))i∈I ∈ Λ(Y (δ, θ)) , (1.5)
where Λ(Y (δ, θ)) is an abstract consumption set. Its structure depends on whether the
goods in question are public or private.
Budget balance. We often assume that a social choice function has to satisfy a budget
constraint, which requires that the consumers’ expected payments suce to cover the
producers’ expected revenues,
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
. (1.6)
An alternative that we will also consider is that the consumer’s expected payments have
to be sucient to cover the producer’s expected costs, i.e.,
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
≥ E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
. (1.7)
The budget condition in (1.6) is relevant in models in which producers have private
information. The budget condition in (1.7) is employed in models in which the producers’
cost functions are assumed to be publicly known information and in which prots in the
hands of producers are considered undesirable. Since there is no private information
there is also no impediment to reaching an outcome with zero expected prots, i.e., with
E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
rj(θ, δ)
]
= E(θ,δ)
[
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
However, as we will see below, such an outcome is out of reach if producers have private
information and if their participation in the system is voluntary so that pij(δj, rj, yj) ≥
pij , for all j.
These budget conditions allow for the possibility that there are decits in some states
of the economy and surpluses in others, provided that, in expectation, the surpluses are
at least as large as the decits. Thus, it is more permissive than having a separate bud-
get balance condition for each state of the economy. There are various justications
for working with this permissive notion of budget balance. First, for many applications
of the independent private values model, the following proposition holds true: if there
is a social choice function that is incentive-compatible, respects the relevant participa-
tion constraints and budget balance in expectation, there is an ’equivalent’ social choice
function that satises in addition a state-wise requirement of budget balance, see Börg-
ers and Norman (2009). Second, a requirement of budget balance in expectation may be
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justied with an appeal to the Law of Large Numbers.5 If the numbers of consumers and
producers is large, the discrepancy between budget balance in expectation and budget
balance for each state separately becomes small, see Bierbrauer (2011). Finally, many
analyses of the independent private values model have established impossibility results,
see Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) or Mailath and Postlewaite (1990). If there is no
social choice function that satises budget balance in expectation, then there is also no
social choice function that gives rise to budget balance in each state separately. Thus,
for the purpose of establishing an impossibility result, working with the requirement of
budget balance in expectation can be a useful modeling device.
Surplus measures. The total expected surplus that is generated by a social choice
function is given by
S((qi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) = E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
In a model with quasi-linear preferences, a social choice function is Pareto ecient
if and only if the relevant budget constraint holds as an equality, the participation con-
straints in (PCC) and (PCF ) are satised and (qi)i∈I , and (yj)j∈J are chosen so as to
maximize total surplus S((qi)i∈I , (yj)j∈J) subject to the constraint of physical feasibility
in (1.5). Note that there are typically many dierent Pareto ecient social choice func-
tions. While the criterion of surplus-maximization pins down the functions (qi)i∈I and
(yj)j∈J , alternative specications of the payment and revenue rules (ti)i∈I and (rj)j∈J
give rise to dierent distributions of the surplus among consumers and producers.
1.5 Implementable provision rules
Before we turn to the question under which conditions ecient outcomes can be ob-
tained, we will provide, as a preliminary step, a characterization of the set of imple-
mentable social choice functions, i.e., social choice functions with the property that there
exists a direct mechanism that is incentive compatible, satises participation constraints,
and is budgetary and physically feasible.
We begin by deriving a necessary and a sucient condition for a social choice function
to be implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
1.5.1 Necessary condition
The following proposition states a necessary condition for the possibility to implement a
social choice function. More specically, it states an inequality constraint so that, if this
5See e.g. Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985).
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inequality is violated, we know that there is no mechanism that satises the incentive
compatibility constraints in (ICC) and (ICF ), participation constraints in (PCC) and
(PCF ), and the expected budget constraint in (1.6).
Proposition 1.3.
{
(qi)
n
i=1, (yj)
m
j=1
}
is part of an implementable social choice function
only if6
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
A proof of the Proposition is in part 1.B of the Appendix. The social choice function
can be split into a transfer and consumption rule for consumers and a revenue and pro-
duction rule for producers. We begin by holding xed consumers’ consumption rule and
derive the maximal transfers that consumers are able to make if incentive compatibility
and participation constraints need to be both respected at the same time. Similarly, we
hold xed rms’ production rule and derive the minimal revenues that rms are will-
ing to accept if again incentive compatibility and participation constraints need to be
respected. We then check whether consumers maximal transfers cover rms’ minimal
revenues. If the mechanism is unable to generate consumer payments that are high
enough to cover the minimal revenue of provision, then there is no mechanism that
reaches eciency.
We make use of techniques used in the non-linear pricing literature (see e.g. Mussa
and Rosen (1978)). We consider the relaxed problem of maximizing consumers’ transfers
subject to the local downward incentive compatibility constraints and the participation
constraints for the lowest preference type. The local downward incentive compatibil-
ity constraints prevent type θli of consumer i to announce the next lower type to the
mechanism designer. Hence, only a subset of consumers’ incentive compatibility and
participation constraints are taken into account. Thus, the maximal transfers that can
be obtained at the solution to the relaxed problem, is an upper bound on the transfers
that can be obtained if all incentive compatibility constraints are taken into account. We
then show that the maximal transfers are given by the left-hand-side of the inequality
constraint in Proposition 1.3 above.
Similarly, we solve a relaxed problem on the production side, to dene the minimal
revenues rms need to receive, where the local upward incentive compatibility con-
straints and the participation constraints of the worst technology type δr are taken into
6Note that the following expressing entails components that are not dened, i.e. θs+1i δ0j . This is not
problematic as they are weighted with zero.
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consideration. As under consumer transfer maximization, only a subset of rms’ incen-
tive compatibility constraints is considered, so that the minimal revenues that need to be
generated at the solution to the relaxed problem, is a lower bound on the revenues that
can be generated if all incentive compatibility constraints are taken into account. If we
plug the maximal transfers and the minimal revenues in the requirement of the budget
constraint in (1.6), we obtain the inequality in Proposition 1.3 above.
For the derivation of the necessary condition in Proposition 1.3, we did not assume
that the utility function ui and the prot function pij are dierentiable. Neither did we
need to assume, that qi and yj are monotonic. In contrast to a model that assumes the
set of possible types for all agents to be innite, we can avoid such assumptions on
endogenous objects.
1.5.2 Sufficient condition
The next proposition establishes a sucient condition for the implementability of a so-
cial choice function. For this purpose, we consider only a subset of all provision and
production rules, namely those that satisfy the following monotonicity conditions: For
every i,
q(θli, θ−i, δ) ≥ q(θki , θ−i, δ) for θli > θki , θi ∈ Θi , (1.8)
i.e., consumption must be monotonically increasing in θi for every consumer i. For every
j,
y(δlj, δ−j, θ) ≥ y(δkj , δ−j, θ) for δlj < δkj , δj ∈ ∆j , (1.9)
i.e., rm j’s contribution to production must be monotonically decreasing in δj .
Ecient mechanisms satisfy these monotonicity conditions. Thus, as long as we limit
ourselves to surplus-maximizing provision rules, the assumptions on monotonicity are
not restrictive.
Proposition 1.4. Let the monotonicity constraints in (1.8) and (1.9) be satised, then we
can implement the social choice function if7
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
Suppose that the condition in Proposition 1.4 holds. We need to show that we can
construct a payment scheme that satises all relevant constraints. We can choose our
transfer and revenue scheme such that they solve the relaxed problems that we studied
in the proof of Proposition 1.3. After that, we need to verify that the transfer and revenue
7This is also true if the less demanding weak monotonicity condition holds instead of condition (1.8) and
(1.9). See equation (WM) and (wm) in the appendix for a denition.
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schemes, which solve the relaxed problems, satisfy not only the local downward incen-
tive compatibility constraints of consumers and the local upward incentive compatibility
constraints of rms, but all consumers’ and rms’ incentive compatibility constraints.
We prove that the fact that all local downward incentive compatibility constraints of
consumers are binding, together with the monotonicity constraints of consumption, im-
plies that all incentive compatibility constraints are satised. With that, consumption
is ecient for the consumer of highest type and distorted downwards for all other con-
sumers. And similarly, production is ecient for the rm of lowest costs and distorted
upwards for all other rms.
Denition 1.1. We dene the minimal subsidy (MS(·)) as
MS((qi)i∈I ,(yj)j∈J) :=
n∑
i=1
ui −
m∑
j=1
pij
− E(θ,δ)
 n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj , yj(θ, δ))
 S(·)
+ E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
−
m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
p(δlj){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)


IR(·)
Under the monotonicity constraints (1.8) and (1.9), the minimal subsidy gives the
amount of money that is required from an outside party to satisfy Proposition 1.4.8 Apart
from the reservation utilities and prots, it consists of two components: the rst compo-
nent is surplus S(·), given by the dierence of consumers’ valuations and rms’ costs.
The second component IR(·) is the dierence of consumers’ and rms’ information
rents. In an environment with complete information, the maximal transfer a consumer
i is is willing to pay is his true valuation. With private information about preferences,
however, the transfers are decreased by the hazard rate expression
∑s
l=1 f(θ
l
i){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))−
v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}1−F (θi)f(θi) . That is why these hazard rate expressions are often interpreted as
information rents. Similarly, for rms, the virtual costs account for the private informa-
tion. The revenues, rms would accept in an environment with complete information,
are increased by an information rent.
1.5.3 Efficiency
In the previous section, we have been concerned with deriving conditions such that
social choice functions could be implemented in an environment where agents’ have
8This notion follows Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), who call the amount that would be required
from an outside party to overcome the impossibility result minimal lump-sum subsidy.
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private information about their preferences and costs, respectively. Now, we focus on
the welfare evaluation of implementable social choice functions.
Corollary 1.1. A mechanism that maximizes surplus S(θ, δ), in the following denoted by{
(q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1
}
, is implementable if and only if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
A necessary condition for the implementability of ((q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1) is that the max-
imal transfers that can be extracted from consumers suce to cover the minimal rev-
enues that the production sector needs to obtain, which means that the minimal subsidy
is negative.
Suciency can be shown by constructing the transfers of consumers such that all
local downward incentive compatibility constraints are binding, and constructing the
revenues of producers such that all local upward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding. Finally, we choose the transfer of the consumer with the lowest preference
parameter such that budget balance is satised and the minimal utilities and resource
requirement is taken into consideration. Then, we obtain a mechanism that achieves
((q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1) and satises all relevant constraints stated in Corollary 1.1.
From Corollary 1.1, it follows immediately that when participation constraints can be
violated, a social choice function can be implemented eciently. The minimal subsidy
can be decreased without limit. This is an alternative proof of the possibility results
obtained by D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979).
The following Corollary shows how the second-best mechanism can be derived.
Corollary 1.2. The second-bestmechanism, in the following denoted by ((q∗∗i )ni=1, (y∗∗j )mj=1),
can be found by maximizing S(θ, δ) subject to
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij
and the monotonicity constraints in (1.8) and (1.9).
In the solution to the second-best problem, the budget condition has to be binding.
Otherwise, expected consumer transfers can be reduced without violating any of the
incentive compatibility and participation constraints. The provision rule that solves
the second-best problem satises the monotonicity constraints for all consumers and all
rms. This follows because the optimal provision level is given by the rst-order con-
dition where the sum of virtual marginal valuation equals the sum of virtual marginal
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costs. The assumption that hazard rates are non-decreasing for consumers implies that
virtual valuation is increasing in consumer i’s type, and the assumption that the mono-
tone hazard rate is non-increasing for rms implies that virtual costs are increasing in
the cost type.
Continuous types. To study whether a model with a large but discrete number of types
behaves approximately in the same way as a model with continuum types, we state the
expression for the minimal subsidy for continuous type distributions. We know from
the literature (compare e.g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995) that for a surplus maximizing mech-
anism
{
(q∗i )
n
i=1, (y
∗
j )
m
j=1
}
in a continuous environment, implementability is possible if
the constraint in the following Remark is satised. It is based on the assumption that
functions are continuously dierentiable.
Remark 1. Suppose that qi and yj are continuously dierentiable functions. Then a mech-
anism that maximizes S(θ, δ), is implementable if and only if
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))−
∫ θsi
θ0i
f(θi)v1(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
dθi
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) +
∫ δrj
δ1j
p(δj)k1(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ))
P (δj)
p(δj)
dδj
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
(1.10)
The dierences, in comparison to Corollary 1.1, are that {v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))−v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
and {k(δlj, y∗j (θ, δ))−k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))} are replaced by the derivatives v1(θi, q∗i (θ, δ)) and
k1(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)), respectively. Therefore, the dierentiability assumption is crucial with
a continuum of types.
1.6 Comparative statics I: From few to many agents
We use our results in Proposition 1.3 and 1.4 to obtain a more systematic understanding
of how a change in the parameters of the model aects the possibility to implement
ecient social choice functions. Again, we will check whether our results depend on
whether the allocation problem involves private or public goods.
1.6.1 Possibility results when the type set is binary
Bilateral trade. We have shown on Section 1.3.1 that parameter constellations can be
found such that ecient bilateral trade is possible. In order to investigate what drives
this possibility result, we make some simplifying assumptions.
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Assumption 1.1. All agents have a binary type set.9
Under Assumption 1.1, the buyer’s marginal valuation can be high or low, Θ = {θL, θH},
and the seller’s marginal costs can take two values, ∆ = {δL, δH}. We denote the re-
spective probabilities by Prob(θ = θL) = fL, Prob(θ = θH) = fH = 1 − fL and
Prob(δ = δL) = pL, Prob(δ = δH) = pH = 1− pL.
Assumption 1.2. (Symmetry) The distance between the low type and the high type is the
same for buyer and seller, θH − θL = δH − δL.10 The probability of a high valuation buyer
is equal to the probability of a low cost seller fH = pL and therefore fL = pH .
Analogously to the continuous environment of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), where
[θL, θH ]∩ [δL, δH ] 6= ∅ and [θL, θH ] 6= [δL, δH ], we assume that the parameter constella-
tion is such that δL < θL < δH < θH , with the normalization δL = 0 and θH = 1. The
social choice function f is ecient if and only if q(θ, δ) = y(θ, δ), q(θ, δ) satises
qf (θ, δ) =

0, if θ < δ ,
∈ {0, 1} if θ = δ ,
1, if θ > δ ,
and E(θ,δ)[tf (θ, δ)] = E(θ,δ)[rf (θ, δ)].
Observation 1.1. Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are satised and consider the direct
mechanism for f . There is a social choice function, which is ecient, implementable as
Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields a non-negative material payo for every type of agent
if and only if
fL(θH − δL) + (θL − δH) > 0 ⇔ fL > δH − θL .
The proof of this Observation and all following Observations can be found in Ap-
pendix 1.E. It provides a sucient condition for the possibility to reach ecient bilateral
trade. Specically, the condition states that the probability of the low valuation buyer,
respectively on the high cost seller, needs to be bigger than the ratio that measures the
overlap of buyer’s and seller’s type sets (δH − θL), relative to the whole type set that we
normalized to 1 (θH − δL = 1). We call this ratio in the following d,
d :=
δH − θL
θH − δL = δ
H − θL .
The bigger the ratio d, the bigger is the overlap of buyer’s and seller’s type sets. If
d = 0, the type sets of buyer and seller are disjunct, and ecient trade is always possible,
9Without loss of generality, we specify the binary type set, in the following, as consisting of a low and
high type, where the high type exceeds the low type.
10We assume that Θ ⊆ R and ∆ ⊆ R, such that ’distance’ is well-dened by the Euclidean metric.
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regardless of the probability distribution. On the other hand, the maximum of d is given
by 1, where the type sets of the buyer and the seller are congruent.
To understand what drives the possibility result above, it is instructive to look at the
proof of Observation 1.1. By Proposition 1.4, we know that ecient bilateral trade is
possible if the minimal subsidy is negative. Given that trade is ecient for all states of
the economy but when the low valuation buyer faces the high cost seller, we have three
states of the economy that need to be evaluated, and weighted with the probability of
occurrence.
Figure 1.2: Minimal subsidy for a binary type set
In the following we do comparative statics for dierent components of the model. As
a rst exercise, we x the probability of the low valuation buyer and the high cost seller
fL and vary the ratio d. Without loss of generality, we keep the normalization of the
whole type set, so that θH − δL = 1. In order to change d, the position of θL and δH can
be varied. By Assumption 1.2, θH − θL = δH − δL, so that a shift from the low valuation
buyer to the left goes hand in hand with a move of the high cost seller to the right, and
vice versa, as the following Figure illustrates.
Figure 1.3: Changing parameters in the bilateral trade setting
0 = δL δH
θL θH = 1
d
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Observation 1.2. Suppose we move the types as in Figure 1.3 above, such that d is in-
creased. This aects the minimal subsidy via the expected information rents and the ex-
pected surplus, where
∂IR(·)
∂d
> 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂d
< 0 .
For types outside the overlap, ecient trade takes place – independent of the op-
ponent’s type, i.e., the private information of the other party does not matter for the
decision whether trade takes place. This means, that the two-sided private information
only matters in the overlap. Thus, d can be understood as a measure for the importance
of two-sided private information. The rst eect depends on the distance of types for
each player. If d increases, higher expected information rents need to be paid under the
new parameter constellation, since the distance of high and low types increases for both
players. This has a negative eect on the possibility to achieve ecient trade, and there-
fore yields a negative information rent eect. Second, if d increases, the expected surplus
decreases, i.e., we have a negative surplus eect. Further, the average valuation for the
good goes down relative to the average costs if d is increased. Therefore, expected sur-
plus decreases, which has a negative eect on the possibility to achieve ecient trade.
Thus, an increase of d decreases expected surplus and increases expected information
rents. It is hence more costly to achieve eciency.11
Next, consider the situation where for a given d and fL implementation is possible.
We x the ratio that measures the overlap d and analyze how varying the probability fL
aects implementability.
Observation 1.3. Suppose d is xed and the probability fL is increased. This aects the
minimal subsidy via the expected information rents and the expected surplus, where
∂IR(·)
∂fL
< 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂fL
< 0 .
Incentive compatibility constraints are binding for the high valuation buyer and the
low cost seller, and slack for the other types. Hence, if fL increases, we will have to
pay less individuals information rents. This has a positive eect on the possibility to
achieve ecient trade. Second, we nd that the surplus eect is negative if θH − δH =
θL−δL < 1
2
. Since we start our analysis in a situation where implementation is possible,
we know that this conditions always holds. Thus, the increase of fL has an unambiguous
negative eect on implementability since it lowers the expected surplus. Intuitively, the
11Whenever we write ecient implementation gets more costly, we mean the following: if we compare
two sets that represent the tuples of fL and d, for which ecient trade is possible, the set for which
eciency is more costly is a subset of the other. Analogously for the case where eciency is less costly
to achieve.
27
Chapter 1 On the independent private values model - A unied approach
expected surplus decreases since we expect more low valuation buyers, respectively high
cost sellers. Overall, an increases in fL increases the minimal subsidy, and thus has a
negative eect on the possibility to reach ecient trade: by Observation 1.1, we know
that an increase of fL makes it less costly to achieve ecient trade. Therefore, when
fL is increased, the reduction in expected information rents is bigger than the reduction
in expected surplus, so that an increase of fL makes it less costly to achieve eciency.
The intuition for this result is that there is more mass on the types that do not receive
an information rent. Overall, the eect of an increase in fL on the minimal subsidy is
negative such that implementation gets less costly.
Figure 1.4: Possibility of ecient trade
d
fL
1
1
fL = 0.5
d = 0.8
By assumption, fL and d are bounded by 0 and 1. If fL is for example xed at 0.5, then the distance
between the high cost seller and the low valuation buyer needs to be lower than 0.5 in order to
achieve ecient trade. And if the distance is for example xed at d = 0.8, then the probability of
the low type buyer, respectively the high cost seller, needs to be higher than 0.8 to get a possibility
result.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the interplay of the expected surplus eect and the expected infor-
mation rent eect on the possibility of ecient bilateral trade. The grey shaded area T0
gives every combination of fL and d, such that, ecient trade is possible,
T0 =
{
(fL, d) : fL > d =
δH − θL
θH − δL
}
.
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PublicGood. Given Assumption 1.1 holds, a social choice function f ′ species whether
the public good is provided qf ′(θ1, θ2), and the accompanying transfers tf
′
1 (θ1, θ2) and
tf
′
2 (θ1, θ2). Pareto ecient public good provision requires
qf
′
(θ1, θ2) =

0, if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi < c ,
∈ {0, 1} if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi = c ,
1, if 1
n
∑n
i=1 θi > c .
and E(θ)[tf
′
1 (θ1, θ2) + t
f ′
2 (θ1, θ2)] = 2c E(θ)[qf
′
(θ)] for all (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ.
The following Observation highlights that if there are just two consumers, then e-
cient implementation of the public good will be possible for some parameter constella-
tions.
Observation 1.4. Suppose Assumption 1.1 is satised, the per capita costs are such that
θL < c < θH , and consider the direct mechanism for f ′. There is a social choice function
which is ecient, implementable as Bayes Nash equilibrium, and it yields non-negative
utility for every type of consumer if and only if
fL − c− θ
L
θH − c > 0 .
Observation 1.4 provides a sucient condition for ecient public good provision.
Following the proof of Observation 1.4, the public good can be provided eciently, if
and only if consumers’ expected transfers cover the costs of public good provision, so
that the minimal subsidy is negative
MS = −
[θH − c− fL(c− θL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(·)
− (1− fL)(θH − θL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR(·)
 < 0 .
The rst term denotes expected surplus, depending on the cost c and the type distri-
bution, whereas the second term describes expected information rents.
In the following, we analyze what drives the possibility to reach ecient public good
provision. Again, we analyze the eect of a change in the type distribution fL and a
change in the cost parameters c and split the resulting eects into the expected surplus
and the expected information rent eect.
Observation 1.5. Suppose Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold.
i) Suppose further that fL is xed, then ∂S(·)
∂c
< 0 .
ii) Suppose further that c is xed, then
∂IR(·)
∂fL
< 0 , and
∂S(·)
∂fL
< 0 .
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When costs are increased, this does not aect the information rents of the agents, but
lowers the expected surplus. Higher per capita costs imply that in expectation, the share
of beneting types reduces compared to the share of suering types. This means that
for higher c, the average valuation for the public good decreases compared to the xed
per capita costs.
If c is xed, a change in fL aects the minimal subsidy in two ways. First, the expected
surplus decreases if fL increases. This has a negative eect on the possibility of ecient
public good provision. And second, for the expected information rents, we nd, that
if fL increases, we have to pay in expectation less agents an information rent. This
means, the higher the probability for low valuation consumers, the lower the expected
information rent term and the higher the possibility for ecient public good provision,
ceteris paribus. As we can see in Observation 1.4, the reduced expected information rent
eect dominates the negative expected surplus eect, such that an increase in fL makes
it less costly to provide the public good eciently, i.e., the minimal subsidy decreases.
Comparison. When a binary type set and two agents are considered, ecient bilat-
eral trade and ecient public good provision are possible when parameters are chosen
appropriately. Further, when the average valuation for the private or public good is in-
creased, it gets cheaper to achieve eciency, in the sense that the minimal subsidy goes
down. To understand the dierence between private and public goods, we study how
the increase in the number of the agents aects the minimal subsidy.
1.6.2 Many agents
The classical bilateral trade setting has one buyer and one seller. To that extent Obser-
vation 1.1 is not restrictive. Contrary, the impossibility result in the public good setting
is studied for a large economy, with many individuals. In the following, we want to an-
alyze these impossibility results under the assumption that the type set of individuals
remains binary.
Public good. Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) show that ecient public good provision
is impossible when the number of individuals goes to innity. The following Proposition
shows that the assumption of continuous type sets has no impact on this impossibility
result. Even for a binary type set, ecient public good provision is impossible if the
number of individuals grows without limit.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Consider the public good example and
an economy with n individuals. For any sequence of incentive-compatible mechanisms
(q, tn1 , . . . , t
n
n),
limn7→∞E(θ)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
tni (θ)
]
= 0 .
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As n→∞, the probability of public good provision converges to 0 if c > θL, and converges
to 1 otherwise.
According to Proposition 1.5, the per capita revenue from individuals’ contribution
goes to zero. That is, with many individuals, any social choice function, which is at-
tainable when voluntary participation needs to be guaranteed, prescribes a public good
provision level that is equal to 0. Even if the average valuation for the public good is
larger than the per capita costs, the amount that is implemented is almost equal to 0,
although the ecient amount is almost equal to 1.
The reason for the impossibility result is that, for n → ∞, any individual’s impact
on the public good provision becomes negligible. The free-rider problem in public good
provision becomes extreme as the number of individuals becomes large. Since no indi-
vidual is pivotal for the production of the public good, incentive compatibility implies
that all individuals have to make the same lump-sum transfer that does not depend on
their announced preference intensity. Participation constraints imply that this lump-
sum transfer must not exceed θL. Thus, the aggregate of all individuals’ transfers is as
if every individual has a low valuation for the public good. This makes it impossible to
cover the costs of public good provision. Hence, for the impossibility result, the assump-
tion that the type set is discrete has no impact. Remember that Proposition 1.2 states that
public good provision is as well not possible under the assumption of a continuous type
set when the number of individuals goes to innity.
Private good. Consider a nite economy with I = {1, . . . n} buyers and J = {1, . . . n}
sellers. Buyers and sellers have equivalent binary type sets with the corresponding prob-
ability distributions (fLi , fHi ) and (pLj , pHj ).12 The agents face a price ρ ∈ [θLi , δHi ]. As we
have seen in previous sections, there exist parameter constellations and probability dis-
tributions, where trade does not take place. Now, we assume that the number of agents
grows without limits, i.e., n −→ ∞. The Law of Large Numbers applies, and probabili-
ties can be interpreted as cross-sectional distribution of types. In particular, this means
that for large economies one knows with probability 1, that there exist high type buy-
ers with a share of fHi , and low type sellers, with a share of pLj = fHi . For these agents,
trade always takes place. This proves the existence of trade in large economies for prices
ρ ∈ [θLi , δHi ] if agents have binary type sets.13
Gresik and Satterhwaite (1989) additionally show that trade in large economies is ef-
cient – ex-ante and ex-post – holding the ratio of buyer and seller xed. Further, they
provide results on the rate of convergence to the competitive equilibrium.
Comparison. When private and public goods are compared for economies with many
agents, we see that ecient public good provision is impossible when the number of con-
12fHi , f
L
i , p
H
j , p
L
j > 0,∀ i, j.
13This argument holds independently of whether the type set is nite or innite.
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sumers is large. Contrary, for the private good model ecient bilateral trade is possible
if there are many agents. The impossibility result of Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) is
thus stronger than the impossibility result of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in the
sense that it extends to any model with a discrete set of types.
1.7 Comparative Statics II: From few to many types
This section shows that the minimal subsidy for a discrete type set with a large num-
ber of types converges to the minimal subsidy for a continuous type set environment.
We proceed as follows: we rst show how one additional type aects the implemen-
tation rule for private and public goods and add a third type for each agent. To study
the changes of an increased number of types separately from changes in the number of
agents, we hold the number of agents xed in this section. Second, we consider the situ-
ation where the number of types gets larger and larger and study general convergence.
We provide conditions that need to be met for the convergence result and discuss how
violating these conditions aects our analysis.
1.7.1 Introducing a third type.
Bilateral trade. In the following, we consider what happens if we add step-by-step
new types in rounds to agents’ type sets of the pre-round. Thereby, we do not move the
existing types, but add new types ’between’ them.14 If the procedure of adding types
fullls two conditions we call it ’uniform extension’.
Denition 1.2. (Uniform Extension) Consider the agent sets I and J , fully ordered
nite type sets Θ0i = {θL0i, . . . , θH0i}, #Θ0i <∞, ∀ i ∈ I , ∆0j = {δL0j, . . . , δH0j}, #∆0j <
∞,∀ j ∈ J and the respective probabilities, such that fL0i + · · ·+ fH0i = 1 and pL0j + · · ·+
pH0j = 1. We add nitely many new types in every round k to every agent’s type set, such
that for every new type θki and δkj , it holds that θL0i < θki < θ
H
0i and δ
L
0j, < δkj < δ
H
0j ,
respectively. We call this procedure uniform extension if there exists a round K < ∞15
such that for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J
• ΘKi = [θL0i, θH0i ] and ∆Kj = [δL0j, δH0j].16
• For every θki ∈ Θki and δkj ∈ ∆kj , it holds that fi(θki) and p(δkj) are monotonically
decreasing from round to round.
The rst property assures, that there is round K from which on, there are no neigh-
bored types that have a distance of more than an , which can be arbitrary small. That
14Since we consider fully ordered type sets, ’between’ is well-dened.
15This does not have to be the same K for producers and consumers or each individual. In such a case,
round K as used here, is the maximum of all those.
16 The closure of a set A is dened as A = A ∪ {limn an, an ∈ A} .
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this is crucial to achieve implementability in the limit can be seen in the section coun-
terexamples later on.
We start in a situation with a binary type set, see Section 1.3, and call this setting ’round
0’. Successively, we add new types and index the new situations by round numbers
k = 1, 2, . . . . Exemplary we calculate the new ecient trade possibility condition for
’round 1’, i.e., there are three types for the buyer and the seller. Hence, the buyer has
the extended type set Θ1 = {θL1 , θM1 , θH1 }, and the seller has the extended type set
∆1 = {δL1 , δM1 , δH1 }.17 Without loss of generality, we add the new types according to
the following procedure and call it uniform extension type I.
Denition 1.3. (Uniform Extension Type I) Consider given agent sets I0 and J0, for
which every agent i ∈ I0 has the same nite type set Θ0i and for which every agent j ∈ J0
has the same nite type set∆0j . The probabilities assigned to the possible types of any agent
sum up to 1. This situation is called round 0. In every round k = 1, 2, . . . nitely many
new types are added to each agents’ type set. Thereby, new types θki and δkj are positioned
at the center between adjacent types from round k = 0, . . . , k − 1 .
In the following, we start with round 0, which is given by I0 = 1 and J0 = 1 and the
type sets Θ0 = {θL, θH} and ∆0 = {δL, δH} and the respective probabilities, such that
fL0 + f
H
0 = 1.18
Continuing, new types are introduced,in every ’round k’, in the middle of the sub-
intervals of type sets that existed already by ’round k − 1’. With this procedure, the
continuous type interval is approached, such that the rst condition in Denition 1.2
is fullled. Since the probability of an existing type cannot increase, both conditions
of Denition 1.2 are fullled. We consider the case where the introduced third type is
positioned such that θM1 > δH1 .19
Figure 1.5: Three buyer and seller types
0 = δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1 = 1
δM1
θM1
We can now derive which condition needs to be satised in order achieve ecient
bilateral trade when the buyer and the seller have an extended type set with three types.
Applying Proposition 1.4, the following Observation shows a condition for reaching ef-
cient bilateral trade.
17Since I = 1 and J = 1, we drop the indices that label the agent for ease of notation.
18Remember that by Assumption 1.2, fL = pH and fH = pL and analogously for every round k.
19The case where θM1 < δH1 can be found in Appendix 1.E.
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Observation 1.6. Without loss of generality, suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.5. For
the ’Uniform Extension Type I’ in ’round 1’, there is a social choice function which is e-
cient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields non-negative material payo
for every type of player if and only if
fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
⇔
1
2
fL1
1 + 1
2
fL1
> d .
d still denotes δH−θL
θH−δL and did not change from ’round 0’ to ’round 1’. For the purpose
of illustration, assume that every type has equal probability: In ’round 0’ with a binary
type set, the condition in Observation 1.1 states that 1
2
> d. After adding a third type,
Observation 1.6 states that ecient bilateral trade is possible if 1
7
> d. So, even for only
one additional type, the possibility condition for ecient trade gets more restrictive.
As for the binary type set, the minimal subsidy is important to evaluate whether e-
cient trade is possible. It is decisive, for which states of the economy trade takes place,
i.e., for which combinations of buyer and seller types trade should take place, so that
q∗(θ, δ) = 1. From Observation 1.6 we know that the high type buyer and the low type
seller are not relevant. Intuitively, this is because even when a buyer with a lower val-
uation, i.e., θM1 , can trade with every possible type of seller, then this is as well true for
high type buyers. By the same logic, the seller with the lowest valuation does not en-
ter the implementability condition. Mathematically, for buyer’s high type (and seller’s
low type), terms of the expected surplus eect and the expected information rent eect
coincide and thus cancel out. Instead, the middle type (which is the lowest types that
can trade with every possible seller) needs to be considered. When subsequent rounds
are considered, we generalize this observation and analyze for which types the expected
surplus eect and the expected information rent eect coincide. We dene the buyer
types and the seller types, for which the eects do not cancel out and thus are relevant
for the evaluation of possibility.
When the type sets Θ1 and ∆1 are considered, expected surplus is given by
S(·) = (θM1 − δM1 )fM1 − d fL1 (fM1 + fH1 ) .
Expected information rents are given by
IR(·) = (fM1 + fH1 )2(θM1 − δM1 + d)− fH1 (θM1 − δM1 ) .
Expected surplus is bigger than expected information rents if
1
2
fL1
1+ 1
2
fL1
> d. This is the
inequality we know from Observation 1.6.
The following Figure illustrates that implementation is more costly, i.e., the minimal
subsidy goes up, if we add types to the setting. The lighter shaded area T0, known from
Figure 1.4, gives the set of tuples (fL, d), for which trade with two types is possible. If
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we add a third type, the set T1 (the darker shaded area) gives the combinations for which
ecient trade is possible, where
T1 =
{
(fL, d) : fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
=
2d
1− d
}
,
so that T1 ⊆ T0.
Given Denition 1.3, we can express the new type θM1 in terms of the types θL1 and θH1 .
Therefore we can compare the sets T0 and T1 in a coordinate system, with axes labelled
d and fL.
Figure 1.6: Bilateral trade – Comparison between ’round 0’ and ’round 1’
d
fL
1
0.5 1
Figure 1.6 implies that if ecient trade is possible in round 1, then it is as well possible in ’round 0’.
The opposite is, however, not true. Imagine that the ratio of overlapping is 0.5 in ’round 0’. Then,
there is no value fL can take, such that ecient bilateral trade is still possible.
Counterexamples. In order to illustrate the importance of Denition 1.2 and 1.3, we
present examples that violate the ’Uniform Extension’ procedure.
Observation 1.7. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.5. Implementation in ’round 1’ is
less costly then in ’round 0’ if
fL1 >
2fL0
1 + fL0
.
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For the purpose of illustration, assume that fL0 = 15 . In ’round 0’ with a binary type set,
Observation 1.1 states that if 1
5
> d, then ecient bilateral trade is possible. Suppose now
that fL1 = 12 , according to Observation 1.7 ecient bilateral is possible if
1
2
> d. Hence,
T1 ⊇ T0. If the probability of the low type increases over rounds, so that the second
condition of Denition 1.2 is violated, then ecient bilateral trade gets less costly. For
this result, the monotone hazard rate assumption plays no role. The probabilities on
types fH1 and fM1 can be chosen such that the monotone hazard rate either holds or is
violated.
Consider next the case, where the introduced third type is positioned such that θM1 <
δM1 .
Figure 1.7: Violating the ’Uniform Extension’ procedure
δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1
δM1
θM1
Applying Proposition 1.4, the following Observation shows a condition for reaching
eciency.
Observation 1.8. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.7. There is a social choice func-
tion which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and yields non-negative
material payo for every type of agent if and only if
fL1 + f
M
1 > d .
Comparing Observation 1.6 with Observation 1.8 illustrates that violating the rst
condition in Denition 1.2 makes it less costly to achieve ecient bilateral trade.
1.7.2 Introducing many types
To understand what leads to the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) impossibility result
when the number of types is getting large, we must analyze the following characteristics
of their model: type sets are closed and connected sets.20 Intuitively, this means that
there are no gaps in the type set. When we add new types, we have to respect this
characteristic of the model and achieve it in the limit.
20A set B is closed if it contains the limit points of every possible sequence xn ∈ B, with xn → x,
for n → ∞. A set B is connected if it cannot be represented as the union of two or more disjoint
non-empty open subsets.
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Denition 1.4. (Uniform Extension Type II) Consider the ’Uniform Extension Type I’
Denition. Additionally, equal probability mass is put on all types, in every round.
Making use of Denition 1.4, we can show that a discrete specication of the model
approaches in the limit the continuous specication of the model.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose Assumption 1.1 holds. Consider the ’Uniform Extension Type
II’ procedure. There is no social choice function which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-
Nash equilibrium and yields non-negativematerial payo for every type of agent if k →∞.
The uniform extension procedure is one way to assure that the discrete specication
of the bilateral trade problem approaches the continuous specication of Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983). In the proof we show that an increase in the number of types leads
to an increase of the minimal subsidy. If suciently many types are introduced, then
there exists a round k < ∞, where the minimal subsidy is positive, i.e., it is impossible
to reach ecient bilateral trade.
Public Good provision. Similar to the bilateral trade problem, the condition relates
the type distribution to the relative position of the per capita costs for the public good.
Therefore, we dene
e =
c− θL
θH − c .
Since θL < c < θH , the per capita costs c split the type set into two sub-intervals: the
rst, where the costs exceed the low valuation, and the second, where the costs lie below
the high valuation. Thus, e is a measure for the net gains of free-riding. If consumer i has
high preferences for the public good, he faces the following trade-o: if he announces
his type truthfully, the public good will be provided for sure but he will have to pay
higher transfers than if he is lying. However, if he understates his preferences, he will
have to pay lower transfers but will risk that the public good will not be provided.
As for the bilateral trade setting, we use Denition 1.3 to show that implementa-
tion is getting more costly when more types are introduced. Analogously to the bi-
lateral trade example, we consider the case where the third type is positioned such that
1
2
(
θL1 + θ
M
1
)
> c.
Figure 1.8: Three consumer types
θL1 θ
H
1c θ
M
1
In order to eciently provide the public good, when there are three consumer types,
the inequality in the following Observation needs to be satised.
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Observation 1.9. Suppose parameters are as in Figure 1.8. There is a social choice function
which is ecient, implementable as Bayes-Nash equilibrium and yields non-negative utility
for every type of consumer, if and only if
fL1 >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
.
As for the private good example, the expected surplus eect for the high valuation
consumer equals the expected information rent eect. Thus, the parameter for the high-
valuation buyer does not show up in Observation 1.9.
The comparison of Observations 1.4 and 1.9 shows that implementation is getting
more costly with three consumer types. Even for one additional type, the possibility
condition for ecient public good provision gets more restrictive. Graphically, a com-
parison of ’round 0’ and ’round 1’ resembles the graphic in the bilateral trade example.
Figure 1.9: Public good – Comparison between ’round 0’ and ’round 1’
e
fL
1
0.25 0.5
The gray shaded area D0 in Figure 1.9 gives every combination of fL and e, such that
the public good is eciently provided, i.e., Observation 1.9 holds,
D0 =
{
(fL, e) : fL > e =
c− θL0
θH0 − c
}
.
Analogously, D1 gives the tuples (fL, e), for which eciency is achieved, if we have
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three possible types,
D1 =
{
(fL, e) : fL >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
=
2e
1− e
}
.
Hence, D1 ⊆ D0.
If we introduce a continuous type set to the public good setting with only two con-
sumers, we can show that ecient public good provision is impossible.
Proposition 1.7. If consumers’ valuation for the public good are independently drawn
from the interval [θL, θH ], then there is no Bayesian incentive compatible social choice func-
tion that is ecient and yields non-negative utility for every type of agent.
The proof is an adaption of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to the public good pro-
vision setting. Comparing Propositions 1.6 and 1.7, we can see that the assumption of a
continuous type set makes both ecient bilateral trade as well as public good provision
impossible. For the latter, the assumption of a large economy is hence not necessary for
the impossibility to reach ecient public good provision.
1.7.3 General convergence
As we have seen in the previous subsections, there exist qualitatively dierent results
concerning implementability in discrete and continuous environments. We analyze now
how the results for discrete settings relate to the results in continuous settings. To an-
swer this question, we reconstruct our given environment, such that we are able to link
discrete and continuous environments technically and can specify how the respective
implementation conditions are related. This reconstructed environment enables us to
generalize our results concerning the eects of changing type sets or number of agents
on implementability.
The economic environment in our paper contains a set of agents, a type set for every
agent, and density functions. To combine the decisive factors for implementability, we
bundle them in the denition of an economy. This generates a set of dierent economies
whose elements can dier in the number of types, the number of agents, the density
functions, or the allocation functions. On this set, we dene sequences and the meaning
of convergence. We frame requirements for this environment under which it is pos-
sible to align the implementability conditions in dierent economies. Thereby we nd
that under some assumptions concerning the similarity of these two environments (type
sets, density functions and allocation functions), the implementability result in discrete
settings approaches the result in the continuous setting. We are able to approach the My-
erson and Satterthwaite (1983) result, even if we start with a parametrization, for which
ecient trade is possible. We show conditions that need to be met in order to guarantee
that we end up in an environment, that equals the setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite
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(1983). This means, that it is not a sucient condition to have innitely many types in
the bilateral trade setting to get the impossibility result. The position of the types in the
type set and the probabilities matter. A rst intuitive evidence for this relation is given
by Observation 1.1. To show that even in case of innitely many types ecient trade
can take place, we will give some counterexamples to justify the conditions that we in-
troduce afterwards. Thereafter we formulate the environment of economies for which
we dene the needed convergence and phrase the conditions, under which the innite
number of types is a sucient condition for the impossibility of implementation. Even
if the analysis of the counterexamples is done for the bilateral trade setting, the derived
results apply to every independent private value setting. There will be a general result,
when and under which conditions it is possible to link discrete and continuous (with
respect to the type set) settings.
Consumption Economy.
Denition 1.5. We dene a consumption economy (I,Θ, f, q) as the tuple consisting of
a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}, the Cartesian product of type sets (one type set for every
consumer i) Θ = ×i∈IΘi with the corresponding density functions fi : Θi → [0, 1], where
f := (f0, . . . , fn), and the allocation rule q : Θ → R+, which maps types into allocations.
The economies can dier in the number of agents, the type set, the density function,
or the allocation rule. To relate dierent economies, we have to introduce convergence
to our set of economies. Especially, we want to link the nite and the innite economy,
where we consider nite and innite type sets. For this, we dene a sequence of con-
sumption economies as given by (Ik,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N, where Ik is a sequence of consumer
sets, Θk a sequence of type set, fk a sequence of density-functions, and qk a sequence
of allocation functions. We denote the innite setting by (I∞,Θ∞, f∞, q∞), where we
have an innite number of agents and types. f∞, q∞ are the corresponding density or
allocations functions. As our economy contains dierent formal objects, namely sets
and functions, we have to dene convergence component-wise.
Denition 1.6. A sequence of consumption economies (Ik,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N converges to a
limit economy (I,Θ, f, q), if the sequences of consumers, type sets, density functions and
allocation functions converge to the respective limit given by the limit consumption econ-
omy.
When we look at the convergence of an economy, we require that every element of the
economy converges. In the following we dene in detail the components of an economy
sequence and the corresponding concept of convergence.
Consumers. Let Ik = {1, . . . , nk} be the set of consumers in round k. We say, that
(Ik)k∈N → I∞ if the number of consumers is increasing for k →∞.
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Ik aects the dimension of the other components of an economy. Since we need a
type set for every agent, the type set component in the economy consists of a Cartesian
product over the type sets for every single agent. The domain of the density and the
allocation function change accordingly.
Type sets. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. An element Θk of the sequence (Θk)k∈N
is the Cartesian product over the consumers’ type sets in round k. Since we assume
symmetry, every consumer i ∈ I in round k has the same type set. We call this type set
Θki. The component Θk of an economy in a sequence is hence given by Θk = (Θki)n.
Since the type set component of the economy is a product over many type sets, we
dene the convergence of this Cartesian product element-wise, hence consumer-wise.
This means, that for every consumer i ∈ I , the sequence of his type sets has to converge.
We use the topological concept of density to dene convergence.21
Denition 1.7. Fix a consumer set I . If we write (Θk)k∈N → Θ, this means (Θki)k∈N →
Θi, k → ∞ for every i ∈ I . At that, Θi gives the limit of the sequence of type sets that is
assigned to consumer i ∈ I . Thereby, it holds, that Θi is the limit of the sequence (Θki)k∈N,
if and only if, there exists a K , such that for all k ≥ K , Θki lies dense in Θi,∀ i ∈ I .
The sequence of the Cartesian products over type sets is generated by adding new
types to every single type set of every consumer in a round k.22 We add the same nite
number of types to every one’s type set. As mentioned above, whenever the number
of consumers or the type sets changes, the density function and the allocation rule has
to change as well. In every round k and for every consumer i ∈ Ik, the sum over all
probabilities of types is 1. Thus, we face the following issue: whenever we add new types
to type sets, we do not only need to assign a probability to them but also have to change
probabilities of existing types, i.e., take probability mass of the old types and redistribute
it to the new types. Thereby we make the assumption that for every single type, the
probability cannot increase over rounds. This means, that the collected probabilities of
the old types are shared exclusively among the newly added types.
Density Functions. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. The sequence (fk)k∈N consists
of fk = (fk0, . . . , fkn), where fki is the density function of consumer i ∈ I in round
k over his type set Θki. The change in the type sets means, that we face a change in
the domains of the density functions, such that the standard concept of convergence for
function sequences cannot be used. Thus, for our purpose we require that for every type
in the limit type set, that is also contained in one of the nite type sets, the dierence be-
tween the probability assigned by the limit density function and the sequence of density
functions has to become arbitrarily small if the number of rounds becomes large.
21A set A ⊆ B lies dense in the set B, if A = B.
22Mathematically this means: Θki = Θ(k−1)i ∪ {θm|m = 1, . . . ,M ;M <∞}.
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Denition 1.8. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. We say (fk)k∈N → f, f = (f1, . . . , fn) :
Θ→ [0, 1]n if for any θ ∈ Θ, that lies also in Θk, for some k <∞, there exists a K <∞,
such that for all k ≥ K it holds that |f(θ)− fk(θ)| < . This has to hold component-wise.
Hence, for every consumer κ: |fi(θ)− fki(θ)| < , i = 1, . . . , n, k ≥ K .
For the allocation functions, we do not have to change the outcomes in round k for
the types that are contained in Θk∩Θk−1. Since we consider rst-best environments, we
only have to dene the outcomes assigned to new types. Since the domain changes for
allocation functions, we require analogously for the density functions that for every type
in the limit type set, that is also contained in one of the nite type sets, the dierence
between the outcome assigned by the limit allocation function and sequence of allocation
functions has to become arbitrarily small if the number of rounds becomes large.
Allocation Functions. Fix a consumer set I = {1, . . . , n}. The sequence of allocation
functions is given by (qk)k∈N : (Θk)k∈N → (zk)k∈N, zk ∈ R, where qk : Θk = (Θki)n →
R+.
Denition 1.9. We say (qk)k∈N → q : Θ→ R+ if for any θ ∈ Θ, that lies also in Θk, for
some k <∞, there exists aK <∞, such that for all k ≥ K it holds that |q(θ)−qk(θ)| < .
For the public good example, we have already seen in Proposition 1.5 that a nite
but suciently large number of consumers yields the same result as the Theorem by
Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) for innitely many consumers: the public good will not
be provided. To apply these concepts to the private good example, we need the analogous
denitions for the producer side. The respective denitions and concepts of convergence
follow the same logic as for the consumer side and can be found in Appendix 1.D.
1.7.4 Convergence of type set
We are now able to bring together the implementation condition in discrete and con-
tinuous settings. The terms ’discrete’ and ’continuous’ refer to the set of types – for
the private good application. We found that the implementability conditions in dis-
crete environments approached the conditions in continuous environments such that
the qualitative results concerning ecient implementation converge. Now, we can be
more precise on what we mean by ’approach the results’.
As we know from Section 1.5, ecient implementation is possible when consumers’
expected transfers exceed rms’ expected revenues. The expected transfers and rev-
enues are calculated, taking the respective incentive compatibility and participation
constraints into account. This logic also applies for continuous settings. To compare
the implementability conditions for private goods in discrete and continuous environ-
ments, we increase the number of types, while holding the set of agents xed. We nd,
that with the given denitions of economies and convergence, the expected payments
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for a nite type set converge to the expected payments in the continuous economy. The
payments that we get for a mechanism (q, t) in a continuous environment that fullls in-
centive compatibility and participation constraints can be found in equation (1.10). With
the same arguments, we get the convergence of the revenues for the producer side, see
Appendix 1.D.
Proposition 1.8. Let (I,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N → (I,Θ∞, f∞, q∞), for k → ∞. Then it holds
that for every consumer i ∈ I : For every  > 0 ∃K : ∀ k ≥ K∣∣∣∣∣E(θki)
[(
v(θki, qki(θ, δ))− 1− Fk(θki)
fk(θki)
s∑
l=1
f(θlki){v(θl+1ki , qki(θ, δ))− v(θlki, qki(θ, δ))}
)]
−
E(θ∞i)
[
v(θ∞i, q∞i(θ, δ))−
∫ θs∞i
θ0∞i
f(θ∞i)v1(θ∞i, q∞i(θ))
1− F∞(θ∞i)
f∞(θ∞i)
dθ∞i
] ∣∣∣∣∣ < .
Thus, for the private good application, we get equivalent conditions for ecient im-
plementation of nite but suciently large type sets and the innite type set. Note, that
this result does not require a monotonic change in the implementability from round
to round: the convergence (I,Θk, fk, qk)k∈N → (I,Θ∞, f∞, q∞) does not rule out that
there exists a nite number of rounds where the implementability develops in the oppo-
site direction of the limit case. With respect to our applications, this means, that even for
the counterexample 1.7 where implementation gets less costly in round 1, the impossibil-
ity result will hold in the limit if the aforementioned convergence is fullled. Generally
spoken, the specic extension procedure is irrelevant for the result in proposition 1.8.
For public goods, we know from Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) that for an innite
number of consumer and a nite type set, the public good will never be provided if
incentive compatibility, participation, and the resource constraints have to be fullled.
As shown in Proposition 1.6, we nd that for a nite but suciently large set of con-
sumers, the same result is true: the public good will not be provided. While increasing
the number of agents, the number of types remains unchanged.
Summarizing, we changed the element of the economies in the private and the public
good example that had innite dimension. For the bilateral trade application this is given
by the type set, whereas it is the set of agents in the public good example. If we approach
these innite components of the economies (and the resulting changes in the density and
allocation functions) by a sequence of nite but increasing elements, we can generate
the same implementation result for the nite environments as for the original innite
cases.
The stated convergence result does also apply to every possible application of the
independent private values model that fullls the conditions. Thus, this result enables
us to link results for discrete and innite settings. Thereby, either type sets or agent sets
(or both) can be varied from a nite number of elements to an innite set.
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1.8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we investigate the independent private values model when types are dis-
crete. We use this model for the analysis of how impossibility results by Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) are aected by the specication
of the number of individuals and the specication of the type set. The existing literature
on this topic neglects the question of how the discrete specication and the continuous
specication of the independent private values model relate to each other. Our analysis
provides a framework to study the convergence.
Our analysis yields the following key insights: First, the impossibility results for e-
cient bilateral trade and ecient public good provision vanish when a binary type set is
considered. Moreover, we nd that the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) result extends to
any model with a discrete set of types. The Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) result, by
contrast, extends only to a model with a large but nite number of types.
Second, the discrete version of the independent private values model leads to the same
outcomes as the continuous version of the model if many types are introduced in the
right way. We discuss various factors that have an inuence on the convergence. This
analysis does not support the presumption that the increase in the type set alone leads
to the convergence of both model specications.
The analysis was made possible by a combination of insights from the non-linear
pricing literature and mechanism design. We believe that the applicability of a large class
of problems that have been studied in the empirical economics and behavioral economics
literature can be simplied by using the discrete specication of the independent private
values model.
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Appendix 1.A Preliminaries
Lemma 1.1. For all i, the incentive constraints in (ICC) hold if the following local incentive
constraints are satised: For any l < s,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) , (1.11)
and for all l > 0,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl−1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl−1i ))− T (θl−1i ) . (1.12)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints imply that, for all i, a weak monotonicity condition
as dened by Müller et al. (2007) holds.
Proof: We rst show that the weak monotonicity condition of Müller et al. (2007) holds
for each i and l. Equation (1.12) as stated in the Lemma for θi = θl+1i :
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ≥ V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) .
Adding equation (1.11) as stated above yields:
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)) + V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θli)− T (θl+1i ) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) + V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θl+1i )− T (θli)
⇔ V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)) + V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) + V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))
⇔ V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli)) ≥
V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
(WM)
According to Müller et al. (2007) the condition in equation (WM) is called weak mono-
tonicity. If preferences are linear in the type, incentive compatibility implies not only
weak monotonicity but also monotonicity.
We show that equation (1.11) implies that
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+2i ) .
To see this, rewrite equation (1.11) as
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V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] .
Since (WM) holds for all l, we have
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+2i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))] .
Moreover, condition (1.11) for θi = θl+1i is
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ≥ V (θl+2i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+1i ) .
Adding the last two inequalities yields
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+2i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+2i ))− T (θl+1i ) .
Hence, an individual with preference parameter θli does not benet from announcing
θl+2i . Iterating this argument once more establishes that this individual does neither
benet from announcing θl+3i , etc. The proof that an individual with preference param-
eter θli does not benet from announcing θ
l−j
i , for any j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the
reader.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that, for some i, all local downward incentive compatibility con-
straints are binding and that the weak monotonicity condition (WM) holds. Then all incen-
tive constraints of i are satised.
Proof: If all local downward incentive constraints are binding for individual i, this im-
plies that, for all l ≥ 1,
T (θli) =
l∑
k=1
{V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θk−1i | θki , qi(θ−i, θk−1i ))}+ T (θ0i ) .
For all l > 0, the equation can be equivalently written as
T (θli) =V (θ
l
i | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
−
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i ) .
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1.1 implies that it suces to show that
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all local upward incentive constraints are satised, i.e., for all l,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i ) ,
or equivalently,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−T (θli) ≥
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− T (θl+1i )
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] .
ByT (θli) = V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))−
∑l−1
k=0{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))−V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))},
this inequality can be written as
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))−V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))} ≥
l∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}
− [V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))] ,
or
V (θl+1i | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θl+1i ))− V (θl+1i | θli, qi(θ−i, θl+1i )) ≥
V (θli | θl+1i , qi(θ−i, θli))− V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli)),
which is equivalent to weak monotonicity which is satised by assumption.
Lemma 1.3. If for individual i, all local downward incentive compatibility constraints are
binding, then the expected utility of individual i from ex ante perspective is given by
E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))−ti(θ)] = E(θ)
[
s∑
l=1
f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ))− v(θli, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
−T (θ0i ) .
Proof: Equation
T (θli) =V (θ
l
i | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))
−
l−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i ) ,
in the proof of Lemma 1.2 and the law of iterated expectations imply that,
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E(θ)[ti(θ)] =
s∑
j=0
f jT (θji )
=
s∑
j=0
f j
[
E(θ−i)[v(θ
j
i , qi(θ−i, θ
j
i ))]
−
j−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}+ T (θ0i )
]
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
s∑
j=1
f j
j−1∑
k=0
{V (θki | θk+1i , qi(θ−i, θki ))− V (θki | θki , qi(θ−i, θki ))}
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
s∑
j=1
(
1−
j∑
k=0
fk
)
{V (θji | θj+1i , qi(θ−i, θji ))− V (θji | θji , qi(θ−i, θji ))}
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))] + T (θ0i )
−
s∑
j=1
f j{V (θj+1i | θji , qi(θ−i, θj+1i ))− V (θji | θji , qi(θ−i, θji ))}
1−∑jk=0 fk
f j
= E(θ)[v(θi, qi(θ))]− E(θ)
[
s∑
l=0
f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ))− v(θli, qi(θ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
]
+ T (θ0i )
Lemma 1.4. For all i, if the (PCC) is satised for θi = θ0i , then it is satised as well for
θi 6= θ0i .
Proof: Let θi 6= θ0i . Then by (ICC)
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− T (θli) ≥ V (θ0i | θli, qi(θ−i, θ0i ))− T (θ0i ) .
Moreover, θi > θ0i implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
V (θ0i | θ0i , qi(θ−i, θ0i ))− T (θ0i ) ,
which is non-negative by (PCC) for θi = θ0i . This proves that (PCC) is not binding for
θi 6= θ0i .
Lemma 1.5. Let qi be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the problem of choosing
a mechanism (t1, ..., tn) in order to maximize total transfers
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
,
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICC) and the interim participation
constraints in (PCC). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (PCC)
is binding for θi = θ0i and slack otherwise.
Proof: By Lemma 1.4 we only need to show that it is binding for θi = θ0i . We show that
it is possible to increase the expected payments of individual i in an incentive compatible
way if, for some i, the participation constraint for θi = θ0i does not hold as an equality. It
is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICC) as follows: For
each i, for each θli ∈ Θi, and for each θˆi ∈ Θi,
V (θli | θli, qi(θ−i, θli))− V (θˆli | θli, qi(θ−i, θˆli)) ≥ T (θli)− T (θˆi) .
Consider a new payment rule for individual i such that for each θi ∈ Θi, T (θli) increases
by some  > 0, this implies that the right-hand side of the incentive constraints states
above remains constant, i.e., the increase of i’s expected payments does not violate the
incentive compatibility. Since revenue increases in the expected payments of individual
i, the revenue maximizing mechanism must be such that a biding participation constraint
for θi = θ0i prevents a further increase of individual i’s payments.
Lemma 1.6. Let qi be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the "relaxed problem" of
choosing a mechanism (t1, ..., tn) in order to maximize total transfers
E(θ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
]
,
subject to the downward incentive compatibility constraints in (ICC) and the ex interim
participation constraints in (PCC). At a solution to this problem, all downward incentive
constraints are binding, and the participation constraint in (PCC) is binding for θi = θ0i
and slack otherwise.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that, for all i, all downward incentive constraints
are binding. Otherwise the expected payments of some individual could be increased
without violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be
shown that, for all i, the participation constraint in (PCC) is binding for θi = θ0i and
is slack otherwise. By Lemma 1.4 we only need to show that, for all i, the participation
constraint in (PCC) is binding for θi = θ0i . Suppose otherwise, then is was possible to
increase T (θ0i ) without violating any constraint.
Lemma1.7. For all j, the incentive constraints in (ICF ) hold if the following local incentive
constraints are satised: For any l < r,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+1j )) , (1.13)
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and for all l > 1,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) . (1.14)
Moreover, the local incentive constraints imply that, for all j, a weak monotonicity con-
dition as dened by Müller et al. (2007) holds.
Proof: We rst show that the weak monotonicity condition of Müller et al. (2007) holds
for each j and each l. Equation (1.14) as stated in the Lemma for δj = δl+1j :
R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j )) ≥ R(δlj)−K(δlj | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δlj)) .
Adding equation (1.13) as stated above yields:
K(δlj | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j )) ≥
K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δl+1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+1j )).
(wm)
This is exactly the weak monotonicity condition of Müller et al. (2007).
We show that equation (1.13) implies that
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl+2j )−K(δl+2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+2j )) .
To see this rewrite equation (1.13) as
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j ))
+ [K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j ))−K(δl+1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+1j ))] .
Since condition (wm) holds, we have
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j ))
+K(δl+2j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+2j ))−K(δl+2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+2j )) .
Moreover, condition (1.13) for δj = δl+1j is
R(δl+1j )−K(δl+1j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+1j )) ≥ R(δl+2j )−K(δl+2j | δl+1j , yj(δ−j, δl+2j )) .
Adding the two last inequalities yields
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl+2j )−K(δl+2j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl+2j )) .
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Hence, a rm with technology parameter δlj does not benet from announcing δl+2j .
Iterating this argument once more establishes that this individual does neither benet
from announcing δl+3j , etc.
The proof that a rm with technology parameter δlj does not benet from announcing
δl−jj , for any j ≥ 1 is analogous and left to the reader.
Lemma 1.8. Suppose that, for some rm j, all local upward incentive constraints are bind-
ing and that the weak monotonicity condition (wm) holds, for all l > 1. Then all incentive
compatibility constraints are satised.
Proof: If all local upward incentive constraints are binding for rm j, this implies that,
for all l ≥ 2,
R(δlj) =
r−1∑
k=l
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk+1j , yj(δ−j, δk+1j ))} −R(δrj ) .
For all l > 1, the equation can equivalently be written as
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r∑
k=l+1
{K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj))} −R(δrj ) .
To establish incentive compatibility, Lemma 1.7 implies that it suces to show that all
local downward incentive compatibility constraints are satised, i.e., for all l,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) ,
or equivalently,
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥
R(δl−1j )−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
+
[
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))]
]
.
By equation
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}+ pij ,
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this inequality can be written as:
r∑
k=l+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))} ≥
r∑
k=l
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j, δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j, δkj ))}
+
[
K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))
]
,
or
K(δl−1j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δl−1j ))−K(δl−1j | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δl−1j )) ≥
K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj)) .
This inequality is identical to the weak monotonicity condition which holds by assump-
tion.
yj(δ−j, δl−1j ) ≥ yj(δ−j, δlj) .
These monotonicity constraints are fullled by assumption.
Lemma 1.9. If for rm j, all local downward incentive constraints are biding, then the
expected prot of rm j from ex ante perspective is given by
E(δ)[r(δ)− k(δj, y(δ))] = E(δ)
[
r−1∑
l=1
{k(δlj, yj(δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
]
−R(δrj ) .
Proof: Equation
R(δlj) =K(δ
l
j | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))
+
r∑
k=l+1
{K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δlj | δl−1j , yj(δ−j, δlj))}+ pij ,
in the proof of Lemma 1.8 and the law of iterated expectation imply that
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E(δ)[r(δ)] =
r∑
i=1
R(δij)
=
r∑
i=1
pi
[
E(δ−j)[k(δ
i
j , yj(δ−j , δ
i
j))]
+
r∑
k=i+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j , δkj ))−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j , δkj ))} −R(δrj )
]
= E(δ)[k(δj , yj(δ))] +
r−1∑
i=1
pi
r∑
k=i+1
{K(δkj | δkj , yj(δ−j , δkj ))
−K(δkj | δk−1j , yj(δ−j , δkj ))} −R(δrj )
= E(δ)[k(δj , yj(δ))] +
r−1∑
i=1
r∑
k=i
pk−1{K(δij | δij , yj(δ−j , δij))
−K(δij | δi−1j , yj(δ−j , δij))} −R(δrj )
= E(δ)[k(δj , yj(δ))] +
r−1∑
i=1
pi{K(δij | δij , yj(δ−j , δij))
−K(δij | δi−1j , yj(δ−j , δij))}
∑r
k=i p
k−1
pi
−R(δrj )
= E(δ)[k(δj , yj(δ))] + E(δ)
[
r−1∑
l=1
p(δlj){k(δlj , yj(δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
]
−R(δrj )
Lemma 1.10. For all j, if the (PCF ) is satised for δj = δrj , then it is satised as well for
δj 6= δrj .
Proof: Let δj 6= δrj . Then by (ICF )
R(δlj)−K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj)) ≥ R(δrj )−K(δrj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δrj )) .
Moreover, δj < δrj implies that the right-hand side of this inequality exceeds
R(δrj )−K(δrj | δrj , yj(δ−j, δrj )) ,
which is non-negative by (PCF ) for δj = δrj . This proves that (PCF ) is not binding for
δj 6= δrj .
Lemma 1.11. Let y be an arbitrary production rule. Consider the problem of choosing a
mechanism (r1, ..., rm) in order to minimize revenue
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
r(δ)
]
,
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subject to the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ) and the interim participation
constraints (PCF ). At a solution to this problem, the participation constraint in (PCF ) is
binding for δj = δrj and slack otherwise.
Proof: By Lemma 1.10 we only need to show that it is binding for δj = δrj . We show
that it is possible to decrease expected revenues of rm j in an incentive compatible way
if, for some j, the participation constraints for δj = δrj does not hold as an equality. It
is instructive to rewrite the incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ) as follows: For
each j, for each δlj ∈ ∆j , and for each δˆj ∈ ∆j ,
R(δlj)−R(δˆj) ≥ K(δlj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δlj))−K(δˆj | δlj, yj(δ−j, δˆj)) .
Consider a new revenue rule for rm j such that for every δj ∈ ∆j , R(δlj) decreases
by some  > 0. This implies that the left-hand side of the incentive constraint remains
constant, i.e., the decrease of j’s expected revenue does not violate the incentive compat-
ibility. Since revenue increase in the expected transfers to rm j, the revenue minimizing
mechanism must be such that a binding participation constraint for δj = δrj prevents a
further increase of rms j’s revenues.
Lemma 1.12. Let y be an arbitrary given provision rule. Consider the "relaxed problem"
of choosing a mechanism (r1, ..., rm) in order to minimize total revenue
E(δ)
[
m∑
j=1
r(δ)
]
,
subject to the upward incentive compatibility constraints in (ICF ) and the interim partic-
ipation constraints (PCF ). At a solution to this problem, all upward incentive constraints
are biding, and the participation constraint in (PCF ) is binding for δj = δrj and slack
otherwise.
Proof: It is straightforward to verify that, for all j, all upward incentive constraints
are binding. Otherwise, the expected revenue of some rm j could be decreased without
violating any one of the constraints of the relaxed problem. It remains to be shown that,
for all j, the participation constraint in (PCF ) is binding for δj = δrj . Suppose otherwise,
then it was possible to decrease R(δrj ) without violating any constraint.
54
1.B Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Appendix 1.B Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
Consider the ’rst relaxed problem’ of maximizing expected transfers subject to local
downward incentive constraints in (1.12) and interim participation constraints in (PCC).
The arguments in the proofs of Lemma 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 imply that, for all i, all local down-
ward incentive constraints as well as the interim participation constraints are binding
for θi = θ0. In these Lemmata the provision rule for the publicly provided good is not
taken as given. However, this does not aect the logic of the argument.
Given that all local incentive compatibility constraints are biding, Lemma 1.2 implies
that, for all i,
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)] =
E(θ,δ)
[
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i ) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all i, whenever θi = θ0i , we have
T (θ0i ) = −ui, for all i, and hence,
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)] =
E(θ,δ)
[
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
− ui .
Second, consider the ’second relaxed problem’ of minimizing revenues subject to the
local downward incentive constraints in (1.14) and the interim participation constraints
in (PCF ). The arguments in the proofs of Lemmata 1.8, 1.10 and 1.11 imply that, for all
j, all local upward incentive constraints as well as the interim participation constraints
are binding for δj = δr. In these Lemmata the production rule for the good is not taken
as given. However, this does not aect the logic of the argument.
Given all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding, Lemma 1.8 implies, for
all j,
E(θ,δ)[rj(θ, δ)] =
E(θ,δ)
[
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
+R(δrj ) .
Since the participation constraints are binding, for all j, whenever δj = δr, we have
R(δrj ) = pij , for all j, and hence,
E(θ,δ)
[
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
+ pij .
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Consequently, a necessary condition for the implementability of {(qi)ni=1, (y)mj=1} is that
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
) .
Proof of Proposition 1.4.
Suppose that the condition in Proposition 1.4 holds. We need to show that we can con-
struct a payment scheme satisfying all relevant constraints. Suppose rst that the condi-
tion in Proposition 1.4 holds as an equality. Then we can choose a payment scheme that
solves the relaxed problem, that we studied in the Proof of Proposition 1.3. To show this,
we need to verify that the payment scheme, which solves the relaxed problem in Propo-
sition 1.3 satises not only the local downward incentive constraints, but all incentive
compatibility constraints. This is a consequence of the Lemmata 1.2 and 1.8.
Since the given provision rule qi satises the monotonicity constraints qi(θ−i, θli) ≥
qi(θ−i, θl−1i ) for all i and all l, Lemma 1.8 implies that all incentive compatibility con-
straints are binding. Lemma 1.3 implies that, for all i,
E(θ,δ)[ti(θ, δ)] =
E(θ,δ)
[
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i ) .
Now choose
T (θ0i ) =
1
n
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)
+ pij
−
1
n
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)
− ui
]
,
for all i. By assumption this is smaller or equal to zero, so that the interim participation
constraints are satised, for all i. It remains to be shown that budget balance holds. This
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follows since, by construction,
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
= E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
+ T (θ0i )
= E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)
−E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
(v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
.
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
Recall that for an economy with n individuals at a solution to consumer transfer maxi-
mization
Ti(θ
L) = θLQni (θ
L) ,
and
Ti(θ
H) = θH(Qni (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) + θLQni (θL) ,
which implies that
Rn =
1
n
n∑
j=1
{f(θH)θH(Qni (θH)−Qni (θL))}+ θLQni (θL) .
We can view the transfer maximization problem as consisting of θLQni (θL) that every
consumer has to pay and an incremental transfer if f(θH)θH(Qni (θH) − Qni (θL)) that
applies only for consumers with a high valuation for the public good. Proposition 1.5
states that the revenue due to these incremental payments goes to zero as the number
of consumers becomes large.
To proof this, we proceed in two steps:
Step 1. We rst show that limn→∞V n = 0, where
V n := maxqn()
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
Qni (θ
H)−Qni (θL)
)
.
we start by analyzing the stated sum and decompose the expected values Qni (θk), k ∈
{L,H} in its components qn.
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Fix θ′. The contribution of qn(θ′) to
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) is given by
wn(θ′) := m(θ′)f(θH)m(θ
′)−1(1−f(θH))n−m(θ′)−(n−m(θ′))f(θH)m(θ′)(1−f(θH))n−1−m(θ′) ,
where m(θ′) is the number of individuals with θ′i = θH .
Consequently, qn(θ′) is chosen equal to 1 if wn(θ) ≥ 0 and equal to 0 otherwise.
Equivalently,
qn(θ′) =
{
1, if m(θ
′)
n
≥ f(θH) ,
0 if m(θ
′)
n
< f(θH) .
Substituting these expression into V n implies
V n =
1
n
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
(
n
x
)
f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−x − (n− x)f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−1−x ,
where ˆf(θH)n is the smallest integer larger than nf(θH). Equivalently,
V n =
1
f(θH)(1− f(θH))
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
(
n
x
)
f(θH)x(1− f(θH))n−x
(x
n
− f(θH)
)
=
1
f(θH)(1− f(θH))
n∑
x= ˆf(θH)n
prob
(
m(θ)
n
= x
)(x
n
− f(θH)
)
.
Note that m(θ)
n
= 1
n
∑n
i=1 zi, where (zi)ni=1 is a collection function of i.i.d. random
variables such that zi = 1 if θi = θH and zi = 0 otherwise. By the weak Law of Large
Numbers, for any  > 0,
limn→∞prob
(∣∣∣m(θ)
n
− f(θH)
∣∣∣ > ) = 0 .
Hence, limn→∞V n = 0.
Step 2. Under any incentive compatible mechanism, 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) con-
verges to zero. It follows from the incentive compatibility constraints that Qni (θH) −
Qni (θ
L) ≥ 0 since utility is dened linearly in type. This implies that 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−
Qni (θ
L)) ≥ 0. By Step 1, the upper bound on 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) converges to 0.
Hence, 1
n
∑n
i=1(Q
n
i (θ
H)−Qni (θL)) also converges to 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.6.
The proof is omitted as it is a special case of proposition 1.8.
Proof of Proposition 1.7.
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Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θ = [θL, θH ]. We
assume, that θL + θH > 2c. Then the ecient allocation rule is given by
q(θ) =
{
0, if θ1 + θ2 < 2c ,
1, if θ1 + θ2 > 2c .
Then g can be implemented, if and only if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)q(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[q(θ)]
Or equivalently,∫
θ1
∫
θ2
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2 − 1− F2(θ2)
f2(θ2)
)
q(θ1, θ2)f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
≥ c
∫
θ1
∫
θ2
q(θ1, θ2)f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
⇔ ∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2 − 1− F2(θ2)
f2(θ2)
)
f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
≥ c
∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
The left-hand side of the inequality can be written as∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1
2
[(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θ2
)
f(θ2)− 1 + F2(θ2)
]
f1(θ1)dθ1dθ2
=
∫
θ1
[
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
)
F2(θ2)
∣∣∣θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
+ θH2
−max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})−
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
F2(θ2)dθ2
− θH2 +max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}+
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
F2(θ2)dθ2
]
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
∫
θ1
1
2
(
(θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}
)(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
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Case 1: max{θL2 , 2c− θ1} = 2c− θ1.∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ 2c− θ1
)(
1− F2(2c− θH1 )
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(−(1− F1(θ1))(1− F2(2c− θH1 )) + 2cf1(θ1)(1− F2(2c− θH1 ))) dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 ) [1− 2cf(θ1)− F1(θ1)] dθ1
+
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
cf(θ1)dθ1 − 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + cF2(2c− θH1 )
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1
Case 2: max{θL2 , 2c− θ1} = θL2 .∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1
2
(
θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+ θL2
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
(
θ1f1(θ1)− (1− F1(θ1)) + θL2 f1(θ1)
)
dθ1
=
1
2
(
θ1F1(θ1)
∣∣∣θH2
2c−θH1
−
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
F1(θ1)dθ1
−
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + θL2 F (θ1)
∣∣∣θH2
2c−θH1
)
=
1
2
(
θH2 − (2c− θH1 )F1(2c− θH1 )
)− ∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1dθ1 + θ
L
2 (1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
=
1
2
(
θH2 − (2c− θH1 )F1(2c− θH1 )− θH2 + (2c− θH1 ) + θL2 (1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
)
=
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 )) + c− cF1(2c− θH1 )
Combining Case 1 and Case2 the left-hand side of the inequality is given by∫
θ1
1
2
(
(θ1 − 1− F1(θ1)
f1(θ1)
+max{θL2 , 2c− θ1}
)(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θ1})
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + cF2(2c− θH1 )
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− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1
+
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 )) + c− cF1(2c− θH1 )
=
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + c
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1 +
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
The right-hand side of the inequality can be written as
c
∫
θ1
∫ θH2
max{θL2 ,2c−θ1}
1f1(θ1)f2(θ2)dθ1dθ2
=
∫
θ1
(
1− F2(max{θL2 , 2c− θH1 })
)
f1(θ1)dθ1
= c
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
(
1− F2(2c− θH1 )
)
f(θ1)dθ1 +
∫ θH2
2c−θH1
1f(θ1)dθ1
= c
(∫ θH2
θL2
1f1(θ1)dθ1 −
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
= c
(
1−
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
The inequality can hence be written as
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + c
− 1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )2cf(θ1)dθ1 +
1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
≥ c
(
1−
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
F2(2c− θH1 )f(θ1)dθ1
)
⇔
1
2
∫ 2c−θH1
θL2
[
F2(2c− θH1 )− 1
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− F1(θ1))dθ1 + 1
2
(θL2 − θH1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− F1(2c− θH1 ))
≥ 0
The inequality cannot be fullled. The public good can therefore not be provided e-
ciently.
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Proof of Proposition 1.8.
Reminder:fD, FD are the density-, distribution function in the discrete environment.
For every individual, they are dened as follows:
fD(θ) =
∫ θl+1+θl
2
θl+θl−1
2
f(θl)dθl , θ ∈ (θ0, θs)
fD(θ
0) =
∫ θ1+θ0
2
0
f(θl)dθl
fD(θ
s) =
∫ θs
θs+θs−1
2
f(θl)dθl
Without loss of generality (for I < ∞), we consider a situation with one individual on
each side we take δ as given and calculate the ex ante expected payment. All arguments
also apply in case of more than one agent and taking expectation over (θ, δ). The ex ante
expected payment is given by the following equation
Eθ
[(
v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))−
s∑
l=1
fD(θ
l){v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}1− FD(θ
l)
fD(θl)
)]
.
We neglect the rst term for the moment and consider the second:
∑
l
fD(θ
l){v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}1− FD(θ
l)
fD(θl)
=
∑
l
{v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))}(1− FD(θl))
=
∑
l
v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
θl+1 − θl (θ
l+1 − θl)(1− FD(θl)) .
Adding types in every round k, yields that |θl+1− θl| → 0. Thus the dierence quotient
of the value function converges to the partial derivative of v with respect to θl.
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
v(θl+1, q∗(θ, δ))− v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
θl+1 − θl (θ
l+1 − θl)(1− FD(θl))
=
∑
l
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
θl
(1− FD(θl)) .
Since v is monotone we can change summation and take the innum/supremum. The
limit of the upper- and the lower-sum of the above function coincide and FD(θl) →
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F (θl), thus the integral exists and is given by23
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
inf
z
(
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− FD(z))
)
= lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
sup
z
(
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− FD(z))
)
=
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
z
(1− F (z))dz .
Using integration by parts and Fubini’s Theorem (to change the order of integration),
we get ∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
s
(1− F (s))dr =
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θi
∣∣∣
x
(1− F (x))dx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
∫ θs
x
f(z)dzdx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ θs
x
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
f(z)dzdx
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
f(z)dxdz
=
∫ θs
θ0
∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
dxf(z)dz .
For the neglected term Eθ
[
v(θl, q∗(θ, δ))
]
=
∑
l fD(θ
l)v(θl, q∗(θ, δ)), we consider the
limes inferior and the limes superior and nd, that it converges:
lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
inf
θl
(
v(θl, q∗(θl, δ))
)
= lim
|θl+1−θl|→0
∑
l
sup
θl
(
v(θl, q∗(θl, δ))
)
=
∫ θs
θ0
v(z, q∗(z, δ))f(z)dz .
Combining the converged terms, this yields
∫ θs
θ0
(
v(z, q∗(z, δ))− ∫ z
θs
∂v
∂θl
∣∣∣
x
dx
)
f(z)dz =
Eθ[t(θ, δ)], which gives the claimed result.
Proof of Corollary 1.1.
Let us assume for a moment that the mechanism that maximizes expected surplus subject
to (ICF ) and (PCF ) satises the monotonicity constraint yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl+1j ), for
all l. This will be veried below.
A necessary condition for the maximization of S is that consumers’ transfers need to
be higher than rms’ revenues. The budget constraint (1.6) needs to hold with equality,
otherwise it was possible to decrease transfers without violating any constraints of the
23Reminder: We summarize over all possible types l = 0, . . . , s. This is not a summation over agents.
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surplus maximization problem. Hence,
S(θ, δ) := E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
.
Now suppose that the solution to this problem involves overproduction,
n∑
i=1
qi(θ, δ) ≤
m∑
j=1
yj(θ, δ) .
Then increasing
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) involves no costs, i.e., rm prots remain unaected, but
increases consumer surplus as E(θ,δ)[
∑n
i=1 v(θi, qi(θ, δ))] goes up. This is a contradiction
to the assumption that the optimum involves underproduction. Hence, we need that∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ).
We can therefore once more rewrite the problem of choosing an optimal provision
rule: Choose (qi)ni=1, (yj)mj=1 in order to maximize
S(θ, δ) := E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))−
m∑
j=1
k(δj, yj(θ, δ))
]
,
subject to
∑n
i=1 qi(θ, δ) =
∑m
j=1 yj(θ, δ). The solution to that problem is such that the
following rst order condition is satised:
v2(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ)) = k2(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)) .
The rst order condition implies that for every δ, qi(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ) and for
every yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl+1j ). This implies that the monotonicity conditions, for
all l, are satised. As the monotonicity of the allocation rule is satised, which in turn
yields weak monotonicity, Proposition 1.4 yields the given statement. See below in more
detail, how maximal payments are constructed such that all local downward incentive
compatibility constraints are binding.
We choose T (θ0i )ni=1 such that
n∑
i=1
T (θ0i ) = E(θ,δ)
[ n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)
−
m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)]
.
It follows from Lemma 1.2 that for all consumers incentive compatibility constraints
are satised. Also it follows from Proposition 1.4, that the expected transfers are given
by
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E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
ti(θ, δ)
]
=
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)− n∑
i=1
ui .
It follows as well from Proposition 1.4 that maximal revenue that can be extracted
from consumers are equal to
E(θ,δ)
[ n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, q
∗(θ, δ))
− f(θli){v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
.
Consequently, a necessary condition for the implementability of (q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1 is
that
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
−
n∑
i=1
ui ≥
E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)+ m∑
j=1
pij .
Suciency of this condition can be shown by using once more, the construction in
the Proof of Proposition 1.4. If the condition above holds and we let for all i,
T (θ0i ) = −
(
E
[ n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, q
∗
i (θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , q∗i (θ, δ))− v(θli, q∗i (θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)
−
m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , y∗j (θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , y∗j (θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)])
≥ 0 ,
we obtain a mechanism that achieves (q∗i )ni=1, (y∗j )mj=1, satises all relevant constraints.
Proof of Corollary 1.2.
Suppose that the constraint in Corollary 1.1 is violated, then the inequality constraint
in Proposition 1.2 is binding, and the optimal provision rule maximizes the following
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Lagrangian
L = E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
(v(θi, q(θ, δ))− k(δj , yj(θ, δ)))
]
+ λ
(
E(θ,δ)
[
n∑
i=1
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
− ui
)]
− E(θ,δ)
 m∑
j=1
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj , yj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj , yj(θ, δ))− k(δl−1j , yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
+ pij
)) ,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier, which, at a solution to this maximization problem,
has to be strictly positive, λ > 0.
To complete the proof it remains to be shown that a solution to the maximization
problem satises the monotonicity constraints.
To see that qi(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ), for all i and all l holds, note that the monotone
hazard rate assumption implies that
E(θ,δ)
[
s∑
l=1
(
v(θi, qi(θ, δ))− f(θli){v(θl+1i , qi(θ, δ))− v(θli, qi(θ, δ))}
1− F (θi)
f(θi)
)]
≥ 0 ,
is an increasing function. Consequently, the solution to the maximization problem is
such that
qi(θ−i, θli) ≥ qi(θ−i, θl−1i ) ,
for all i, l, θ−i and δ.
To see that yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥ yj(δ−j, δl+1j ), for all j and all l, note that
E(θ,δ)
[
r−1∑
l=1
(
k(δj, y
∗
j (θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δlj, yj(θ, δ))− k(δj−1, yj(θ, δ))}
P (δj)
p(δj)
)]
≥ 0 ,
also is an increasing function. This implies that, for all j, l, δ−j and θ, yj(δ−j, δlj) ≥
yj(δ−j, δl+1j ).
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Appendix 1.C Applications
Here, we present further applications that highlight the dierence between discrete and
continuous type settings. We show that the revenue equivalence theorem for rst-price
and second-price auctions (see i.e., Vickrey (1961), Harris and Raviv (1981), Riley and W.
(1981); and for further references McAfee and McMillan (1987)) does not need to apply
for nitely many types in Myerson (1981) single-unit auction. Further, for the partner-
ship dissolution framework of Cramton et al. (1987), we demonstrate that irrespectively
of the original distribution of shares in the partnership, this partnership can be dissolved
eciently for examples with discrete types.
This list of applications is not complete. For instance, Rob (1989) considers a model
with one producer and n consumers. The producer considers to locate in a particular
area. His location would come with emissions, which are a public bad from the perspec-
tive of consumers who live in the vicinity of the new production site. Rob characterizes
the social choice function, which maximizes the producer’s expected prots subject to
incentive and participation constraints for the consumers.
A single-unit auction, Myerson (1981). There are n buyers and one producer, also
referred to as the auctioneer, so that I = {1, . . . , n}, and J = {1}. Payo functions of
consumers are assumed to be linear in the quantity traded so that v(θi, qi) = θi qi. The
seller in-elastically supplies one unit of an indivisible private good, and does not incur
production costs. A state of the economy is therefore dened by a vector of valuations
θ. The set of physically feasible consumption rules is such that
n∑
i=1
qi(θ) = 1 and qi(θ) ∈ {0, 1} , for all i . (1.15)
It is assumed that trade is voluntary and, that, in the absence of trade, everyone realizes
a utility of 0. Thus, ui = 0, for all i, and pi1 = 0. Surplus-maximization requires to
choose the functions qi : Θ→ {0, 1} so as to maximize Eθ [
∑n
i=1 θiqi(θ)] subject to the
constraints in (1.15). The auctioneer receives the payments of the buyers, so that, for all
θ, r1(θ) =
∑n
i=1 ti(θ).
The famous revenue equivalence theorem (see i.e., Vickrey (1961), Harris and Raviv
(1981), Riley and W. (1981); and for further references McAfee and McMillan (1987))
states that all auction formats that give rise to the same consumption rules (qi)i∈I yield
the same expected revenue for the auctioneer. For instance, if these functions, are cho-
sen in a surplus-maximizing way, or, equivalently, so that the object is allocated to the
consumer with the highest valuation, then a rst price auction and a second price auc-
tion, generate the same expected revenue. This theorem is proven under the assumption
that all distributions are atomless. Below, we will show that a model with a discrete set
of types provides additional degrees of freedom in the specication of payment rules, so
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that the revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds.
Proposition 1.9. Consider a rst price auction and a second price auction with n risk-
neutral buyers, in which buyer i’s valuation is drawn from Θi. Then the rst price auction
and the second price auction do not generate the same expected revenue for the seller.
In a second-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each buyer i to bid his
true valuation. This argument does not rely on the assumption that buyers’ values were
continuously distributed. However, in the rst-price auction, buyers have an incentive to
understate their valuation. A buyer that bids an equal amount to his value has a payo
of 0. If he bids less than his value, he reduces the probability of winning but at the
same time increases his payo from winning. Thus, it is a weakly dominant strategy for
buyer i to understate his valuation. If these values are distributed discretely, the expected
transfers under a rst-price auction and a second-price auction are not the same. Hence,
the expected revenues do not coincide under the two auctions.
Partnership dissolution, Cramton et al. (1987). There are I = {1, 2} consumers,
also referred to as partners, and no producers. They form a partnership in which any
one agent i initially holds a share ei ∈ [0, 1], with e1 + e2 = 1. The allocation problem is
to change the ownership structure. Let si be agent i’s share in the partnership after the
reassignment of shares. Let ti be the monetary payment of i, which is positive if i has to
compensate others for receiving their shares and is negative if i sells some of her shares
to other partners. Partner i evaluates this outcome according to the utility function
θi si− ti. We can relate this setup to the general framework developed in Section 1.4 by
dening qi = si − ei as the change of the shares held by agent i. Partner i’s utility gain
from the change of the ownership structure can then be written as θi qi − ti. A social
choice function consists of a collection of consumption functions qi : Θn → R, i ∈ I , so
that, for all θ,
q1(θ) + q1(θ) = 0 and, for all i, −ei ≤ qi(θ) ≤ 1− ei . (1.16)
The partners have to agree unanimously on the new ownership structure so that ui = 0,
for all i. The surplus that is generated by the change of the ownership structure is, again,
given by Eθ [θ1q1(θ) + θ2q2(θ)].
A key insight by Cramton et al. (1987) is that the specication of the initial ownership
structure, i.e., the choice of e = (e1, e2), has an inuence on the possibility to dissolve
a partnership in a surplus-maximizing way. Below, we will show that our discrete type
specication allows us to communicate this insight in a very simply way, without having
to invoke all the calculus that an analysis with an atomless distribution would require.
In the following we assume that there are two types per individual, i.e., Θ1 = {θL1 , θH1 }
and Θ2 = {θL2 , θH2 }. We denote the probability of the event θi = θLi by fLi and fHi :=
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1−fLi . For ease of notation we dene the interim expected change of share in partnership
as:
Q1(θ
L
1 ) := f
L
1 q1(θ
L
1 , θ
L
2 ) + f
H
1 q1(θ
L
1 , θ
H
2 ) ,
and analogously Q1(θH1 ), Q2(θL2 ) and Q2(θH2 )
Proposition 1.10. Suppose that q1 and q2 are such that
Q1(θ
L
1 ) ≤ Q1(θH1 ) ≤ 0, and Q2(θL2 ) ≤ Q2(θH2 ) ≤ 0 ,
then there exists (t1, t2) so that (q1, q2, t1, t2) satises incentive compatibility, voluntary
participation and expected budget balance if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)]− fL1 (θH1 − θL1 )Q1(θH1 )− fH2 (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 .
In a discrete type version of Cramton et al. (1987) an ecient dissolution of partnership
is possible, even though the initial ownership is such that one party owns everything and
the other party nothing. This is dierent under a continuous distribution of types. The
possibility result relates to Observation 1.1. If initial shares are distributed more equally
between two parties, ecient dissolution of partnership is possible with discrete and
continuous distribution of types, as the following Proposition highlights.
Proposition 1.11. Suppose that q1 and q2 are such that
Q1(θ
L
1 ) ≤ 0 ≤ Q1(θH1 ), and Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 ≥ Q2(θH2 ) ,
then there exists (t1, t2) so that (q1, q2, t1, t2) satises incentive compatibility, voluntary
participation and expected budget balance if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)] ≥ 0 .
Proofs of Applications.
Proof of Proposition 1.9
Assume that there are n bidders. The bidder’s valuation for the good can take two values
Θi = {θLi , θHi }.
Second price auction. In a second-price auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid of
bi. This gives rise to the following utilities:
Ui =
{
0, if b1 < maxj 6=ibj ,
θi −maxj 6=ibj, if b1 > maxj 6=ibj .
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If b1 = maxj 6=ibj , the object goes to each winning bidder with the same probability.
It’s a weakly dominant strategy for bidder i to bid his own valuation bi(θi) = θi (see
Vickrey (1961) for a proof).
We x a bidder i and let the random variable Xi ≡ Xn−1i denote the highest value
among the n− 1 remaining bidders. Since each bidder will bid their value, the transfer
of each bidder in a second-price auction (SP) is
tSPi (θi) = Prob(Win)× E(θ) [2nd highest bid| θi is highest bid]
= F (θi)× E(θ)[X1|X1 < θi] .
First price auction. Bidder i’s expected payo, as a function of his bid bi and valuation
θi is
Ui =
{
0, if b1 < maxj 6=ibj ,
θi − bi, if b1 > maxj 6=ibj .
The bidder chooses bi in order to maximize
maxbi(θi − bi)Pr[bj = b(Θj) ≤ bi, ∀ j 6= i] .
It is a weakly dominant strategy to understate one’s valuation, as this leads to positive
expected prots. If instead the bidder bids truthfully, his expected payo will be zero.
Thus, the transfer from the rst-price auction (FP) is
tFPi (θi) = θ
L
i .
Hence, the revenues under the rst-price auction and the second-price auction do not
coincide when types are discretely distributed.
Proof of Proposition 1.10.
For the given allocation function q the incentive and participation constraints for in-
dividual i are given by
θLi Qi(θ
L
i )− Ti(θLi ) ≥ θLi Qi(θHi )− Ti(θHi ) (1.17)
θHi Qi(θ
H
i )− Ti(θHi ) ≥ θHi Qi(θLi )− Ti(θLi ) (1.18)
θLi Qi(θ
L
i )− Ti(θLi ) ≥ 0 (1.19)
θHi Qi(θ
H
i )− Ti(θHi ) ≥ 0 . (1.20)
Additional we have the expected budget balance condition:
E(θ) [t1(θ1, θ2) + t2(θ1, θ2)] = 0
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For standard arguments, we assume, that the participation constraint for the worst-o
type and the incentive constraint for the best-o are binding and solve the relaxed prob-
lem under these conditions. Subsequently we show, that the found solution fullls the
neglected conditions. Since Q1(θ1j) ≤ 0, j ∈ L,H we refer to individual 1 as the seller
and individual 2 as the buyer. Thus, equations (2.3) and (2.4) are binding for individual
2 and equations (2.2) and (2.5) are binding for individual 1.
Rearranging these conditions yields
T2(θ
L
2 ) = θ
L
2Q2(θ
L
2 )
T1(θ
H
1 ) = θ
H
1 Q1(θ
H
1 )
T2(θ
H
2 ) = θ
H
2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 )
T1(θ
L
1 ) = θ
L
1Q1(θ
L
1 )− (θL1 − θH1 )Q1(θH1 )
Plugging these transfers into the neglected conditions:
0 ≥ θL2Q2(θH2 )−
(
θH2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 )
)⇔ Q2(θH2 ) ≥ Q2(θL2 ) (1.21)
θH2 Q2(θ
H
2 )− θH2 Q2(θH2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 . (1.22)
Equation (1.22) always holds. The constraints for player 1 are analogous. We check
now the budget balance condition
fH1
(
θH1 Q1(θ
H
1 )
)
+ fL1
(
θL1Q1(θ
L
1 )− (θL1 − θH1 )Q1(θH1 )
)
=− (fL2 (θL2Q2(θL2 )) + fH2 (θH2 Q2(θH2 )− (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ))) .
Thus, forQi(θHi ) ≥ Qi(θLi ) we found the desired transfers, such that t1(θ1, θ2), t2(θ1, θ2),
q1(θ1, θ2), q2(θ1, θ2) fulll incentive constraints, participation constraints, if and only if
Eθ[θ1q1(θ1, θ2) + θ2q2(θ1, θ2)]− fL1 (θH1 − θL1 )Q1(θH1 )− fH2 (θH2 − θL2 )Q2(θL2 ) ≥ 0 .
Proof of Proposition 1.11.
We solve the relaxed problem and check, whether the solution fulll the neglected
conditions. Incentive and participation constraints are given by equations (2.2) - (2.5).
We assume that the participation constraints are binding. Thus,
Ti(θ
L
i ) = θ
L
i Qi(θ
L
i )
Ti(θ
H
1 ) = θ
H
i Qi(θ
H
i )
Check for the incentive constraints:
0 ≥ θLi Qi(θHi )− θHi Qi(θHi )
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0 ≥ θHi Qi(θLi )− θLi Qi(θLi ) .
Since Qi(θHi ) ≥ 0 and Qi(θLi ) ≤ 0, both incentive constraints hold. To check budget
balance, we plug the transfers into the budget balance condition and get the desired
result.
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Appendix 1.D From discrete to continuous for the
firm side
Production Economy. We dene a production economy (J,∆, p, y) as the vector
consisting of producers j ∈ J , the Cartesian product of type sets (one type set for ev-
ery rm j) ∆ = ∆1 × · · · × ∆m with the corresponding density functions pj : ∆j →
[0, 1], where p := (p0, . . . , pm), and the allocation rule y : ∆ → R+, that maps re-
ported types into allocations. Thus, a sequence of production economies is given by
(Jk,∆k, pk, yk)k∈N, where Jk is a sequence of producer sets, ∆k a sequence of type set-
products, pk a sequence of density-function vectors and yk a sequence of allocation func-
tions. We introduce some additional denitions and notations:
Producer. We keep the set J = 1, . . . ,mk be the set of consumers in round k. For
ease of notation, we write J instead of Jk and J∞k in every element of the sequence of
production economies.
Type sets. An element ∆l of the sequence (∆k)k∈N is given by the Cartesian product
over the type sets of the rms in round k. Since we assume symmetric rms, every rm
κ ∈ J has the same type set ∆kκ. Thus, ∆k = (∆kκ)mk
Density Functions. The sequence (pk)k∈N consists of pk = (pk1, . . . , pkmk), where pkj
is the density function over a nite type set, namely ∆kj , for all j < mk <∞, j ∈ J .
Allocation Functions.The sequence of allocations functions is given by (yk)k∈N : (∆k)k∈N
→ (xk)k∈N, xk ∈ R, where yk : ∆k → R. Remark: The denitions of convergence are
analogously to the consumption side. The revenues that we receive for a mechanism
(y, r) in a continuous environment, that fullls incentive compatibility constraints and
participation constraints can be found in equation (1.10)
Proposition 1.12. Let (J,∆k, pk, yk)k∈N → (J,∆∞, p∞, y∞), for k →∞. Then it holds,
that for every producer j ∈ J : For every  > 0 ∃ K : ∀ k ≥ K
∣∣∣∣∣E(δkj)
[
r−1∑
k=1
(
k(δkj, ykj(θ, δ)) + p(δ
l
j){k(δkkj, ykj(θ, δ))− k(δk−1k(kj), ykj(θ, δ))}
Pk(δkj)
pk(δkj)
)]
−
E(δ∞j)
[
k(δ∞j, y∞j(θ, δ)) +
∫ δr∞j
δ1∞j
p∞(δ∞j)k1(δ∞j, y∞j(θ, δ))
P∞(δ∞j)
p∞(δ∞j)
dδ∞j
] ∣∣∣∣∣ <  .
Proof of Proposition 1.12.
The arguments are similar to the ones used in Proposition 1.8 and therefore left to the
reader.
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Appendix 1.E Proof of Observations
Proof of Observation 1.1.
In the direct mechanism, there are 4 states of the economy, namely: (θH , δH), (θH , δL),
(θL, δH) and (θL, δL). Since q(θL, δH) = 0, straightforward computations yield
(θH1 , δ
H
1 ) : f
HfL
[
θH − δH + (δH − δL)f
H
fL
]
(θH1 , δ
L
1 ) : +f
HfH
[
θH − δL]
(θL1 , δ
L
1 ) : +f
LfH
[
θL − (θH − θL)f
H
fL
− δL
]
≥ 0
Hence, implementation of the social choice function is possible if and only if
fL ≥ δ
H − θL
θH − δL .
Proof of Observation 1.2.
The expected surplus is
S() =fHfL
[
θH − δH]+ fHfH [θH − δL]+ fLfH [θL − δL]
=fHfL
[
θH − δH + θL − δL]+ fHfH [θH − δL]
=fHfL
[
1− (δH − θL)]+ fHfH1
=fHfL [1− d] + fHfH
Hence ∂S()
∂d
< 0 .
The expected information rents are
IR() =fHfL
[
δH − δL + θH − θL]
=fHfL
[
1 + δH − θL]
=fHfL [1 + d]
Hence ∂IR()
∂d
> 0 .
Proof of Observation 1.3.
From the proof of Observation 1.2, we know that
S() = (1− fL)fL [1− d] + (1− fL)2 .
Therefore, whenever θH − δH < 1
2
,
∂S()
∂fL
< 0 .
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The expected information rents are
IR() = fHfL [1− d] .
So that ∂IR()
∂fL
< 0 .
Proof of Observation 1.4
Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θi = Θ = {θL, θH}.
We assume, that 0.5
(
θL + θH
)
> c. (For ease of notation: f(θL) = fL) Then g can be
implemented eciently, if and only if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[g(θ)] .
Since trade takes place, if at least one consumer has a high valuation, and g is either 0
or 1, the right-hand side of the equation equals
cE(θ)[g(θ)] =c(1− Prob(both have a low valuation))
= c
(
1− (fL)2) = c ((1 + fL)(1− fL)) = c ((1 + fL)fH) .
The left-hand side is given by
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)]
=
1
2
(fH)2
[
2θH
]
+
1
2
2fH fL
[
θL − 1− F (θ
L)
fL
(θH − θL) + θH
]
= fH
(
θL + fLθH
)
.
This yields that ecient implementation is possible, if and only if
θL + fLθH ≥ (1− fL)c⇔ fL ≥ c− θ
L
θH − c
Proof of Observation 1.5.
MS = −
[θH − c− fL(c− θL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
S(·)
− (1− fL)(θH − θL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IR(·)
 ≤ 0 .
i) If fL is xed, then ∂S()
∂c
< 0.
ii) If c is xed, then ∂S()
∂c
< 0 , and ∂IR()
∂c
< 0.
Proof of Observation 1.6.
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Consider the mechanism, in which the third type θM and δM for each player is added by
cutting the existing intervals [θH , θL] and [δH , δL] into halves and set
δM =
1
2
(
δH − θL + 1− (δ
H − θL)
2
)
,
and
θM =
1
2
(
δH − θL + 1− (δ
H − θL)
2
)
+
1− (δH − θL)
2
.
The mechanism works like the mechanism with outcome function f . We assume, that
the new middle type has probability, fM1 .
Ecient implementation is possible, whenever Corollary 1.1 applies.
If an additional type is introduced for the buyer and the seller, there are 9 states of the
economy. Trade is inecient when the low valuation buyer faces the high cost seller.
(θH , δH) : fH1 f
L
1
[
θH −
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θH , δM ) : fH1 f
M
1
[
θH −
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θH , δL) : fH1 f
H
1
[
θH − δL]
(θM , δH) : fM1 f
H
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
−
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θM , δM ) : fM1 f
M
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
−
(
δM + (δH − δM ) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θM , δL) : fM1 f
L
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
− δL
]
(θL, δM ) : fL1 f
M
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
−
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θL, δL) : fL1 f
H
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
− δL
]
Hence, by using the denition for θ11 and δ11 implementation of the social choice function
is possible if and only if
fL1 (θ
M
1 − δM1 ) ≥ δH1 − θL1 .
If we introduce a third type for each player, so that θM1 < δH1
Applying Proposition 1.4, ecient bilateral trade is possible if and only if
fL1 (θ
H
1 − δL1 ) ≥ δH1 − θL1 .
Proof of Observation 1.7.
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1.E Proof of Observations
Figure 1.10: ’Round 1’, Case b
δL1 δ
H
1
θL1 θ
H
1
δM1
θM1
By Observation 1.1, we know that implementation in ’round 0’ is possible if
fL0 > d .
By Observation 1.9, we know that implementation in ’round 1’ is possible if
fL1 >
δH1 − θL1
θM1 − δM1
.
Making use of Denition 1.2, implementation in ’round 1’ is less costly than in ’round
0’, i.e., the minimal subsidy decreases, if
fL1 >
2fL0
1 + fL0
.
The monotone hazard rate assumption is satised if
0 ≤ f
H
1
fM1
≤ f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
.
When fM1 is suciently small, the monotone hazard rate assumption is violated and im-
plementation can still be possible in ’round 1’.
Proof of Observation 1.8.
Consider the mechanism, in which the third type θM and δM for each player is added
such that θM1 < δM1 . Ecient implementation is possible, whenever Corollary 1.1 applies.
If an additional type is introduced for the buyer and the seller, there are 9 states of the
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economy. Trade is ecient only in 5 of them.
(θH , δH) : fH1 f
L
1
[
θH −
(
δH + (δH − δM )f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
)]
(θH , δM ) : fH1 f
M
1
[
θH −
(
δM + (δM − δL) f
H
1
fM1
)]
(θH , δL) : fH1 f
H
1
[
θH − δL]
(θM , δL) : fM1 f
L
1
[
θM − (θH − θM ) f
H
1
fM1
− δL
]
(θL, δL) : fL1 f
H
1
[
θL − (θM − θL)f
H
1 + f
M
1
fL1
− δL
]
Hence, implementation of the social choice function is possible if and only if
fL1 ≥
δH − θL
θH − δL .
Proof of Observation 1.9.
Consider the Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) setup for I = {1, 2},Θi = Θ = {θL1 , θM1 , θH1 }.
We assume, that 0.5
(
θL1 + θ
M
1
)
> c. Then g can be implemented eciently, if and only
if
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)] ≥ cE(θ)[g(θ)]
Since trade takes place, if at least one consumer has a middle valuation, and g is either
0 or 1, the right-hand side of the equation equals
cE(θ)[g(θ)] =c(1− Prob(both have a low valuation))
= c
(
1− (fL1 )2
)
= c
(
(1 + fL1 )(1− fL1 )
)
= c(1 + fL1 )(f
H + fM1 )
The left-hand side is given by:
1
2
∑
i=1,2
E(θ)[v(θi)g(θ)]
= θM1
[
fL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)]
+ θL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
= θM1 f
L
1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
+ θL1
(
fH1 + f
M
1
)
This yields that ecient implementation is possible, if and only if
fL1 >
c− θL1
θM1 − c
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Optimal non-linear income taxation for
arbitrary welfare weights
2.1 Introduction
The given paper addresses the question how optimal income tax schedules should be
designed under the assumption that the direction of redistribution can vary arbitrarily.
A model building on Mirrlees (1971) is used where the welfare function is assumed to
be weighted Utilitarian. The welfare weights assigned to productivity types reect the
redistributive preference of the planner. Typically, the existing literature in tradition
of Mirrlees (1971) focuses on redistribution towards the poor. In discrete type models
this translates to welfare weights that decrease in the individuals’ productivity as e.g.
in Weymark (1986a) or Simula (2010). For models with continuous type sets, optimal
redistribution towards the poor is a consequence of a concave welfare function, see e.g.
Mirrlees (1971) or Ebert (1992), Brunner (1993, 1995) and more recently Hellwig (2007).
The present paper considers a broader set of welfare objectives, given by weighted Util-
itarian welfare functions with arbitrary weights, and analyzes the formal implications
for the corresponding optimization problem and its solutions. It, thereby, provides theo-
retical contributions to the literature on mechanism design theory and, in particular, to
the eld of optimal tax theory.
Extending the analysis to a broader set of welfare weights is in line with various papers
in recent years. These papers question the monotonicity assumption Mirrleesian models
apply on welfare weights and study alternative formulations. A comprehensive investi-
gation of "generalized" welfare weights in a taxation framework is provided by Saez and
Stantcheva (2016). They introduce a formulation of welfare weights that allows to study
various redistributive preferences; among other features, those weights include fairness
considerations as these distinguish between individual characteristics that require com-
pensation via a tax and those that do not. Furthermore, there is a branch in the literature
taking an inverse perspective on optimal tax schemes and, thereby, shedding more light
on the importance of analyzing various welfare weights and deriving the corresponding
income tax schedules. Zoutman et al. (2014, 2017), Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) as
well as Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016) use income tax schemes that are implemented to
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infer marginal social welfare weights. By this "inverse-optimum" method, Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2012) nd that marginal welfare weights are negative for high earners
which implies that the tax scheme is not Paretian.1 For the Netherlands, Zoutman et al.
(2014, 2017) infer a non-monotonic pattern of welfare weight. i.e the weight that is put on
middle incomes is much higher than the one on small incomes or non-working people.
This contradicts strict redistribution towards the poor as considered by Mirrlees (1971)
and subsequent work. Conclusively, these ndings motivate to deepen the examination
of welfare weights as determining factor of optimal tax schemes.2
Slightly changing the perspective, the given paper can also be read from a political
economy perspective such that welfare weights or, equivalently, the corresponding tax
rates, reect a political position. Citizen candidate models as rstly considered by Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996) or Besley and Coate (1997) can be used to identify politically
feasible policies. Among others, Röell (2012) and Brett and Weymark (2017) use this
framework to study voting over tax schedules and show that the median’s most preferred
tax schedule is politically feasible, more precisely, wins in a majority voting procedure.
They focus on selshly optimal taxes formalized by welfare weights that are zero for all
but one productivity type and, thus, yield redistribution towards the type with the non-
zero welfare weight. In game-theoretical terms these binary weights can be interpreted
as pure strategies in the policy space of Utilitarian welfare objectives. Analogously, a
vector of welfare weights that consists of elements between zero and one can be seen
as a mixed strategy that results in various directions of optimal redistribution. In that
sense, the given paper is a rst step towards a broader analysis on politically feasible
income tax schedules and, in turn, on the link of taxation theory and political economy.
Note that the interpretation of welfare weights as mixed strategies also refers to a strand
in the political science literature that studies optimal party positioning in multidimen-
sional policy spaces. The phenomenon of choosing a position that is a mixture of several
dimensions is called "blurring", see Rovny (2012) and Elias et al. (2015).
Concluding, it seems to be useful from dierent perspectives to widen the focus and
consider the complete set of welfare weights, i.e. to expand the existing and well under-
stood results on optimal income taxation in the fashion of Mirrlees (1971) to a broader
set of social preferences. To do so, it is decisive to understand how the underlying op-
timization problem is aected by that. The following section provides more detailed
information about the model, the technical details and gives an overview of the main
ndings.
Main Results The model in the present paper is a Mirrleesian income tax model with
a continuum of individuals and three dierent productivity levels which are distributed
1Exemptions are situations including a very small labor supply elasticity.
2With regard to the support of Mirrleesian redistribution pattern in reality, Weinzierl (2014) provides
empirical evidence that people disagree with the unweighted Utilitarian approach of Mirrlees (1971)
but rather prefer an equal sacrice objective.
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uniformly. Individuals hold private information about their productivity such that the
optimization problem includes, in addition to the resource constraint, also incentive con-
straints. The welfare objective is a weighted Utilitarian where the sum of weights is
w.l.o.g. normalized to one.
In the rst part of the paper, the incentive structure of the optimization problem is an-
alyzed. For every possible vector of welfare weights, binding incentive constraints are
identied. As these reect the optimal directions of redistribution, binding constraints
vary in the weights assigned to the productivity types. The analysis considers each pair
of adjacent types and derives the respectively binding incentive constraint. Disentan-
gling incentives this way is only possible as types are assumed to be discrete. In models
with a continuous type set, the concept of adjacent types and, hence, local incentive
constraints is not welldened such that incentive eects of various welfare objectives
are disguised.
There are two prevailing pattern of binding constraints in the literature: for the canon-
ical case of monotonically decreasing welfare weights, all local downward incentive con-
straints bind, see Weymark (1986a) or Simula (2010).3 For the case of selshly optimal
welfare weights, Röell (2012) and Brett and Weymark (2017) show that the incentive
constraints pointing towards the favored type bind at the optimum.4
Yet, the existing work lacks not only an examination of additional pattern or, equiva-
lently, welfare weights but does also not address the question whether those pattern are
obtained injectively in the sense that the considered welfare weights are the only ones
inducing the given pattern of binding constraints.5
With regard to these observations, the present paper tackles the following two points:
rstly, it extends the subject of investigation towards taxation problems with non mono-
tonic welfare weights. Secondly, it renes the existing analysis by identifying the set of
welfare weights that induce the established pattern of binding constraints. It is notewor-
thy that the given setup includes three productivity types which increases the complex-
ity of the problem compared to a two-type model. Not only the number of combinations
of potentially binding constraints multiplies but also qualitatively dierent pattern of
binding constraints, e.g. bunching, can occur at the optimum. This is never true for
two-type models as shown by Bierbrauer and Boyer (2014).
The analysis in the rst part of the presented paper uses a perturbation argument
to deliver a characterization of the incentive structure of the given problem. Dening
utility levels as variables, the binding incentive constraints can be inferred from the
welfare eect of the considered utility perturbation. The ndings are summarized in
3See Mirrlees (1971), Ebert (1992), Brunner (1993, 1995) or Hellwig (2007) for the continuous equivalent.
4For results on binding incentive constraints in an investigation of second-best Pareto ecient tax sched-
ules, see Stiglitz (1982) and Bierbrauer and Boyer (2014).
5With regard to this, Weymark (1986a) includes a sidenote saying that monotonically decreasing welfare
weights are not necessary for local downward incentive constraints to bind. However, there is no
further specication of the corresponding weights.
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two formal conditions that assign a set of binding incentive constraints to a vector of
welfare weights. For each pair of adjacent productivity types, the conditions determine
the respectively binding constraint. It becomes clear that relative weights are decisive
for an incentive constraint to bind.
Furthermore, the conditions imply that depending on the welfare weight, none, one or
two incentive constraints are determined to bind. If there is no desire for redistribution
between adjacent types, the corresponding vector of welfare weights pins down no or
only one binding constraint. For scenarios with two binding incentive constraints, it
holds that these are not mutually binding between adjacent types but belong to two
dierent pairs of types.
To illustrate the resulting correspondence between welfare weights and incentive con-
straints, a geometrical presentation is introduced: as welfare weights sum up to one, the
set of weights can be presented by a simplex. The triangle of welfare weights can be
partitioned according to the binding constraints. The separating lines are dened by
the aforementioned conditions and represent welfare weights that pin down only one
binding incentive constraint. At the intersection of those lines, no incentive constraint
binds which describes the laissez faire situation.6
The second part of the paper is aimed at solving the optimization problem and deriving
optimal marginal tax rates. A mechanism design approach is used to compute optimal
income-consumption bundles for each productivity type. The identication of binding
constraints and the assumption of quasilinear preferences allow to simplify the analy-
sis: a reduced form problem can be stated for every possible vector of welfare weights.
It is obtained by rearranging binding constraints such that a new welfare function can
be formulated which incorporates all binding constraints and is a function of income
only. This halves the dimensionality of the problem as welfare is no longer a function of
both income and consumption. The procedure was rstly used in a non-taxation con-
text by Mussa and Rosen (1978) who study a monopoly pricing problem, and later by
Myerson (1981) and Guesnerie and Laont (1984) in an auction setting and a general
principal-agent-model, respectively. The rst applying it to a tax problem were Lollivier
and Rochet (1983) in a continuous and Weymark (1986a) in a discrete type setting. More
recently, Simula (2010) uses this technique to characterize optimal tax schemes in a set-
ting with nitely many types. He focuses on strictly decreasing welfare weights.
Studying the restated welfare function reveals further insight in the incentive eects
of a given vector of welfare weights. Beside the budgetary restriction of the optimization,
binding incentive constraints show up in the new welfare function by information rents.
These have to be paid to prevent individuals from announcing another than their true
productivity. Depending on the directions of redistribution, the sign and the argument
of information rents dier. Whenever a local incentive constraint binds downwards
6The simplex representation is similar to the one in Laslier and Picard (2002) where the redistribution of
one unit of a homogeneous good among n individuals is studied in a political competition framework.
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(upwards), the corresponding information rent enters welfare negatively (positively).
From slack incentive constraints, as given e.g. in the laissez faire economy, no social
cost arise and no information rent has to be paid. The argument of an information rent
reveals which type the receiving individuals have an incentive to mimic. As a result,
all previously mentioned combinations of binding constraints yield a dierent reduced
form, i.e. welfare function. For a formulation of the canonical case on redistributing
downwards see Weymark (1986a) or Simula (2010).
The subsequent analysis derives optimal marginal tax rates based on a rst order ap-
proach. First order conditions are computed based on the restated welfare function.
Assuming these to be sucient, those conditions characterize the optimal income level.
Due to the quasilinearity of preferences, optimal income unambiguously determines op-
timal consumption. Since the restated welfare function is formulated only based on
binding constraints, one further step is necessary to prove that the derived allocation is
optimal. Only if the computed allocation is monotonically increasing in the productivity
type, it characterizes an optimum. Hellwig (2007) shows that when all local downward
incentive constraints bind, upward incentive constraints can be replaced by a mono-
tonicity condition. The given paper expands this result to the newly derived pattern of
binding incentive constraints. For non-monotonic solutions, the optimal allocation in-
cludes bunching. Utilizing the rst order conditions and the single-crossing characteris-
tic of preferences, some types of bunching can be ruled out: if optimal redistribution is
directed towards the boundary types, bunching cannot be optimal. There is no bunching
around the highly productive type if redistribution towards the poor is optimal. This was
rstly noted by Guesnerie and Seade (1982) for a non-linear pricing context, and later
studied e.g. by Weymark (1986b). Vice versa, redistributing towards the rich does not
allow for bunching around the least skilled type. For weights that induce redistribution
towards the median-skilled type bunching cannot be ruled out. Detailed work on bunch-
ing for scenarios with decreasing welfare weights or selshly optimal welfare weights
is done by Weymark (1986b) and Brett and Weymark (2017), respectively.
Focusing on fully separating allocations, the subsequent analysis delivers the follow-
ing results on optimal tax schedules: it is never optimal to have negative marginal tax
rates for low productive or positive tax rates for highly productive individuals. Individ-
uals with a median productivity can face positive or negative marginal tax rates at the
optimum depending on the welfare weights. Generally, tax rates of a productivity are
zero if his local incentive constraints bind. This is in line with the existing literature. For
scenarios with redistribution towards the poor, it holds that optimal tax rates are positive
for everyone except the most productive individuals who face marginal taxes of zero at
the optimum, see Seade (1977) who extends the results of Mirrlees (1971). For vectors of
degenerate welfare weights, where all except one weight are zero, Röell (2012) and Brett
and Weymark (2017) nd that optimal tax rates below the favored type are negative and
above the favored type are positive.
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Lastly, comparative static properties of optimal tax rates with respect to the welfare
weights are stated. Regardless of the sign, marginal tax rates are non-decreasing (non-
increasing) in the welfare weight of the low (high) productivity type. For the Mirrleesian
redistribution pattern, Weymark (1987) and, more recently, Simula (2010) deliver results
on comparative static properties of optimal non-linear income tax rates also with respect
to welfare weights. Further results on how welfare weights aect optimal income tax
rates can be found in Bierbrauer and Boyer (2014) who describe the complete second-best
Pareto frontier in a two-type model.7
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the formal environment.
It is followed by the introduction of the simplex of welfare weights and the formal iden-
tication of binding incentive constraints in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 starts with the for-
mulation of the reduced form problem. Subsequently, optimal tax rates and comparative
static properties are derived. Part 2.5.1 closes the analysis with a discussion on the rela-
tion between the delivered results and (second-best) Pareto eciency. The last section
gives an outlook on future steps.
2.2 Environment
The following analysis uses a simpler version of the Mirrleesian income tax model, see
Mirrlees (1971), where preferences are quasilinear and given by the following utility
functionU(ci, hi) = ci−v(hi). Person i′s consumption level of a private good is denoted
by ci and hi denotes her hours worked. The utility function is increasing in consumption
and decreasing in labor, v′(·) > 0, v′′(·) > 0 and limh→∞ v′(·) = ∞ and limh→0 v′(·) =
0.
The set of individuals is given by I = [0, 1]. They dier in their productive ability
where the set of all possible productivity levels is Ω = {wL, wM , wH}. It holds that
0 < wL < wM < wH . In the economy, equally many individuals of each type exist.8
The distribution of types is common knowledge.
The production possibilities in the economy are such that if an individual with pro-
ductivity wk works for one hour she produces wk units of the consumption good. The
output she produces is therefore given by yik = wkhik. For a given productivity wk, we
can rewrite person i’s utility function as
U ik(c
i
k, h
i
k) = c
i
k − v
(
yik
wk
)
=: uk.
Individuals of the same productive abilitywk are treated equally in the sense that they
consume the same amount of the private good ck and work for hk hours, i.e. produce
the same output yk. Hence, the index i distinguishing between single individuals can
7Comparative static results for linear tax schedules are derived by Hellwig (1986).
8This assumption simplies the analysis but is in fact only a normalization and thus w.l.o.g..
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be omitted such that an allocation for the described economy is given by a collection of
consumption and output levels for each productivity level (ck, yk)k=L,M,H ∈ R+ × R.
In this setting, the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition is satised where pref-
erences are such that indierence curves intersect only once,
∂Uk
∂yk
∂Uk
∂ck
>
∂Ul
∂yl
∂Ul
∂cl
⇔ 1
wk
v′
(
yk
wk
)
> 1
wl
v′
(
yl
wl
)
, if wl > wk. (SC)
An allocation is resource feasible if aggregate consumption does not exceed aggregate
production,9 ∑
k=L,M,H
ck ≤
∑
k=L,M,H
yk,
Individuals have private information about their productive abilities wk and about
hours worked hk. By contrast, consumption ck and output yk = wkhk are assumed to be
observable.
For this information structure, we call an allocation incentive compatible if it satises
the following incentive compatibility constraints: for every pair of productivity level wk
and wl,
Uk(ck, yk) = ck − v( ykwk ) ≥ cl − v(
yl
wk
) = Uk(cl, yl).
So, incentive compatibility ensures that an individual of type wk prefers consuming
ck and working ykwk hours over consuming cl and working for
yl
wk
hours.
An allocation (c, y) is incentive feasible if it is resource feasible and incentive compat-
ible.
To study the Mirrleesian income tax problem a mechanism design approach is used:
instead of choosing a tax schedule T (y) as a function of income, a set of allocations
(ck, yk)k=L,M,H with a designated allocation for each skill type is stated. The allocations
are designed such that they allow for a decentralization via a tax system: by the taxation
principle due to Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995), an allocation (ck, yk)k=L,M,H
can be reached by an income tax system T : y 7→ T (y) if and only if it is incentive
feasible.
Implicit marginal tax rates are dened by the wedge between the marginal rate of
substitution and the marginal rate of transformation:
τk := T
′(yk) = 1 − 1ωk v
′( yk
ωk
). (2.1)
As preferences are quasilinear in consumption, marginal tax rates do not depend on
consumption. When marginal tax rates are zero, labor supply is undistorted. In con-
9One could account for positive governmental expenditures, but they do not aect results qualitatively.
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trast, whenever incentive constraints bind, a distortion in the respective labor supply is
induced.
The following chapter identies the binding incentive constraints as a function of wel-
fare weights.
2.3 Simplex of welfare weights
The following analysis examines how the mathematical formulation of the welfare max-
imization problem is aected the assumption of arbitrary welfare weights.
The analysis is aimed at simplifying the optimization problem in the sense that bind-
ing constraints are determined for every possible pattern of redistributive preferences,
formally, every possible vector of welfare weights.
The welfare maximization problem P (g) is given by:
for a given vector of welfare weights, choose an allocation (ck, yk)k=L,M,H to maximize
the corresponding weighted Utilitarian welfare function W (·; g) subject to incentive
constraints and a resource constraint. Formally,
max
(c,y)
W (c, y; g) = gL UL(cL,
yL
wL
) + gM UM(cM ,
yM
wM
) + gH UH(cH ,
yH
wH
)
cL − v( yLwL ) ≥ cM − v(
yM
wL
), (ICL)
cM − v( yMwM ) ≥ cL − v(
yL
wM
), (ICML)
cM − v( yMwM ) ≥ cH − v(
yH
wM
), (ICMH )
cH − v( yHwH ) ≥ cM − v(
yM
wH
), (ICH )
yL + yM + yH ≥ cL + cM + cH . (RC)
where g = (gL, gM , gH) ∈ G is the vector of welfare weights. It expresses the redis-
tributive preferences of the planner and is assumed to be arbitrary. Using a normalized
presentation, the complete set of possible welfare weights is G = {g = (gL, gM , gH) :
gL + gM + gH = 1}. As the solution of the optimization problem depends on g, the
optimal allocation is denoted by (c∗(g), y∗(g)) = (c∗k(g), y∗k(g))k=L,M,H .
To compute the optimal allocation for a given weight g ∈ G, it is useful to know
the binding constraints as it simplies the analysis. Those constraints depend on the
desired directions of redistribution. In particular, if g entails conicting directions of
redistribution, which means that welfare weights are not monotonic in the type, it is a
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priori unclear which constraint binds. The following analysis delivers conditions that
unambiguously determine binding constraints as a function of g.
If welfare weights are egalitarian, such that gL = gM = gH = 13 , there is no desire
to redistribute between dierent productivity types since preferences are quasilinear.
Hence, in this case, no incentive constraint binds. Whenever gj 6= gk 6= 13 , redistri-
bution is desirable such that incentive constraints are no longer slack. To specify the
binding incentive constraints for each vector g ∈ G, it is useful to put some structure on
the set G by distinguishing weights g with respect to the ordinal ranking of single wel-
fare weights (gL, gM , gH). There are six dierent ways to rank weights strictly given by
the list below. Additionally, there are elements g ∈ G that entail two (or more) identical
weights.
gL > gM > gH (i)
gL > gH > gM (ii)
gM > gL > gH (iii)
gM > gH > gL (iv)
gH > gL > gM (v)
gH > gM > gL (vi)
The normalized welfare weights can be illustrated by a simplex where the welfare
weight of the median type is expressed in terms of the others’ welfare weights, such
that gM = 1− gL − gH , see Figure 2.1.
Some welfare weights, or more generally, sets of welfare weights, are well studied. The
Mirrleesian case of redistributing towards the poor is represented in the given frame-
work by non-increasing welfare weights which is region (i) of the simplex. For every
element in this subset ofG, all local downward incentive constraints bind. Analogously,
welfare weights that are non-decreasing in the skill type as in ((vi)) induce all local
upward incentive constraints to bind. The degenerate cases of selshly optimal weights
where gk = 1 for some k, yield incentive constraints to bind towards type k as her utility
is maximized.10
The following analysis replicates these ndings, but, additionally delivers insights for
welfare weights that are neither monotonic nor selshly optimal illustrated by regions
ii)− v).
10For details on the results see Weymark (1986a), Simula (2010), Röell (2012) or Brett and Weymark (2017),
respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Simplex of welfare weights
To gure out what pattern of binding constraints applies for a given welfare weight g,
redistributive preferences have to be disentangled. If welfare weights are non-monotonic
and, so, include various directions of redistribution, the dominating ones have to be
identied as they determine the binding incentive constraints.
The procedure starts at an agnostic point, where all four incentive constraints are as-
sumed to be slack. In the next step, this point is left as small perturbations in utility
levels are considered and the resulting welfare eect is computed. If the change leads
to an increase in welfare without violating any incentive or the resource constraint, the
redistribution expressed by the perturbation is desirable in terms of welfare. Hence, re-
distributing in this direction should be carried on until one of the incentive constraints
hinders further redistribution and binds. Vice versa, if welfare has dropped due to the
change, redistributing in the opposite direction is desirable. It becomes clear that de-
pending on relative weights, the pattern of binding incentive constraints varies.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a given welfare weight g ∈ G and the corresponding optimiza-
tion problem P (g).
1) If the following condition holds, ICML binds at the optimum
gL >
gM + gH
2
. (A)
If the opposite is true, ICL binds at the optimum.
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If the condition holds with equality, neither ICML nor ICL has to bind at the opti-
mum.
2) If the following condition holds strictly, ICH binds at the optimum
gH <
gL + gM
2
. (B)
If the opposite is true, ICMH binds at the optimum.
If the condition holds with equality, neither ICMH nor ICH has to bind at the opti-
mum.
Intuitively, if the welfare weight of the low-skilled type is suciently high, she needs
to be made o as good as possible to maximize welfare. This creates an incentive for the
median-skilled type to mimic this type, such that ICML binds. More precisely, if low-
skilled individuals are assigned a welfare weight that is as least as high as the weighted
sum of the others’ welfare weights, the local downward incentive constraint of the me-
dian skill type binds – and vice versa. Analogously, if the welfare weight of the highly
productive type falls below the weighted sum of the others’ welfare weights, her local
downward incentive constraint binds – and vice versa.
Hence, optimal redistribution depends solely on the welfare weights.11 Note that the
desire to redistribute between adjacent productivity types depends not only on their
welfare weights but also on the weight of the third productivity type. E.g. even if gL >
gM , it depends on the welfare weight of the high-skilled type whether the local incentive
constraint towards the low-skilled binds. For instance, if we consider area v), where
gH > gL > gM , it is not a priori clear whether the desire to redistribute towards the
high-skilled outweighs the desire to redistribute towards the low-skilled or vice versa.
Only if welfare weights are monotonic no other information than the ordinal ranking of
singular weights is needed to identify the binding constraints. This is the case for area
i) and iv). In the remaining four areas where weights are non-monotonic, condition (A)
and (B) have to be checked to ’compare’ the conicting desire to redistribute upwards
or downwards to make out the binding incentive constraints.
Replacing gM = 1 − gL − gH in condition (A) and (B), the expressions become even
more simple and can be added by lines to Figure 2.1. Condition (A) and (B), respectively,
become
gL >
1
3
, (A)
gH <
1
3
. (B)
11The population shares enters the given conditions as well. As we assumed w.l.o.g. that the type distri-
bution is uniform, they do not show up explicitly in the conditions.
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Figure 2.2: Simplex of welfare weights with partitioning
The lines given by gL ≡ 13 and gH ≡ 13 in Figure 2.2 represent welfare weights such
that condition (A) and (B) hold with equality, respectively. According to proposition 2.1
there is no desire to redistribute between the two respective adjacent skill types. Hence,
welfare weights g where either the low- or the high-skilled individuals’ welfare weight
equals the average of the others weights pin down only one binding incentive constraint.
At the intersection of these lines, no incentive constraint binds which describes the lais-
sez faire situation.
In cases where neither condition (A) nor condition (B) hold with equality formally
gk 6= 13 , ∀k, two binding incentive constraints are determined by the conditions. The
following lemma summarizes these ndings.
Lemma 2.1. The set of normalized welfare weights G consists of elements that determine
no, one or two binding incentive constraints for the solution of problem P (g).
Local upward (downward) constraints bind if welfare weights are monotonically in-
creasing (decreasing) in the productivity type. No other information than the ordinal
ranking of single weights is necessary to make out the two binding constraints. This
shows up in the graphic by area i) and vi) not being split by the lines representing (A)
and (B), respectively. Contrary, area ii)− v) are cut by those lines. Intuitively, there are
conicting directions of redistribution for welfare weights that lie in those areas. The
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strength of the respective redistribution desire decides on the nal pattern of binding
incentive constraints. Constraints bind towards the median skill type if his weight is
suciently high compared to the other two weights. And, vice versa, if the median’s
type weight is suciently low, constraints pointing towards the boundary types of the
skill distribution bind.
It is worth noting, that the assumption of a uniform skill distribution is not restrictive.
Depending on the specic distribution, the functional form of the lines that correspond
to condition (A) and (B), respectively, dier. However, the qualitative results are inde-
pendent of that: the line linked to condition (A) splits section iii) and v) and the line
linked to condition (B) splits section ii) and iv). So, whenever a group of median-skilled
individuals exists, all before mentioned combinations of binding incentive constraints
are induced by some welfare weight. The upcoming analysis builds on the pattern of
binding incentive constraints, so that the assumption on the skill distribution is w.l.o.g.
for the results.
2.4 Welfare maxima and optimal marginal taxes
2.4.1 The reduced-form problem
The ndings of the preceding chapter allow to restate the optimization problem P (g)
in a way that simplies the analysis drastically. The binding constraints can be utilized
to state a reduced-form problem for which the welfare function incorporates already
the binding incentive constraints. Slack constraints are replaced by a monontonicity
constraint.12
The solution of the original problem P (g) and the reduced-form problem P ′(g) are
identical.13
The analysis proceeds in two steps: in a rst step, the reduced-form problem P ′(g)
is derived. Contrary to the original problem P (g) which involves two control variables,
consumption and income, the reduced form entails only one, income. Secondly, rst
order conditions on optimal income are provided which implicitly describe the optimal
allocation as a solution of the reduced-form problem and are henceforth, assumed to be
sucient.14 Finally, the question whether and for which welfare weights the optimal
allocation might include bunching is addressed.
Beside the incentive constraints, the following Corollary proves the resource con-
straint to bind in the optimal allocation.
12Lollivier and Rochet (1983) applied this method to taxation problems with a continuum of individuals
and Weymark (1986a) uses this approach in the context of optimal taxation problems when nitely
many individuals live in the economy.
13For a proof see Proposition 2.3.
14Whether those conditions are sucient depends on the functional form of preferences, i.e. on v(·), see
Corollary 2.3.
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Corollary 2.1. If an allocation is welfare maximizing, the resource constraint (RC) binds.
Given the set of binding constraints, the reduced-form problem P ′(g) and its solution
can be obtained as follows: rearranging the binding resource and incentive constraints
allows to state expressions of consumption c∗(y) that are functions of income and respect
all binding constraints:15
c∗L(y) =
1
3
∑
i=L,M,H
yi +
H∑
k=M
(
1−
k−1∑
j=L
fj
)(
v(yk−1
ωk
)− v( yk
ωk
)
)
c∗j(y() = c
∗
L(y)−
j∑
k=M
(
v(yk−1
ωk
)− v( yk
ωk
)
)
, j = M,H
with ωM :=
 ωL if ICL binds,ωM if ICML binds, and ωH :=
 ωH if ICH binds,ωM if ICMH binds.
Given that, welfare can be restated such that it is a function of income only and in-
corporates all binding constraints, denoted by W ∗(c∗(y), y; g). Maximizing the restated
welfare function subject to a monotonicity constraint yields an income vector y∗(g) that
respects all constraints and solves the problem. According to Hellwig (2007) non-binding
incentive constraints can be replaced by a monotonicity constraint if all local downward
incentive constraints bind. The next Corollary extends the result to other pattern of
binding incentive constraints.
Corollary 2.2. Consider the given economy. There are two pairs of adjacent incentive
constraints. An allocation is incentive feasible if it is monotonic and one constraint out of
each pair of adjacent incentive constraints binds.
Hence, a monotonic solution of the reduced-form optimization is incentive feasible
regardless of the pair of binding incentive constraints. The optimal income level can be
obtained by inserting the derived income level in the respective consumption function
c∗ (y(g)) such that the nal solution (c∗ (y∗(g)) , y∗(g)) is obtained.
A necessary prerequisite for this procedure is the knowledge of the binding incentive
constraints. See Simula (2010) applying this method to a similar setting when redis-
tributing downwards is desirable.
Proposition 2.2. For a given g ∈ G, the reduced form problem P ′(g) of problem P (g) is
given by: choose an income vector y = (yL, yM , yH) that maximizes the following welfare
functionW ∗(·) subject to the monotonicity and non-negativity constraints
15See the proof of Proposition 2.2 for details on the following expressions.
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max
y
W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) =
∑
k=L,M,H
(
yk − v( ykwk )
)
+
∑
j=l,h
αj Rj(yj)
s.t. 0 ≤ yL ≤ yM ≤ yH .
where
yl ∈ {yL, yM} and yh ∈ {yM , yH},
αl = 1 − 3 gL and αh = −(1 − 3 gH).
and
Rl(·) =
{
v(yM
wL
) − v( yM
wM
), if gL < 13 ,
v( yL
wL
) − v( yL
wM
), if gL ≥ 13 , 16
(Rl)
and
Rh(·) =
{
v( yM
wM
) − v( yM
wH
), if gH ≤ 13 , 17
v( yH
wM
) − v( yH
wH
), if gH > 13 .
(Rh)
Rj(·), j ∈ {l, h} is the information rent associated with a binding incentive con-
straint: Rl(·) is the rent arising from either ICL or ICML being binding and, analogously,
Rh(·) is the rent arising from either ICH or ICMH being binding. Those rents have to
be paid due to the unobservability of productivity types, so to prevent individuals from
mimicking another than their true type. The argument ofRj(·) depends on the direction
of redistribution. Information rent Rj(yk) is paid to an individual who has an incentive
to report type wk.
The factor αj ∈ {αl, αh} mirrors condition (A) and (B), respectively. Its sign is deter-
mined by the direction of the binding incentive constraint, formally
αl =

> 0 , if ICL binds,
< 0 , if ICML binds,
= 0 , if neither ICML nor ICL binds.
and
16This denition of the information rent entails the case gL = 13 when no information rent has to be paid.
As the corresponding weight αj is zero, the given denition is w.l.o.g..
17This denition of the information rent entails the case gH = 13 when no information rent has to be
paid. As the corresponding weight αj is zero, the given denition is w.l.o.g..
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αh =

< 0 , if ICH binds,
> 0 , if ICMH binds,
= 0 , if neither ICMH nor ICH binds.
The weight αk reects the redistributive preferences: while its sign mirrors the direc-
tion of redistribution, its size quanties the strength of the desire to redistribute in this
direction. More precisely, αl captures the net welfare eect of increasing the consump-
tion of low-skilled individuals by one unit without taking incentive eects into account.
Similarly, αh mirrors the net welfare eect when one more unit of consumption is given
to low- and median-skilled types, respectively. Thereby, welfare increases by the sum
of their welfare weights. To restore the resource constraint, everyone’s consumption is
reduced by the same amount. This yields the stated expressions.
2.4.2 Optimal marginal taxes and bunching
In the following, a rst order approach is used to study the reduced form problem P ′(g).
First order conditions are computed for every type, respectively, and the corresponding
optimal tax rates are derived. Thereby, the second order conditions are assumed to be
satised. Whether the given rst order conditions are actually sucient to determine a
maximum depends on the preferences’ characteristics, i.e. on v(·). See Appendix, Corol-
lary 2.3 for details on the conditions on v(·) that need to be fullled for second order
conditions to hold. Note that the conditions vary across the simplex as they depend on
binding constraints and, therefore, are not introduced with the general setting in Section
2.2. Based on the rst order conditions comparative static properties of optimal income
and tax rates with respect to welfare weights are derived.
The analysis starts by solving a relaxed version of problem P ′(g) where the mono-
tonicity and the non-negativity constraint is neglected. The condition is checked ex-post.
If the solution of the relaxed problem fullls the monotonicity and the non-negativity
constraint, a solution of P ′(g) is found. Otherwise, the optimal solution includes bunch-
ing, which will be addressed in Section 2.4.2.
The relaxed problem P r(g) is given by: maximizeW ∗(c∗(y), y; g) overR. Solving this
unconstrained optimization problem yields optimal income yrk(g), k = L,M,H that is
implicitly given by the following rst order conditions,18 respectively
∂W ∗(c∗(y), y; g)
∂yk
= 1− 1
wk
v′(
yk
wk
) +
∑
j=l,h
αj
∂Rj(·)
∂yk
= 0, k = L,M,H. (FOC)
18The proof of the following expression is entailed in the proof of Proposition 2.2.
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If the implicitly given solution yr(g) of the relaxed problem P r(g) is fully separating,
formally yrk(g) 6= yrj (g), j 6= k, it is in fact a solution of problem P ′(g). In this case, the
rst order conditions FOC reveal further insights in the underlying mechanisms.
The derivative of ∂W
∗(·)
∂yk
captures the eect of an increase in the income of type k on
welfare. The rst component of the rst order condition refers to an increase in person
k’s income by one unit without accounting for the incentive constraints. An increase
in yk allows to consume an additional amount of 1 − 1wk v′(
yk
wk
). This is always positive
regardless of the welfare weights. Contrary, if incentive constraints towards type k bind,
those need to be restored after the change in income. As an information rent reects the
adjustment that has to be made in the utility of a person that has an incentive to mimic
type ωk, it varies in the respective income, mirrored by ∂Rj(·)∂yk . Whether this adjustment
aects welfare positively or negatively depends on the direction of redistribution which,
in turn, is determined by αj .19 If a downward incentive constraint binds towards type
k, the increase in person k’s utility requires an increase in the utility of types above
k. Consequently, restoring incentives due to binding downward incentive constraints,
yields a negative welfare eect. Vice versa, if an upward constraint binds towards type
k, consumption of less skilled types can be reclaimed (and evenly distributed among in-
dividuals), such that restoring incentives has a positive eect on welfare. However, αj
not only reects the direction of redistribution but also quanties the desire to redis-
tribute. Formally, it weights the change in information rents and, hence, measures the
social costs arising from reestablishing binding incentive constraints.
Before studying the corresponding optimal marginal taxes, the following section ap-
proaches how optimal income is dened if the solution of the relaxed problem is de-
creasing for some k and, hence, not fully separating but includes bunching.
Bunching
Bunching occurs if the solution yr(g) of the relaxed problem violates the monotonicity
or the non-negativity constraint. So it is either yrL(g) > yrM(g) or yrM(g) > yrH(g) or
yrL(g) < 0. Depending on the welfare regime, i.e. the binding constraints, some types of
bunching can be ruled out as they contradict the rst order conditions.
Proposition 2.3. Consider the relaxed problem P r(g). For the solution yr(g) implicitly
given by the rst order conditions FOC, it holds that
• there is no bunching, if ICML and ICMH bind. Formally, yrL(g) < y
r
M(g) <
yrH(g).
• bunching cannot be ruled out, if ICL and ICH bind.
19The adjustment in the information rent is always positive such that the sign of αk ∂Rj(yk)∂yk is determined
by αk .
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• there is no bunching at the top, if ICML and ICH bind. Formally, yrM(g) < y
r
H(g).
• there is no bunching at the bottom, if ICL and ICMH bind. Formally yrL(g) <
yrM(g).
Bunching can be ruled out in some cases by utilizing the single-crossing condition
(SC). It ensures that for every point in a c − y−diagram, the indierence curve of low-
skilled individuals is steeper than that of median-skilled individuals, which, again is
steeper than the one of highly productive individuals. This relation is formally described
by the rst inequality in condition (SC). This condition allows to draw conclusions on
the ordering of income levels from comparing the respective marginal rates of substi-
tution. As the rst order conditions (FOC) provide information on the marginal rates
of substitution for optimal income, they can be used to rule out some types of bunch-
ing. It depends on g whether and which type of bunching is refused by the rst order
conditions.
E.g. if incentive constraints bind downwards at the optimum, there is no bunching
at the top:20 the marginal rate of substitution of the high-skilled income level is one,
while it is smaller than one for the median- and low-skilled individuals’ income. Hence,
yrM(g) < y
r
H(g) and yrL(g) < yrH(g), which means that there is no bunching at the top
but no conclusion on the ranking of optimal median- and low-skilled income is possible.
By similar arguments, at least one type of bunching can be ruled out in two other
regions. Only in the region where ICL and ICH bind, bunching can not be ruled out at
all. See Brett and Weymark (2017) who use a continuous type model and nd that for
the analogue pattern of binding constraints, a bunching region around the median type
exists.
Assume now that the optimal allocation includes bunching. Then, the next proposi-
tion provides the rst order conditions that implicitly determine the income level y¯ at
which the respective productivity types are bunched. By denition, two adjacent types
generate the same income in a bunching allocation, so that the respective monotonicity
constraint of P ′(g) binds.
The corresponding Lagrangian of the reduced-form problem is considered whereλL,λM ,
λH are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the (non-negativity and monotonicity) constraints,
respectively.
L(·) = W ∗(c∗(y)y; g) + λLyL + λM(yM − yL) + λH(yH − yM) (2.2)
yielding the following rst order conditions
20See Guesnerie and Seade (1982) who rstly observed this for a non-linear pricing context.
96
2.4 Welfare maxima and optimal marginal taxes
∂L(·)
∂yk
=
∂W ∗(·)
∂yk
+ λk − λk+1 = 0, k = L,M, (2.3)
∂L(·)
∂yH
=
∂W ∗(·)
∂yH
+ λH = 0, (2.4)
λL ≥ 0 (= 0, if yL > 0), (2.5)
λk ≥ 0 (= 0, if yk > yk−1), k = M,H. (2.6)
Formally, the two types of bunching are described by i) λL > 0 (and λk = 0, k 6= L)
and ii) λk > 0, k = M,H and (λj = 0, j 6= k). This formal characterization of bunching
yields an implicit denition of the income level where individuals are bunched at.
The following proposition sums up the ndings on the optimal bunching allocation.21
Proposition 2.4. a) If there is no bunching, the solution of the relaxed problem P r(g)
is identical to the solution of reduced-form problem P ′(g).
b) Bunching of all three productivity types is never optimal.
c) If the non-negativity constraint is violated, it holds that∑
k=L,M
∂W ∗(·)
∂yk
∣∣∣
yL=0
< 0.
d) If type j and j + 1 are bunched at y¯ 6= 0, it holds that
j+1∑
k=j
∂W ∗(·)
∂yk
∣∣∣
y¯
= 0.
Those rst order conditions provide an implicit characterization of the optimal bunch-
ing level y¯ if two adjacent types are bunched together.
In the following, we focus on fully separating allocations and study optimal marginal
tax rates. Second order conditions are still assumed to be satised.
Optimal distortions and the sign of optimal marginal tax rates
Under the given assumptions, the formulation of the rst order conditions (FOC) yields
an instant representation of optimal marginal tax rates. Further, it enables to directly
learn the tax rate’s sign.
21A special case of this is given by Proposition 3 in Simula (2010) who focuses on redistribution down-
wards.
97
Chapter 2 Optimal non-linear income taxation for arbitrary welfare weights
As mentioned before, the implicit marginal tax rate of type k at income level yk is
given by the wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate
of substitution, formally
τk = 1 − 1wk v
′( yk
wk
).
If redistribution is desirable, there is a tradeo between equity and eciency such that
marginal taxes are unequal to zero at the optimal allocation. In this case, optimal labor
supply is distorted compared to the rst-best allocation. If taxes are positive, individuals
are discouraged from work at the margin, i.e. there is a downward distortion. Vice versa,
if taxes are negative, individuals are overly encouraged to work which yields an upward
distortion at the margin.
It follows directly from the rst order conditions (FOC) that optimal implicit marginal
tax rates in the given setup are
τ ∗k (g) := τk(y
∗
k(g)) =
∑
j=l,h
−αj ∂Rj(·)∂yk . (2.7)
Except for the region where ICL and ICH bind,22 the argument of Rl(·) diers from
the argument of Rh(·) such that the above expression simplies to
τ ∗k (g) = −αj
∂Rj(y
∗
k(g))
∂yk
. (2.8)
Since v(·) has increasing dierences in wk,23 the derivative of Rj(·) w.r.t. yk is posi-
tive. Hence, the weight−αj determines the sign of optimal marginal tax rates, or equiv-
alently, the direction of the distortion.
For three of the four areas, i.e. whenever tax rates take the form of equation (2.8), the
direction of the distortion is unambiguously determined by the respective weight αj . For
the fourth area, where ICL and ICH bind, marginal tax rates are of the form of equation
(2.7). Since αl is positive and αh is negative the resulting sign of the marginal tax rate is
a priori ambiguous. The specic welfare weights are decisive to identify the direction of
the distortion. Revisiting the respective rst order condition allows to derive a formal
condition that distinguishes between cases where y∗M(g) is distorted up- or downwards,
respectively. Stated for later reference, the following expression denes welfare regimes
g ∈ {g ∈ G : gL, gH ≤ 13}24 for which y∗M(g) is distorted upwards:25
22When ICL and ICH bind, both, Rl(·) and Rh(·) are functions of yM .
23v(yi, wk) has increasing dierences since: forwl < wk it holds that v(y2, wl)−v(y2, wk) > v(y1, wl)−
v(y1, wk)(> 0), ∀y2 > y1.
24This describes the region where ICL and ICH bind.
25For an illustrative representation of the separating line (?), see Figure 2.3 in the proof of proposition
2.5.
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gL <
1
3
(
1− (1− 3gH)
1
ωM
v′(
y∗M
ωM
) − 1
ωH
v′(
y∗M
ωH
)
1
ωL
v′(
y∗
M
ωL
) − 1
ωM
v′(
y∗
M
ωM
)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:(?)
⇔ αl ∂Rl(y
∗
M )
∂yM
> − αh ∂Rh(y
∗
M )
∂yM
(> 0).
If the opposite holds, y∗M(g) is distorted downwards, or, if gL = (?), the optimal
income of the median type is undistorted. Note that gH = 13 implies gL =
1
3
and for
gH = 0 it holds that gL ∈ [0, 13 ] so that the expression is welldened in the sense that it
actually separates only subregions of the region where ICL and ICH bind.
This region is the only one where the sign of a distortion changes for some type k. Within
all other regions, the sign of distortions and, hence, of marginal tax rates, is constant.
Proposition 2.5. The sign of optimal marginal tax rates τ ∗k (g), k = L,M,H are, respec-
tively
τ ∗L(g) > 0 if gL >
1
3
, (τL)
τ ∗L(g) = 0 if gL ≤ 13 ,
τ ∗H(g) < 0 if gH >
1
3
, (τM )
τ ∗H(g) = 0 if gH ≤ 13 ,
τ ∗M(g) < 0 if gL <
1
3
and gL < (?), (τH )
τ ∗M(g) > 0 if gH <
1
3
and gL > (?),
τ ∗M(g) = 0 if gH ≥ 13 and gL ≥ 13 , or if gL = (?).
It is never be optimal to force low-skilled individuals to work more than in the undis-
torted rst-best allocation, i.e. optimal labor supply is distorted downwards or undis-
torted at the margin. Equivalently, the optimal marginal tax rate of low-skilled individ-
uals is non-negative. Vice versa, high-skilled individuals face a non-positive marginal
tax rate, such that optimal labor supply is undistorted or distorted upwards at the mar-
gin for highly productive individuals. The intuitive reason for the opposite directions of
distortions lies in the eort costs: for low productivity levels generating more output is
relatively costly, so it can never be optimal. Contrary, highly productive individuals can
produce more output at a relatively low costs such that their labor supply is distorted up-
wards or undistorted at the optimum. For the median productivity types, optimal labor
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supply can be either upward, downward or undistorted.26
Comparative statics of optimal marginal tax rates
The following analysis studies the eect of changes in the welfare weights on optimal
income. Since welfare weights sum up to one, changing gk for some k goes hand in hand
with a compensating change in at least one other welfare weight. Specic changes are
introduced that leave one weight xed and, graphically, represent movements parallel to
the axes in the simplex. Considering those is without loss of generality as we can study
every possible variation of g by combining those basic movements.
Denition 2.1. Small variations in the welfare weights g that leave either gL or gH
unaected are called basic changes. There exist two basic changes: a basic-L-change
given by a marginal increase in gL and a compensating decrease of gM and a basic-H-
change given by a marginal increase in gH and a compensating decrease of gM .
Comparative static results with respect to welfare weights are delivered by utilizing
the implicit function theorem. Although basic changes encompass two welfare weights
to change, this is actually welldened: a basic change leaves either gL or gH xed but
includes a change in the remaining two weights. As optimal income is determined by
the rst order conditions (FOC) which are separable in the welfare weights and do not
depend on gM , using the implicit function theorem is not problematic. The following
observations can be made regarding the eect of a basic change on optimal income.27
Lemma2.2. Consider for a given g ∈ G the optimal income vector y∗(g) as implicitly given
by the respective rst order condition (FOC). Then, optimal income decreases or remains the
same after a basic-L change and increases or remains the same after a basic-H change.
Depending on the binding incentive constraints the productivity type whose optimal
income is a function of gL (gH ), respectively, varies. However, regardless of the pattern
of binding constraints, a basic-L-change induces optimal income to drop (or does not
aect it) while a basic-H-change has the opposite eect.
Those ndings are directly transferable to optimal marginal tax rates. As prefer-
ences are quasilinear, the previous results on income are sucient to derive how optimal
marginal tax rates behave under basic changes in g.
Lemma 2.3. For every welfare regime g ∈ G it holds that optimal marginal tax rates are
non-decreasing in the welfare weight of low-skilled individuals and non-increasing in the
welfare weight of high-skilled individuals.
26Brett and Weymark (2017) provide a similar result for selshly optimal welfare weights. Non-boundary
types are distorted up- or downwards depending on the type who’s utility is maximized.
27See also Weymark (1987) and Simula (2010) for comparative static results with respect to paramteres
beside the welfare weights. And for comparative static results of linear taxes see Hellwig (1986).
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Within each area it holds, that the undistorted income level and, hence, the corre-
sponding tax rate, remains constant under a basic change. Mathematically, this is a
consequence of the quasilinear utility functions which imply that the no-distortion-
conditions completely pins down the corresponding income levels: optimal marginal tax
rates of zero for low- and high-skilled individuals are preserved under a basic change
if ICL or ICH remain binding, respectively, after the variation in g. The same is true
for the median type, which requires ICML and ICMH to be binding before and after a
change in the welfare weights.
Otherwise, changes in the welfare weights always yield a corresponding change in
the tax rate. One can make the following observations: optimal marginal taxes increase
in the welfare weight of low-skilled individuals and decrease in the welfare weight of
the high-skilled – or remain the same, respectively. So, independently of the binding
incentive constraints, the more we care about the poor, lowering marginal taxes is never
optimal. Vice versa, if we focus on the well-being of the rich, who have relatively low
eort costs, we want to encourage individuals to work more, i.e. taxes should not go up
but rather decrease or remain the same.
The second observation is, that even though the direction of a tax change (due to basic
changes in g) is the same for all areas of the simplex, the change in the corresponding
distortions is not. Depending on the sign of the marginal tax rate, decreasing (increas-
ing) tax rates can lead to bigger or smaller distortions. If a change in the welfare weights
points into the direction of redistribution, i.e. in the same direction as the binding in-
centive constraint, distortions get bigger. The reason is that the change emphasizes the
desire to redistribute towards the respective skill type. If the welfare change points to
the opposite direction of the direction of redistribution, it alleviates the equity- eciency
trade-o and reduces distortions.
2.5 Further steps to go and conclusion
2.5.1 Notes on the second-best Pareto frontier
The given paper takes a normative perspective and considers weighted Utilitarian wel-
fare as the objective of the optimization problem. A natural question to follow is how the
resulting set of welfare maximizing allocations relates to the set of (second-best) Pareto
ecient allocations.
The second-best Pareto frontier is given by the set of incentive feasible allocations
(c, y) such that there exists no other incentive feasible allocation (c′, y′) 6= (c, y) for
which the following conditions holds.28
Uk(c
′
k, y
′
k) ≥ Uk(ck, yk), ∀k ∈ {L,M,H} and Uk(c′k, y′k) > Uk(ck, yk) for at least one k.
28For a detailed analysis of the second-best Pareto frontier in a taxation model with two types see Bier-
brauer and Boyer (2014).
101
Chapter 2 Optimal non-linear income taxation for arbitrary welfare weights
Or to phrase it dierently: the second-best Pareto frontier encompasses all allocations
that solve the following optimization problem PP (vM , vH):
max
(c,y)∈A(vm,vH)
UL(cL, yL) s.t. UM(cM , yM) = vM
UH(cH , yH) = vH ,
where A(vM , vH) is the set of incentive feasible allocations for a pair of given utility
levels (vM , vH) which are assigned to median- and high-skilled individuals, respectively.
From the rst welfare theorem we know that every welfare maximum is Pareto ef-
cient. Whether the reverse is true for the given economy can not be said, yet. The
following section sketches one way to approach this question by utilizing some results
of the given analysis. However, it is left for future work to actually prove the equiv-
alence of the solution sets of PP (vM , vH) and P (g). The rst step described below is
similar to the one of the welfare maximization problem and is aimed at solving prob-
lem PP (vM , vH). The second step makes use of a geometric argument to link the two
solution sets.
Firstly, the domain of problem PP (vM , vH), i.e. the incentive feasible allocations
A(vM , vH), has to be characterized. Depending on the exogenously given utility lev-
els vM and vH , the binding incentive constraints vary, and, hence, the set of incentive
feasible allocations. Analogue to Section 2.3, potential pattern of binding constraints
need to be identied.
With regard to this, the given analysis of the welfare maximization problem yields the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. For the given economy, the (second-best) Pareto frontier encompasses regions
where none, one or two incentive constraints bind - or, if preferences are such that the welfare
maximum includes bunching, three.
This follows directly from the fact that every welfare maximum is also Pareto ecient.
As shown in Proposition 2.4, bunching of all three types can not occur along the frontier
as it is Pareto dominated by the laissez faire allocation. But there exists no combination of
binding incentive constraints, that is not covered be those pattern. That said, Lemma 2.4
lists all potential combinations of binding constraints. Further, we know from Corollary
2.1 that the resource constraint has to bind at a Pareto ecient allocation.
These ndings allow to compute Pareto ecient allocations by solving the Lagrangian
of problem PP (vM , vH) for each pattern of binding constraints, respectively. Analogue
to the approach in the welfare maximization problem in Section 2.4.1, incentive com-
patibility constraints that are slack can be replaced by a monotonicity constraint and
checked ex-post, while binding incentive constraints are included explicitly in the La-
grangian. This delivers the set of second-best Pareto ecient allocations.
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However, even knowing this set does not allow to draw conclusions of the relation
to the welfare maximizing allocations. To prove the equivalence, it has to be ruled out
that the set of welfare maximizing allocations is only a subset of the set of Pareto ef-
cient allocations. To show that there is a one-to-one mapping between the set of
second-best Pareto ecient allocations and the set of welfare maximizing allocations, the
(second-best) Pareto frontier has to be everywhere convex. By a separating-hyperplane-
argument, the convexity ensures that there is a bijective mapping between the two sets
of allocations. For a setup without information asymmetries, Negishi (1960) uses this
argument to show that every competitive equilibrium is also a maximum of a welfare
function that is a weighted sum of utilities. As mentioned before, this is left for future
research.
Finally, the following gives an idea why this is of interest – not only from a formal, but
also from an applied perspective. Suppose there was a bijective mapping between the
mentioned sets, then this allows to link a rather theoretical optimal income tax problem
to applications in the eld of political economy.29
Formally, points on the (second-best) Pareto frontier are dened by utility levels (vMvH)
whereas welfare maxima are computed based on the vector of welfare weights g. Both,
vM and vH and g can be interpreted as political positions with regard to redistribu-
tion. However, there is a remarkable weakness of studying welfare weights compared
to points on the Pareto frontier.
With the given analysis on three productivity types, it is not possible to say how utility
changes with respect to welfare weights at an optimum. Hence, marginal tax schemes
can not be compared in terms of utility based on the analysis of welfare maximizing
allocations – which is possible along the second-best Pareto frontier.
That said, the preceding analysis does e.g. not allow to address questions on vot-
ing over tax schedules. To infer voting behavior of utility maximizing individuals, it is
necessary to know how utility is aected by dierent tax systems which requires a one-
to-one relation between the second-best Pareto frontier and welfare weights. Therefore,
it is valuable to tackle this problem in future work.
2.5.2 Conclusion
The given paper provides a characterization of the incentive structure of a welfare maxi-
mization problem in a Mirrleesian income tax model with three productivity levels when
welfare weights can vary arbitrarily. More precisely, conditions are stated that map wel-
fare weights to binding incentive constraints.
Secondly, reduced form problems in the fashion of Weymark (1986a) are formulated
for each pattern of binding constraints and solved by a rst order approach. This yields
29See Bierbrauer and Boyer (2013), who exploit the congruence of these sets in a two type setting and
examine welfare implications of political competition.
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formulations of marginal tax rates for every productivity type which are such that low-
skilled (high-skilled) individuals never face a negative (positive) marginal tax rate at the
optimum, while the median type can be distorted up- or downwards depending of the
direction of redistribution. Bunching can not be ruled out completely, however, some
bunching pattern contradict rst order conditions and, hence, do not occur for the re-
spective welfare weight.
The nal, but important note relates the stated results on welfare maximization to
(second-best) Pareto eciency.
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Appendix 2.A Proof of Corollaries
Corollary 2.1
Proof. As preferences are quasilinear in consumption, a non-binding resource constraint
can not be optimal: each person’s consumption could be increased by a small amount
without violating incentive constraints.
Corollary 2.2
Proof. We have Ω = {ωL, ωM , ωH}. The analysis proceeds locally in the sense that each
pair of adjacent incentive constraints is studied separately.
We consider the case where ICL and ICH bind and show that those imply ICML and
ICMH to bind, respectively, if income is monotonic. The remaining cases go through by
the same arguments.
Binding ICL and ICH are given by
cL − v
(
yL
ωL
)
= cM − v
(
yM
ωL
)
(ICL)
cH − v
(
yH
ωH
)
= cM − v
(
yM
ωH
)
(ICH )
Then, (ICL) can be rearranged to cM − cL = v
(
yM
ωL
)
− v
(
yL
ωL
)
. For ICML to be
satised, it has to hold
cM − cL
!
> v
(
yM
ωM
)
− v
(
yL
ωM
)
Inserting the rearranged condition ICL yields
v
(
yM
ωL
)
− v
(
yL
ωL
)
!
> v
(
yM
ωM
)
− v
(
yL
ωM
)
.
But this holds due to the characteristics of v(·) if yM > yL. Thus, ICL + Monotonicity
implies ICML. Analogously, it can be proven that ICH + Monotonicity imply ICMH ,
ICMH + Monotonicity imply ICH and ICML + Monotonicity imply ICL. This proves
the given statement.
Note that the arguments used in the proof are independent of the quasilinearity of the
utility function but use the separability of consumption and income. Furthermore it can
extended to models with n types since the analysis proceeds locally in the sense that
each pair of local constraints is studied separately.
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Corollary 2.3
Corollary 2.3. The given specication of v(·) is not sucient to ensure that second order
conditions for a maximum hold. The sign of ∂
2Rj(·)
∂y2k
∣∣
y∗ is decisive to determine the sign of
the second order conditions. Depending on the welfare regimes, the requirements change.
Proof. To prove that the rst order conditions are necessary and sucient to determine
a welfare maximizing allocation (for problem P ′(g)), it has to be shown that the respec-
tive Hessian matrix is negative denite. A direct implication of the rst order condition
FOC is that the cross-derivatives are zero, formally ∂
2W ∗(·)
∂yk∂yj
= 0. Hence, proving neg-
ative deniteness simplies to checking ∂
2W ∗(·)
∂y2k
?
< 0. The following conditions provide
the respective results and can be understood as sucient conditions on v(·) that have to
hold to ensure that derived solution is in fact a maximum.
Based on the rst order condition FOC, the respective second order conditions are
• ICL and ICMH
Take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2L
= − 1
ω2L
v′′( yL
ωL
) < 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2M
= − 1
ω2M
v′′( yM
ωM
) +(1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1
ω2L
v′′(
yM
ωL
)− 1
ω2H
v′′(
yM
ωM
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
<0
?
< 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2H
= − 1
ω2H
v′′( yH
ωH
)−(1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1
ω2M
v′′(
yH
ωM
)− 1
ω2H
v′′(
yH
ωH
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
<0
?
< 0.
• ICL and ICH
Take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
106
2.A Proof of Corollaries
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2M
= − 1
ω2M
v′′( yM
ωM
) +(1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1
ω2L
v′′(
yM
ωL
)− 1
ω2M
v′′(
yM
wM
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
<0
−(1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
1
ω2M
v′′(
yM
ωM
)− 1
ωH
v′′(
yM
wH
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
>0
?
< 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2H
= − 1
ω2H
v′′( yH
ωH
) < 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2L
= − 1
ω2L
v′′( yL
ωL
) < 0.
• ICML and ICMH
Take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2L
= − 1
ω2L
v′′( yL
ωL
) +(1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
1
ω2L
v′(
yL
ωL
)− 1
ω2M
v′(
yL
wM
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
>0
?
< 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2M
= − 1
ω2M
v′′( yM
ωM
) < 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2H
= − 1
ω2H
v′′( yH
ωH
))−(1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1
ω2M
v′′(
yH
ωM
)− 1
ω2H
v′′(
yH
ωH
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
<0
?
< 0.
• ICML and ICH
Take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2L
= − 1
ω2L
v′′( yL
ωL
)) +(1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
1
ω2L
v′′(
yL
ωL
)− 1
ω2M
v′′(
yL
wM
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
!
>0
?
< 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2M
= − 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
))−(1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
1
ω2M
v′′(
yM
ωM
)− 1
ω2H
v′′(
yM
wH
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
?
< 0.
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2H
= − 1
ω2H
v′′( yH
ωH
) < 0.
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Since 1
ω2k
v′′(·) > 0, rst order conditions dening undistorted labor supply are su-
cient for a maximum. However, when distortions are present, the claimed characteristics
of v(·) in section 2.2 are not sucient to yield ∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2k
< 0. That said, the second deriva-
tives of the information rents are decisive for the sign of the derivatives, respectively.
Sucient conditions to ensure that second order conditions are fullled are given by the
desired sign of the ∂
2Rj(yk)
∂y2k
in the stated second order conditions respectively.
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Appendix 2.B Proof of Propositions
Proposition 2.1
Proof. The constraints of the given welfare maximization problemP (g) can be expressed
in terms of utility (uL, wM , uH) and income y. The resource constraint and the incentive
constraints become respectively
uL + uM + uH ≤ s(y) :=
∑
k=L,M,H
(yk − v( ykwk )) ,
and
uL ≥ uM −
(
v(yM
ωL
)− v( yM
ωM
)
)
,
uM ≥ uL +
(
v( yL
ωL
)− v( yL
ωM
)
)
,
uM ≥ uH −
(
v( yH
ωM
)− v( yH
ωH
)
)
,
uH ≥ uM +
(
v( yM
ωM
)− v(yM
ωH
)
)
.
At the optimum, the resource constraint binds, see Corollary 2.1 such that utility of
high-skilled individuals can be expressed on terms of uM and uL, formally uH = s(y)−
uM − uL. Inserting into problem P (g) yields the following version of the problem
max
uL,uM ,y
W = (gL − gH)uL + (gM − gH) uM + gHs(y)
s.t.
v(yM
ωL
)− v( yM
ωM
) ≥ uM − uL (ICL)
uM − uL ≥ v( yLωL )− v(
yL
ωM
) (ICML)
2uM + uL ≥ s(y) −
(
v( yH
ωM
)− v( yH
ωH
)
)
(IC ′MH )
s(y) −
(
v( yM
ωM
)− v(yM
ωH
)
)
≥ 2uM + uL (IC ′H )
Each pair of local incentive constraints is studied separately. Small changes in utility
are used to gure out which incentive constraint binds: if the considered changes yields
welfare to go up without violating any constraints, a desired direction of redistribution
is found and the binding incentive constraints can be inferred. To guarantee that no
constraint is violated, an auxiliary function h(·) is introduced which prescribes how to
vary utility levels without violating incentive constraints.
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1) To gure out whether ICL or ICML bind at the optimum the following auxiliary
function h1(uL, uM) is dened. It represents the lefthand side and righthand side
of IC ′MH and IC ′H , respectively.
h1(uL, uM) = 2uM + uL
dh1(·) = 0⇔ 2duM + duL = 0⇔ duL
duM
∣∣
dh2=0
= −2
If we change uL and uM by a an appropriate ε, i.e. such that dh1(·) = 0, the left-
hand side of equation (IC ′MH) and the righthand side of equation (IC ′H) remain
unaected: if those constraints are satised before the variation, they will be as
well afterwards.
u′L = uL + ε
u′M = uM −
1
2
ε
h1(u
′
L, u
′
M) = 2u
′
M + u
′
L = 2uM + uL − ε+ ε = h1(uL, uM)
W.l.o.G. we have increased uL. To check, whether this change leads to an increase
in welfare, we calculate welfare for u′L and u′M and compare it with the original
welfare level.
W (u′L, u
′
M) = gHs(y) + (gL − gH)u′L + (gM − gH)u′M
= gHs(y) + (gL − gH)uL + (gM − gH)uM︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W (uL,uM )
+
(
gL − gH − gM 1
2
+
1
2
gH
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆W
ε
If ∆W > 0, the welfare increases by the variation in utility. This is the case if
condition (A) holds, formally
gL − gH − gM 1
2
+
1
2
gH > 0⇔ gL > gM + gH
2
.
The increase of uL is restricted by the lefthand side of ICML. Thus, if ∆W is
positive, ICML will bind at the optimum. Contrary, if it is negative, ICL will bind.
In this case we want to make uM as big as possible. Otherwise, the variation has
no eect on welfare such that redistribution is not desirable.
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2) Analogously to part 1): to gure out whether ICH or ICMH bind, consider the
following auxiliary function which represents the lefthand side of ICML and the
righthand side of ICH , respectively.
h2(uL, uM) = uM − uL
dh2(·) = 0⇔ duMduL = 1, if u
′
M = um + ε and u′L = uL + ε
h2(u
′
L, u
′
M) = uM − uL + ε− ε = h2(uL, uM)
W.l.o.G. consider uM + ε. To check, whether this change leads to an increase
in welfare, we calculate welfare for u′L and u′M and compare it with the original
welfare level.
W (u′L, u
′
M) = gHs(y) + (gL − gH)u′L + (gM − gH)u′M
= gHs(y) + (gL − gH)uL + (gM − gH)uM︸ ︷︷ ︸
=W (uL,uM )
+
(
gL − gH + gM − gH
)
ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∆W
This means, an increase in uL and uM increases the welfare, if and only if ∆W > 0.
This is equivalent to
gH <
gL + gM
2
.
This is identical to condition (B). If it holds, uM is increased until the respective
incentive constraint IC ′H binds. If the opposite is true, IC ′MH binds or, if ∆W = 0,
neither of both binds.
Proposition 2.2
Proof. A given welfare weight g ∈ G pins down none, one or two binding incentive
constraints, see Proposition 2.1. If no constraint binds, more than one optimal allocation
exist. If one or two constraints, the following procedure delivers a reduced-form problem
which is solvable with simple calculus.
Let g be such that two incentive constraints (and the resource constraint) bind. Then,
rearranging those yield the following expressions of utility.
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u∗L(·) = 13
∑
k=L,M,H
(
yk − v( ykwk )
) − 1
3
Rh(·) − 23Rl(·) (UTIL)
u∗M(·) = 13
∑
k=L,M,H
(
yk − v( ykwk )
) − 1
3
Rh(·) + 13Rl(·) (UTIM )
u∗H(·) = 13
∑
k=L,M,H
(
yk − v( ykwk )
)
+ 2
3
Rh(·) + 13Rl(·), (UTIH )
Summing up those utilities u∗k(·) weighted with the associated welfare weight gk yields
a welfare function W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) that incorporates all binding constraints. To respect
non-binding incentive constraints, a monotonicity constraint has to be added, see Corol-
lary 2.2. This completes the derivation of the reduced form problem P ′(g). See Weymark
(1986a) or Simula (2010) for analogue formulations.
To derive the above utility expressions, two incentive constraints are required to bind.
The following arguments explain why the stated problem P ′(g) covers as well welfare
weights g for which only one incentive constraint binds.
The derived welfare function W ∗(·) consists of two components where the rst re-
ects the resource restriction of the problem and the second the informational restric-
tions due to binding incentive constraints. Consider now a welfare weight that pins
down one binding incentive constraint. Welfare weights that pin down only one bind-
ing incentive constraint are of the form g = (gL, gM , gH) where gk = 13 for one type
k. Pretending that a second constraint binds, allows to state the reduced form problem
P ′(g). Not that the incentive constraints, that is in fact not binding, needs to belong to
the pair constraints that does not include the truels binding constraint.
Both, the actually and the allegedly binding, and binding incentive constraint shows
up in the welfare functionW ∗(·) by the respective information rents. However, only the
one resulting from the actually binding incentive constraints is weighted with a weight
αj 6= 0. The other incentive constraint induces a weight of αj = 0 due to gk = 13 . Hence,
the resulting social costs from the second (actually not) binding constraint are weighted
with zero and hence, have no eect on welfare and the optimal solution. Equivalently, the
Lagrangian could be computed for situations with one binding and three slack incentive
constraints. This yields the same results.
In the following the four relevant cases – as there are four dierent pairs of binding
incentive constraints – and the respective results are listed in more detail. Note that,
equivalently, consumption c∗k(y) instead of utility u∗k(y) level can be studied. It holds
that u∗k(c∗(y), y) = c∗k(y)− v
(
yk
ωk
)
. For each of the four cases, those consumption levels
are computed for every productivity type.
• ICL and ICMH
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Rearranging the binding incentive constraints and making use of the binding re-
source constraint, we get the following utility functions
u∗L(·) =
1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 2
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
, (ICLMH)
u∗M(·) =
1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
,
u∗H(·) =
1
3
s(y) +
2
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
.
And the corresponding consumption level are given by
c∗L(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)
+ 2
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
,
c∗M(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
,
c∗H(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi − 23
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
.
Plugging in the utility functions in the welfare function yields the following ex-
pression
W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) = s(y)−(v( yH
wM
)−v( yH
wH
)
)
(1−3gh)+
(
v(yM
wL
)−v( yM
wM
)
)
(1−3gL).
To derive the optimal income level, we take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
∂W ∗(·)
∂yL
= 1− 1
ωL
v′( yL
ωL
) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yM
= (1− 1
ωM
v′( yM
ωM
)) + (1− 3gL)( 1ωLv′(
yM
ωL
)− 1
ωH
v′( yM
ωM
)) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yH
= (1− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
))− (1− 3gH)( 1ωM v′(
yH
ωM
)− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
)) = 0.
• ICL and ICH
Rearranging the binding incentive constraints and making use of the binding re-
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source constraint, we get the following utility functions
uL(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)− 2
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
. (ICLH)
uM(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
.
uH(·) = 1
3
s(y) +
2
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v(yM
wL
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
.
And the corresponding consumption level are given by
c∗L(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+ 2
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
,
c∗M(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
,
c∗H(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi − 23
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v(yM
wL
)
)
.
Plugging in the utility functions in the welfare function yields the following ex-
pression
W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) = s(y)−(v( yM
wM
)−v( yM
wH
)
)
(1−3gh)+
(
v(yM
wL
)−v( yM
wM
)
)
(1−3gL).
To derive the optimal income level, we take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
∂W ∗(·)
∂yM
= (1− 1
ωM
v′( yM
ωM
)) + (1− 3gL)( 1ωLv′(
yM
ωL
)− 1
ωM
v′( yM
wM
))
−(1− 3gH)( 1ωM v′(
yM
ωM
)− 1
ωH
v′( yM
wH
)) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yH
= 1− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yL
= 1− 1
ωL
v′( yL
ωL
) = 0.
• ICML and ICMH
Rearranging the binding incentive constraints and making use of the binding re-
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source constraint, we get the following utility functions
uL(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 2
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
. (ICMLMH)
uM(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
.
uH(·) = 1
3
s(y) +
2
3
(
v( yH
wM
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
.
And the corresponding consumption level are given by
c∗L(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)
+ 2
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
,
c∗M(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
,
c∗H(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi − 23
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yH
wM
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
.
Plugging in the utility functions in the welfare function yields the following ex-
pression
W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) = s(y)−(v( yH
wM
)−v( yH
wH
)
)
(1−3gh)+
(
v( yL
wL
)−v( yL
wM
)
)
(1−3gL).
To derive the optimal income level, we take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H .
∂W ∗(·)
∂yL
= (1− 1
ωL
v′( yL
ωL
)) + (1− 3gL)( 1ωLv′(
yL
ωL
)− 1
ωM
v′( yL
wM
)) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yM
= 1− 1
ωM
v′( yM
ωM
) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yH
= (1− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
))− (1− 3gH)( 1ωM v′(
yH
ωM
)− 1
ωH
v′( yH
wH
)) = 0.
• ICML and ICH
Rearranging the binding incentive constraints and making use of the binding re-
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source constraint, we get the following utility functions
uL(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)− 2
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
. (ICMLH)
uM(·) = 1
3
s(y)− 1
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
.
uH(·) = 1
3
s(y) +
2
3
(
v( yM
wM
)− v( yM
wH
)
)
+
1
3
(
v( yL
wL
)− v( yL
wM
)
)
.
And the corresponding consumption level are given by
c∗L(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)
+ 2
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
,
c∗M(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi +
1
3
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
,
c∗H(y) =
1
3
∑
i=l,m,h yi − 23
(
v( yM
wH
)− v( yH
wH
)
)− 1
3
(
v( yL
wM
)− v( yM
wM
)
)
.
Plugging in the utility functions in the welfare function yields the following ex-
pression
W ∗(c∗(y), y; g) = s(y)−(v( yM
wM
)−v( yM
wH
)
)
(1−3gh)+
(
v( yL
wL
)−v( yL
wM
)
)
(1−3gL).
To derive the optimal income level, we take the derivative w.r.t. yk, k = L,M,H
∂W ∗(·)
∂yL
= (1− 1
ωL
v′( yL
ωL
)) + (1− 3gL)( 1ωLv′(
yL
ωL
)− 1
ωM
v′( yL
wM
)) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yM
= (1− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
))− (1− 3gH)( 1ωM v′(
yM
ωM
)− 1
ωH
v′( yM
wH
)) = 0.
∂W ∗(·)
∂yH
= 1− 1
ωH
v′( yH
ωH
) = 0.
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Proposition 2.3
Proof. To study bunching for the four dierent areas, respectively, we, technically, make
use of the distortions as described by the rst order conditions (FOC). We know that if the
income of type k is undistorted it holds thatMRSyk = 1, see equation (2.1). Undistorted
income is independent of g and denoted by yFBk . It holds that yFBL < yFBM < yFBH .
If the income of type k is distorted upwards (downwards) it holds thatMRSyk > 1 (<
1). Hence, it exceeds (falls below) the undistorted income level yFBk .
• ICML, ICMH binding
The stated rst order conditions imply that yrL(g) is distorted downwards, yrM(g)
is undistorted, and yrH(g) is distorted upwards. This implies
yrL(g) < y
FB
L < y
FB
M = y
r
M(g) < y
FB
H < y
r
H(g).
So, there is no bunching.
• ICL, ICH binding
The stated rst order conditions imply that yrL is undistorted, yrM is distorted (up-
or downwards), and yrH(g) is undistorted. Hence, yrL(g) = yFBL < yFBH = yrH(g).
But yrM(g) > yrH(g) and yrL(g) > yrM(g) can’t be ruled out by the given infor-
mation.
• ICML, ICH binding
The stated rst order conditions imply that yrL is distorted downwards, yrM is dis-
torted downwards, and yrH is undistorted. Hence, yrL < yFBL < yFBH = yrH and
yrM < y
FB
M < y
FB
H = y
r
H . Hence, there is no bunching at the top. (yrL > yrM can
not be ruled out.)
• ICL, ICMH binding
The stated rst order conditions imply that yrL(g) is undistorted, yrM(g) is distorted
upwards, and yrH(g) is distorted upwards. Hence, yrL(g) = yFBL < yFBH < yrH(g)
and yrL = yFBL < yFBM < yrM(g). Hence, there is no bunching at the bottom.
(yrM(g) > yrH(g) can not be ruled out.)
Proposition 2.4
Proof. a) If there is no bunching, all multipliers are equal to zero. Hence, every in-
come yk that satises equation 2.3 satises the rst order conditions FOC as well.
As those are assumed to be necessary and sucient, this completes the proof of
part a).
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b) If all three types are bunched together, the allocation must lie on the 45◦ line in
the c − y−diagram due to the binding resource constraint. However, it is Pareto
dominated by the laissez-faire allocation and, thus, can not be optimal.
c) If the non-negativity constraint binds λL > 0, λM = λH = 0. Summing up
equation 2.3 for k = L,M yields
M∑
k=L
∂W ∗(·)
∂yk
∣∣∣
y¯
+ λL − λM + λM − λH = 0.
Since λL > 0, λM = λH = 0, this proves the given statement.
d) If the non-negativity constraint does not bind but the low and the median type are
bunched together, it holds λL = 0, λM > 0, λH = 0. Summing up equation 2.3 for
k = L,M yields
M∑
k=L
∂W ∗(·)
∂yk
∣∣∣
y¯
+ λL − λM + λM − λH = 0.
Since λL = 0, λH = 0, this proves the given statement.
Analogously, the case where median- and high-skilled individuals are bunched
together can be shown.
Proposition 2.5
Proof. The sign of marginal tax rates is a direct implication from the rst order condi-
tions FOC. For a given g those rst order conditions vary, such that optimal income and,
hence, the optimal marginal tax rates vary in g. To keep the notation simple, we omit g
as an argument of income but denote τk(g).
It holds that
τ ∗k (g) = −αj
∂Rj(y
∗
k)
∂yk
Thus, for gL and gH respectively
τ ∗k (gL) = − (1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−αl
∂Rl(y
∗
k(g))
∂yk
,
τ ∗k (gH) = (1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−αh
∂Rh(y
∗
k(g))
∂yk
.
Since ∂Rj(y
∗
k(g))
∂yk
> 0, the sign of αj determines the sign of the tax rate.
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In the area where ICL and ICH bind, we get that τL(g) = τH(g) = 0. Marginal tax
rates of the median type are given by
τM(g) = −
∑
j=l,h
αj
∂Rj(y
∗
M(g))
∂yM
= (1− 3gH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂Rh(y
∗
M(g))
∂yM
−(1− 3gL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
∂Rl(y
∗
M(g))
∂yM
≷ 0.
Depending on the specic welfare weight, τ ∗M(g) is positive or negative. Rearranging
the previous equation yields condition τL.
For illustration of partitioned simplex including line (?) see the following Figure
●
●●
𝑔𝐿 = 1
𝑔𝑀 = 1 𝑔𝐻 = 1
●
Cond. B
Cond. A
𝐼𝐶𝐻 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝐻
𝐼𝐶𝑀𝐿
𝐼𝐶𝐿
𝑔𝐿 =
1
3
𝑔𝐻 =
1
3
(∗)
Figure 2.3: Simplex of welfare weights with separating line (?)
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Appendix 2.C Proof of Lemmata
Lemma 2.1
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.1. If gk 6= gj 6= 13 , j 6= k, the welfare
weight pins down two binding constraints. If one weight equals the others’ average
weight, i.e. gk = 13 , Proposition 2.1 tells us that due to the lacking desire to redistribute
none of the two associated incentive constraints has to bind at the optimum. Hence, at
most one incentive constraint (out of the two non-associated) binds for those g. Finally,
at the laissez faire point gL = gM = gH = 13 , no incentive constraint binds at the
optimum.
Lemma 2.2
Proof. As we investigate how optimal income changes in the welfare weight, the follow-
ing proof uses the extensive notation y∗(g).
• Step 1: Prove that implicitly dierentiating is welldened for the considered situ-
ation:
For the comparative static results on the optimal income y∗(g) with respect to
welfare weights, the rst order conditions FOC are used and basic-changes are
considered. Those changes aect two welfare weights, gM and one other weight.
As optimal income is independent of gM it holds for basic-L-changes
dy∗k(g) =
∂y∗k(g)
∂gL
dgL +
∂y∗k(g)
∂gM︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
dgM +
∂y∗k(g)
∂gH
dgH︸︷︷︸
=0
⇒ dy∗k(g) = ∂y
∗
k(g)
∂gL
dgL.
Since a basic-L-change leaves gH xed, the respective term in the dierential is
zero. Hence using the implicit function theorem for basic-L-changes is well-dened.
The same is true for basic-H-changes. Note that, due to v(·) being continuous op-
timal income is a continuous function of g.
The next step species the actual change in y∗(g) after basic changes.
• Step 2: Applying the implicit function theorem to equation (FOC) yields:
For F (g, y∗(g)) := ∂W
∗(·)
∂yk
≡ 0 as given in FOC, we get
dy∗k(g)
dgj
= −
∂F (·)
∂gj
∂F (·)
∂yk
= − 1
∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂2W ∗(·)
∂yk∂gj
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As we assume the second order conditions (see Corollary 2.3) to be satised, it
holds that −∂2W ∗(·)
∂y2k
> 0 such that ∂
2W ∗(·)
∂yk∂gj
determines the sign of dy
∗
k(·)
dgj
.
With the stated rst order condition FOC we have
∂2W ∗(·)
∂yk∂gL
= −3Rl(·) < 0,
∂2W ∗(·)
∂yk∂gH
= 3Rh(·) > 0,
As information rents are positive, we have that optimal income – if it is distorted
– decreases in gL and increases in gH . This proofs the stated lemma.
Lemma 2.3
Proof. Optimal marginal tax rates are by denition given by the following expression
τ ∗k (g) = 1− 1ωk v
′(y
∗
k(g)
ωk
)
With the comparative static properties on optimal income for basic changes in g as
studied in Lemma 2.2, the changes in τ ∗k (g) are a direct implication of v′′(·) > 0.
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Public Goods and Salience
3.1 Introduction
Providing nancial support to refugees and people in crisis regions gained more and
more importance in the last decade; not least since thousands upon thousands of refugees
left Syria in 2015. But, do you know how much you actually contribute to specic Hu-
manitarian aid projects taking contributions by paying taxes into account? And, do you
know the improvement in the needy people’s living conditions generated by your dona-
tion?
Regarding the rst question, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development assigned in 2017 approximately 102 Euro per citizen, i.e. about 8.5 bil-
lion Euro in total, to development cooperation projects. So, neglecting or being unaware
of these mandatory contributions is likely to have an impact on individuals’ privately
made donations choices.
Our paper studies the eect of individuals misperceiving the amount of taxes dedi-
cated to specic crisis regions on aggregate—public and private—donation levels. We
consider the case where the misperception of taxes results in underestimating or ne-
glecting the entailed contribution to charity and analyze how this aects privately made
donations. Intuitively one might think of a situation where the donation made via a tax
is included in an aggregate tax payment and hard to be quantied exactly.
Regarding the second motivational question, it has to be noted that it in fact matters
how benecial a dollar donated is as altruistic individuals are interested in the induced
improvement and so their donation’s eectiveness, see Warren and Walker (1991) or
more recently Krasteva and Yildrim (2013). Here, a donation’s eectiveness or produc-
tivity reects the improvement a 1$-donation generates in the living conditions of people
in the crisis region. However, individuals are not capable of completely guring out what
the exact improvement associated with their donation is: they hold a perception that is
based on accessible information regarding the considered crisis, the aid organization and
the projects. In our notion, perceived productivity is a function of both actual produc-
tivity and its salience. While actual productivity depends on objective factors such as
the infrastructural situation in the crisis region, the aid organization’s eectiveness or
costs for medicine and equipment in the specic country, salience of a project mirrors
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how accessible this information is. Hence, actual productivity reects relevant informa-
tion about a crisis region or an aid organization in a condensed form and individuals
build a perception of a donation’s productivity based on available information such as
newspaper articles, photos etc. that does not coincide with actual productivity.
Remembering the photo of the drowned boy Alan Kurdi, the importance of a crisis’
salience becomes striking: donations to the Swedish Red Cross were more than 50 times
larger in the week after than in the week before the picture’s publication Slovic et al.
(2017). The painful death of the young boy made refugees’ need more salient but had
hardly changed the productivity of a donation to the Red Cross (compared to the days
before the picture’s publication).
However, even after this peak in the donation ow the requirements of the crisis re-
gion Syria were not fully met (see the end-of-year-report of UNHCR 2015). We assume
that individuals underestimate the actual improvement that is induced by a donation
and, in turn, donate less compared to a full information benchmark case. By that, the
underestimation of productivity is one source of underfunding. It is of particular inter-
est, especially in the charity context, to investigate causes of underfunding to be able to
tackle those and provide sucient nancial support.
This instantly begs the question to what extent the underprovision of nancial help is
due to the individuals’ misperceptions as opposed to an implication of utility maximiz-
ing behavior, i.e. free-riding. Further, is the response to a given governmental behavior
aected by the misperception of productivity and how does it interfere with the misper-
ception of taxes?
One interesting observation can be made with regard to the composition of public and
private donations: between 2012 and 2016, not only public but also private contributions
have gone up.1 This simultaneous increase is remarkable as it seems to be at odds with
the well established crowding-out hypothesis of Bergstrom et al. (1986). Hence, an ex-
planation is needed that rationalizes the observed concomitant increase.
We approach these questions in our paper and study the aforementioned factors as
being crucial for understanding what drives individual donation choices in the presence
of public donors. One aim of our paper is to disentangle the mechanisms driving the
interplay of public and private donors and to make out what determines an individual’s
donation choice for a given tax schedule. In that respect, we study in particular the role
misperceptions—of taxes as well as a donation’s eectiveness—play.
The rst part of our paper focuses on the positive analysis of charity as a public good
and studies the eect of the previously described factors on individual behavior. The sec-
ond part of our paper is dedicated to the question how dierent allocations, i.e. dierent
compositions of donations regarding the source of funding (public or private), can be
1While the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development increased its contri-
butions to development cooperation projects from 6.3 billion Euro in 2012 to 7.8 billion Euro in 2016
(German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2018), private donations in
Germany increased between 2012 and 2016 from 4.1 to 5.3 billion Euro (Deutscher Spendenrat, 2018).
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evaluated in terms of welfare. We study how the answer to this question depends on the
factors productivity and salience (in both of its dimensions). In particular, we introduce
a welfare measure that accounts for the individuals’ misperceptions and analyze how
welfare is aected by governmental intervention.
The following section describes the model we use, how it relates to the existing liter-
ature and the main results that can be derived for the given setup.
Main Results and Model To answer the stated questions, we develop a theoretical
model studying the voluntary provision to the public good help in tradition of Warr
(1982), Roberts (1984) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). We rene their workhorse model by
introducing parameters that characterize the public good and describe the informational
circumstances: rst, tax salience reects the fact that individuals are prone to scal illu-
sion, i.e. are not fully aware of the amount of government contributions to the charity
project. Second, a donation’s ecacy or, more technically, a contribution’s productivity
can vary across projects. Third, a charity project can be more or less salient. The more
salient a charity project is, the more productive individuals perceive their donation to be.
Note that the complete analysis we provide is independent of the application to charity
and holds for any public good context. We use charity as an illustrative example.
Chetty et al. (2009), Finkelstein (2009) and Farhi and Gabaix (2015) recently analyzed
the eect of non-salient taxes in various contexts. However, none of them studies the
eects of tax salience in the context of the voluntary provision of public goods.2
The second feature of the public good, perceived ecacy, that we introduce is ap-
proached from many economic elds: however, most of it focuses on the informational
aspect by studying the eect of quality signals, seed money or sequential donation proce-
dures; see among others Vesterlund (2003), Andreoni (2006), Potters et al. (2007), Heutel
(2014). Contrary, we study a static theoretical model and do not adress the question how
to overcome the lack of information and its eects on the contribution level to the public
good but instead focus on the investigation of its interplay with tax salience with regard
to the resulting allocation.
In our model individuals decide on how to split a given income between private con-
sumption and donation. As individuals are interested in the well-being of one another,
they are willing to donate to make people in a crisis region better o. Besides the pure
altruistic motive, we follow among others Andreoni (1989) and Andreoni (1990), assum-
ing that individuals act out of an egoistic motive as well receiving a warm glow when
contributing voluntarily to the public good charity.3 When making their decisions, indi-
2See Eckel et al. (2005) or Hickey et al. (2015) for experimental and eld evidence on the role of tax
awareness or tax salience on charitable giving, Goldin and Listokin (2014) for the limited awareness of
charitable deduction availability in the US, Chetty et al. (2009), Finkelstein (2009) or Chetty and Saez
(2013) for work on the salience of taxes in non-charity contexts and, among others, Wagner (1976),
Buchanan (1960), Buchanan (2014), Baekgaard et al. (2016) for contributions on scal illusion.
3While Harbaugh et al. (2007) shows impressive evidence for positive neural responses to voluntary (as
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viduals take the donation’s productivity into account. Yet, they only hold a perception of
productivity which is a function of the project’s salience and its actual productivity. In
such a framework, individuals raise their donations if they consider these as being more
benecial either due to higher productivity or due to higher salience of the project. This
rst implication of the model ts well with the extensive empirical evidence for salience
as a central inuence factor for the provision of help.4 Regarding perceived taxes, in-
dividuals raise their contributions if they consider taxes to be lower — either due to
actually reduced public contributions or due to a drop in their salience. This nding is
in line with the standard crowding-out result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) and foots in the
substitutability of public and private contributions.
Given the importance of salience for individual contribution behavior, the gap in the-
oretical literature studying the eect of salience in the public good context is surprising.
The only paper that studies government interventions in the context of varying tax’
salience theoretically is Eckel et al. (2005). Although we are in line with the theoretical
motivation for their laboratory experiment, our assumptions on how tax salience aects
behavior dier from theirs. As mentioned before, we further extend the framework as-
suming that behavior is driven by a second misperception, the salience of productivity.
And, most importantly, we provide a welfare analysis that delivers an evaluation of in-
dividuals’ rational behavior.
To be able to address normative questions, we rstly derive the aggregate equilib-
rium donation and study how its composition regarding the source of funding changes
if circumstances vary, i.e. if salience or the respective true parameter change:
In the presence of misperceptions, investigating the interplay between government
contributions to the public good—being nanced via mandatory lump sum taxes—and
the individually rational donation behavior, we make the following observations. Public
contributions crowd-out private contributions. Crowding-out is perfect only if taxes are
perfectly salient and individuals do not experience a warm glow (Warr (1982), Roberts
(1984), and Bergstrom et al. (1986)), and it is partial in all other cases. Here, the degree of
(partial) crowding-out depends negatively on the substitutability between private and
public contributions and positively on the salience of taxes. So, the higher the expe-
rienced warm glow and the lower the salience of taxes are, the larger the increase in
opposed to mandatory) donations, there exists an extensive evidence on the relevance of warm glow
in the laboratory and eld. See e.g. Andreoni and Payne (2013) for a survey in the context of charitable
giving.
4While the before mentioned paper of Slovic et al. (2017) on the media presence of the image of the
young Syrian boy studies an extreme example, Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) sensitize for the eect
of salience on governmental relief using Olympic Games as an exogenous source lowering the news
coverage of simultaneously occurring disasters. While disasters are ve percent less likely to receive
reliefs during Olympic Games, it is, in particular, reliefs to marginally newsworthy crises that are
strongest aected by the reduced salience. Furthermore, focusing on Canadian donations to reliefs on
the Haiti earthquake, Hickey et al. (2015) point out that the eect of tax reductions associated with
giving is positively aected by the salience of the announcement of the policy.
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aggregate contributions to the public good is if taxes increase ceteris paribus. As a di-
rect consequence of the previously described individual behavior, it holds that the sum
of public and private contributions increases in productivity and its salience.
Although outlining how the sum of public and private contributions to the public good
is aected by changes in salience and taxes, the rst part of the analysis does not allow us
to draw conclusions on welfare. The main reason is that increased overall contributions
are by denition accompanied by reductions in private consumption which potentially
reduces welfare. Furthermore, both productivity and taxes are not perfectly salient when
individuals make their decision implying a dierence between decision and experienced
utility (Kahneman et al. (1997)). For the normative analysis we dene an unweighted
Utalitarian welfare function based on experienced utility. The results of the comparative
static analysis are interesting themselves:
Regarding perceived productivity, we nd that independently of what causes the raise,
welfare goes up if perceived productivity increases. Though, the underlying mechanism
diers: A positive shock on the salience of productivity improves the informational
structure and so yields smaller mistakes in the individuals donation choice, which is
benecial. If true productivity goes up, the marginal benet of every dollar donated is
higher, which raises utility and, in turn, welfare. Considering changes in the perceived
tax system, things are less clear a priori.
First, if taxes are fully salient, equilibrium welfare decreases in public contributions.
This implication is not obvious given that the result also holds when the public good
is underprovided and the overall provision of the public good increases due to the tax
increase. The main driving channel is the imperfect substitutability between private and
public contributions. The tax increase reduces warm glow incorporated in private con-
tributions being crowded-out by public ones. Second, if taxes and, in turn, tax increases
are not fully salient, the eect of a tax increase on equilibrium welfare is ambiguous.
While again warm glow is crowded-out, the degree of crowding-out is smaller than un-
der full salience of taxes. Dependent on the size of the free-riding problem—which itself
decreases in the salience of a donation’s productivity—an increase in taxes can be both
welfare increasing and welfare harming.
We nd that this indeterminacy can be tackled by considering tax increases that are
paralleled by increases in private contributions due to raised perceived productivity
which is exactly the empirical pattern from our motivation. In a rst step, we formally in-
troduce this phenomenon called crowding-in and rationalize it in our model.5 Secondly,
we address the question what can be learned from crowding-in regarding the evalua-
5Note that our notion from crowding-in diers from the before mentioned known stamp of approval
mechanism where government’s contributions induce higher private contributions by signaling an
organization’s quality to uninformed individuals. Moreover, it also abstracts from associated changes
in the prices of help associated with tax deductions for donations, see among others Auten et al. (2002)
or, more generally, with matching gifts Karlan and List (2007), Huck and Rasul (2011), Huck et al. (2015),
and Adena and Huck (2017).
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tion of tax changes if we assume that the government behaves in a welfare maximizing
manner. We show that the welfare implications of crowding-in strongly depend on the
respective trigger: crowding-in triggered by a salience of productivity shock indicates a
non-optimal, i.e. welfare decreasing, tax change. However, if crowding-in is triggered by
a shock in true productivity, the implications of crowding-in are determined by whether
the shock has led to a higher level of underprovision of the public good, ceteris paribus.
If underprovision has become more severe after the shock, not observing crowding-in
points to a non-optimal government behavior as the government should have intervened
to alleviate underprovision. However, whether underprovision gets more severe after a
productivity shock is determined by the individuals’ preferences and a priori ambiguous.
With respect to practical applicability, these ndings are highly relevant as they build
a rst step towards identifying changes in welfare and its direction based on observed
behavior. E.g. consider again a salience shock as given by the photo of Alan Kurdi:
observing crowding-in in such a situation of pure salience shock is an indicator for a
decrease in welfare if governments behaved optimally before. Thereby, our analysis
delivers a rst approach to link the rather theoretical concept of welfare to the real world
and allows under specic circumstances to deduce evaluations based on observables.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the theoretical
framework (Subsection 3.2.1) and analyze comparative statics of the equilibrium contri-
butions (Subsection 3.2.2). In section 3.3, the eciency of the Nash-equilibrium outcome
and its reaction to changes in public contributions, productivity, and salience are investi-
gated (Subsection 3.3.1) and implications of crowding-in are discussed (Subsection 3.3.2).
Section 3.4 summarizes and concludes.
3.2 Model description
3.2.1 Theoretical framework
We consider a set of individuals I = {1, 2, . . . , N} living in a safe country while there
exist as well a crisis region where living conditions are unstable. This crisis region is in
need of nancial help. W.l.o.g. we focus on the case of one crisis region.
As individuals in the safe country are altruistic and interested in the well-being of
people in the crisis region they wish to improve the living conditions there via nan-
cial support. What matters for their decision as potential donors is the productivity of
nancial help. In the model, we denote the productivity of a donation to the region by
a. It subsumes all potential inuence factors driving how benecial a dollar spent to the
crisis is. In the real world productivity is, for example, determined by the need level,
the infrastructural situation in the crisis region or the organizational structure of the aid
organization.
Beside nancial help provided privately by individuals there also is nancial support
128
3.2 Model description
by the government of the safe country nanced via mandatory tax payments. In contrast
to public contributions, private donations are made voluntarily by splitting a given in-
come ei between private consumption ci and donation di to the crisis region. As standard
in the literature, we assume that giving voluntarily generates a warm glow. It describes
the preference for giving per se apart from the unselsh motive of improving the liv-
ing conditions in the crisis regions. In this way, a donation di consists of a public good
component help and a private good component called ‘warm glow’.
Denoting the sum of individual private donations by D :=
∑
i di, and the aggregate
amount of individual tax payments dedicated to the region in need of nancial help by
T :=
∑
i ti, the utility an individual i experiences from donating di is described by the
following function:
Ui(·) = ci + v(D + T + g · di, a) . (3.1)
Here, v(·) is a region-specic sub-utility function depending on the total amount of -
nancial support provided,D+T , as well as its productivity, a and the warm glow associ-
ated with contributing voluntarily. Here, g reects the strength of warm glow.6 W.l.o.g.
we assume that g ∈ [0, 1].7 We impose standard assumptions on v(·), assuming that v(·)
is concavely increasing in the total support for the crisis, i.e. v1 > 0, v11 < 0.8 Moreover,
as in other public good contexts, we focus on cases where contributions to the public
good are desired by the safe country’s population assuming that limD→0 v1 = ∞ and
limD→∞ v1 = 0. Finally, we assume that v(·) has a positive cross-derivative, i.e. v12 > 0.
The intuitive interpretation is that the utility increase associated with an additional dol-
lar spent is larger the larger the productivity of nancial help and, in turn, the associated
improvement in the crisis region is.
The utility function given in equation (3.1) describes a situation with perfectly in-
formed individuals. However, this hardly ts empirical observations. Neither do indi-
viduals estimate the actual productivity of nancial contributions correctly nor are they
really informed about the amount of taxes that go to the crisis region. For that reason
we incorporate salience of both the crisis and taxes in the model. In-salience reects the
two most important types of misperception and is a driver of individual donations..
First, while being (impure) altruists potential donors can only build a belief of the
productivity of their donation that diers from actual productivity level. This perception
is a function of the salience of the crisis and its actual productivity. Salience represents
the level of media representation or, more generally, the accessibility of crisis-specic
information. We denote the salience of the region by σa ∈ [0, 1] and assume that the
perceived productivity a˜(a, σa) = σaa is a function that is strictly increasing in both of
its arguments productivity a and salience σa.9
6Note that being mandatory the tax payment does not create a warm glow.
7This ensures that we actually face a public good problem as the weight of the egoistic component is
restricted.
8Here, vk denotes the partial derivative of v w.r.t. the kth argument.
9The specication of the salience function is w.l.o.g. To maintain our results qualitatively, it is crucial
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Second, we assume that individuals are not fully aware of the amount of taxes that are
collected in order to support charity projects. Rather individuals seem to be unattentive
towards these tax payments and do not fully account for these when deciding on their
private donations. Similar to the notation before, we assume that taxes ti are not fully
salient and misperceived by a factor σT ∈ [0, 1], such that t˜i = σT ti and analogously
T˜ = σT
∑
i ti, similar to Eckel et al. (2005). Taxes are assumed to be exogeneously given
and xed.
To sum up, individual i’s utility is a function of private consumption ci, aggregate
donation D, private donation di, tax level T , and the parameter for productivity a and
warm glow g. Thereby, the perception of productivity and taxes is biased by its salience,
respectively. Individuals build their donation choice based on their decision utility func-
tion 10 which is given by
U˜(·) = ci + v(D + T˜ + g · di, a˜) . (3.2)
For ease of notation, we introduce v˜(·) := v(D + T˜ + g · di, a˜) and v(·) := v(D +
T + g · di, a). The stated utility function enlightens the meaning of salience in the given
context. Salience or, to be more precise, the lack of salience leads to an underestimation
of two crucial factors of the model: taxes and productivity. Due to inattention towards
taxes and the lack of information about the crisis, individuals make a mistake: Instead
of using their actual experienced utility dened in equation (3.1), they decide upon their
donations based on the decision utility formalized in equation (3.2).
To condense the notation, we summarize the circumstances under which individuals
make their decisions by the state of the world ω := ((a, T ), (σa, σT )). It describes the
informational structure (σa, σT ) and the two focal attributes of the considered crisis,
(a, T ).
In the following chapter, we study individual equilibrium behavior and how it varies
in the given components of ω, i.e. productivity and taxes as well as productivity salience
and tax salience. Especially, we focus on the eect of previously described misperception
has on individual behavior.
3.2.2 Eqilibrium analysis and comparative statics
In this section we analyze individually optimal donation behavior and derive the Nash
equilibrium for the public good help. We start by characterizing individually optimal be-
havior as a function of the tax schedule and held perceptions. Individuals are responsive
to productivity, taxes and salience in both of its dimensions. Regarding the tax schedule,
we focus on taxes that do not change the set of contributors. We derive the individually
optimal donation behavior under the given assumptions.
that the perception is an increasing function in both of its arguments.
10See Kahneman et al. (1997) who was the rst distinguishing experienced and decision utility.
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Individually rational donation behavior
For a given state of the world ω, individual i chooses private good consumption ci and
the donation level di to solve the following maximization problem:
max
ci,di
ci + v((1 + g)di +D−i + T˜ , a˜) (3.3)
s.t. ci + di ≤ ei − t˜i (3.4)
ci ≥ 0 (3.5)
di ≥ 0 (3.6)
Here, D−i :=
∑
k 6=i dk denotes the sum of donations excluding those of person i.
Equation (3.4) reects the (perceived) budget constraint11 and equations (3.5) and (3.6)
are standard non-negativity constraints. Under ecient use of resources equation (3.4)
binds such that a solution of the preceding problem is characterized by the expression
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a xed state of the world ω. Then, person i’s donation di is a best
response to the others’ contributionD−i if individual i’s decision utility U˜(·) is maximized.
Formally, if the following rst-order condition is satised:
d∗i = argdi{1 = (1 + g)v1
(
(1 + g)di +D−i + T˜ , a˜
)} (FOC∗)
For a given state of the world ω, individual i’s optimal donation is a function of D−i
only. Hence, the preceding rst-order condition implicitly denes a Nash equilibrium
by the intersection of those best response functions:
Denition 3.1 (Nash-equilibrium). The Nash-equilibrium for a given state of the world
ω, is a vector of contributions (d∗i )ni=1 fullling condition (FOC∗) such that for all i: d∗i =
di(D
∗
−i).
As preferences are identical for all individuals, it holds that
d∗i (D
∗
−i) = d
∗
j(D
∗
−j) ,∀ i 6= j ∈ I
This symmetric Nash-equilibrium is unique in pure strategies. For this reason we use
the symmetric equilibrium as the benchmark case. The aggregate equilibrium level of
private donations is given by
D∗(a˜, T˜ ) = N · d∗i (a˜, T˜ ) .
11As shown by Baekgaard et al. (2016), scal illusion foots in unawareness towards taxes but not the lack
of information. Thereby, it’s reasonable to assume that individuals misperceive their available budget.
As we consider quasi linear utility function, this is w.l.o.g..
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Although suciently large public contributions induce individuals not to donate at
all, we are interested in how the equilibrium private contributions change in response
to changes in the state of the world. For that reason the following analysis focuses on
Nash-equilibria in which individuals contribute a positive amount to the region, d∗i > 0.
The public good character of donations—following from individuals being (impure)
altruists—implies that individual contributions are substitutes. More precisely, individ-
ual i’s donation decreases in everyone else’s contribution to the same region. However,
since a voluntary donation creates a warm glow, D−i is only an imperfect substitute for
di. This idea is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. For a given state of the world ω, the best response function d∗i (D−i) is de-
creasing in D−i. It holds that
dd∗i
dD−i
= − 1
1+g
, i.e. di and D−i are imperfect substitutes if
g > 0.
The partial derivative of di with respect to D−i reects the degree of substitutability
between contributions and describes the factor by which di can be replaced byD−i such
that the rst order condition still holds. As the derivative is a function of g, this degree
of substitutability varies in the strength of warm glow. Individual i’s contribution to the
region can be replaced one-by-one by others’ contributions if there is no warm glow,
i.e. if g = 0. In this case, individuals are pure altruists as they are only interested in
the aggregate amount of help provided in the crisis region. Thus, without the egoistic
motive to donate, di and D−i are perfectly substitutable. Contrary, the higher the ex-
perienced warm glow is, the lower is the degree of substitutability between di and D−i.
As the private good character of di becomes more important relative to the public good
character if g is higher, di has to be replaced by a far larger amount ofD−i to keep utility
constant.
Lemma 3.2 allows another noteworthy conclusion as the partial derivative of d∗i with
respect to D−i is a function of g but is independent of the tax schedule or salience. The
degree of substitutability is a constant and does not change if the state of the world
varies. In particular, the degree by which di can be replaced by D−i is independent of
what the government does. Yet, the amount of public contributions, productivity and
salience of both determine the actual amount of private contributions in equilibrium.
The next paragraph claries how the state of the world aect individually rational
behavior and, thereby, the equilibrium donation level D∗.
Comparative static analysis of the individually rational donation
One aim of our analysis is to get a better understanding of how the funding of charity
projects relates to salience and the tax regime. For this purpose, it is insightful to distin-
guish the eect of changes in the state of the world on private donations from its eect
on aggregate contributions, i.e. on the sum of public and private contributions.
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The analysis in this chapter delivers insights in what drives changes in donation be-
havior and a charity project’s funding. Specically, we learn how individuals adapt their
behavior to changes in ω and how this aects the aggregate support level. This positive
analysis sets the stage for answering normative questions regarding the generated wel-
fare in the next chapter.
Lemma 3.1 and the characterization of the symmetric Nash-equilibrium in Denition
3.1 imply that the (perceived) public good level in equilibrium D∗ + T˜ satises the fol-
lowing optimality condition
1
1 + g
= v˜1
(
D∗N+g
N
+ T˜ , a˜
)
.
As a dollar spent is considered as more productive if the crisis’ salience or the do-
nation’s productivity go up, the equilibrium level of aggregate support increases in a
donation’s perceived eectiveness. For later reference, we denote this observation in
the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. The true equilibrium support D∗ + T is increasing in productivity a and
salience σa, formally
d(D∗+T )
da˜
da˜
da
> 0 and d(D
∗+T )
da˜
da˜
dσa
> 0.
As taxes are by assumption exogenously given, this result is driven by the change in
private contributions with respect to perceived productivity, i.e. with respect to produc-
tivity and its salience.12 Formally,
dD∗
dσa
= − v˜12(·)
v˜11(·)
N
N+g
a > 0, (3.7)
dD∗
da
= − v˜12(·)
v˜11(·)
N
N+g
σa > 0. (3.8)
The preceding corollary shows that whatever raises an individual’s perception of pro-
ductivity, increased productivity or increased salience of the crisis, leads to a higher level
of provided help in equilibrium. The higher individuals expect a donation’s productivity
to be, the more money they are willing to spend and the higher the aggregate nan-
cial support D∗ + T in equilibrium is. Technically, the result is driven by the positive
cross-derivative v˜12(·) > 0.
A direct consequence of this observation is that under the given assumption a˜ ≤ a,
the individuals’ perception induces a level of private nancial support that lies below
the equilibrium level under perfect information, i.e.
D∗(a˜, T ) ≤ D∗(a, T ) ∀ω.
12By that argument, it holds as well that perceived equilibrium contributions increase in perceived pro-
ductivity, i.e. d(D
∗+T˜ )
da˜ > 0.
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Hence, the underestimation of productivity is a source of underprovision that is inde-
pendent of free-riding—a second source of the public good’s underprovision.
Apart from productivity and salience shocks, changes in the tax schedule can aect
the aggregate level of support. As mentioned before, we study tax changes that do not
change the set of contributors, ensuring the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium
solution. The following Lemma 3.3 states how these changes in the tax policy alter the
(aggregate) Nash-equilibrium support for the region in need.
Lemma 3.3. The equilibrium support D∗ + T increases in T .
d (D∗ + T )
dT
= 1− N
N + g
σT ≥ 0.
An increase in public contributions to the region has a direct and an indirect eect
on aggregate contributions. The two summands in the stated lemma represent these
eects. An increase in public contributions of one dollar raises the sum of private and
public contributions by the same amount (direct eect). This increase, in turn, induces
individuals to reduce their individually rational contributions (indirect eect) as reected
in the second summand. Hence, higher public contributions crowd-out private contri-
butions.
The degree of crowding-out crucially depends on the substitutability between private
and public contributions and the individuals’ awareness of the tax schedule: rst, taxes
are mandatory and do not induce a warm glow. Hence, these are an imperfect substitute
for private donations inducing individuals to a partial response only (even if individuals
were fully informed about taxes). Thereby, the bigger the private good component of
donations, mirrored by g, is, the less private contributions are crowded-out by public
ones. Second, as taxes are not fully salient, the eect is biased by its salience σT . The
size of the crowding-out eect is lowered due to the limited awareness of government
interventions—here, the increase in public contributions. The overall eect on the aggre-
gate equilibrium support D∗ + T is determined via both channels and is non-negative.
Complete crowding-out as outlined by Bergstrom et al. (1986), i.e. the situation where
the reduction in D∗ balances the increase in T , occurs if only if individuals do not ex-
perience a warm glow (g = 0) and are additionally perfectly aware of taxes (σT = 1).
In all other cases, crowding-out is partial and, thus, the aggregate amount of nancial
help sent to the crisis region increases in T . This partial crowding-out is in line with
the ndings in the existing warm glow literature, following Andreoni (1989). Here, the
government intervention alleviates the problem of free riding in the sense that the ag-
gregate amount of nancial help increases in T .13 This holds—opposed to the results of
Andreoni (1989)—even for a model without warm glow as individuals do not take taxes
13Due to free-riding, public goods are underprovided in a Nash equilibrium compared to the ecient
provision level.
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at the full extent into account when deciding on their donation. So, σT < 1 mitigates
the underprovision of the public good in Nash equilibrium.
In contrast, if g = 0 and σT = 1, public and private contributions are perfect substi-
tutes such that the equilibrium amount of the public good remains unaected by small
government interventions.14
The considerations above as well as the existing literature focus on the overall provi-
sion of the public good as its underprovision is one crucial issue in both economic theory
and practice. Though, they neglect the private good component in the individuals’ util-
ity functions. Private consumption is aected if the contributions to the public good
changes. This has to be accounted for when the quality of an allocation is assessed, i.e.
when normative questions are addressed such that the existing approach of evaluating
public good equilibria by their amount of reduced free riding is unsatisfactory.
This, in turn, points to our next step where we abstract from considering the spe-
cic provision level (of the public good) only but are interested in the generated utility
resulting from the respective contribution allocation, i.e. in welfare.
In the following chapter, we introduce a welfare measure and analyze how welfare
is aected by changes in ω. Thereby, we not only account for changes in private good
consumption, but also incorporate the evaluation of allocations in terms of the generated
utility. This widens the focus of the analysis of public goods: Instead of considering the
eect of a tax change on the provision level of a public good only, we study the eects
on the individuals’ utility and, hence, on welfare.
3.3 Welfare
So far, we took a positive perspective and studied how equilibrium donations are aected
by changes in the state of the world. In the following section, we introduce a norma-
tive analysis of the public good help in case of uninformed individuals: we tackle the
question how to evaluate a given allocation in terms of welfare. In a rst step, we intro-
duce a welfare measure and analyze if and how changes in perceived productivity or the
perceived tax system aect welfare. Secondly, we study the phenomenon crowding-in,
i.e. the concomitant increase in public and private contributions, and ask: Is there any-
thing we can learn from observing this development in contributions regarding welfare
or the evaluation of a given tax system? As we will see, under certain circumstances,
crowding-in points to a non-optimal tax policy.
14Under these circumstances, free-riding can only be reduced if public contributions are so high that they
induce private donors to stop from voluntarily contributing at all.
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3.3.1 Unweighted Utilitarian welfare and comparative statics
The welfare measure we use takes into account that individuals make mistakes when
choosing their donation as they face nonsalient taxes and nonsalient productivity. This
causes a discrepancy between the utility individuals experience Ui(·), see equation (3.1),
and the utility they base their decisions on U˜i(·), see equation (3.2). In line with Kahne-
man et al. (1997) and Chetty et al. (2009) we dene welfare based on experienced utility
Ui(·). For a given state of the world ω, we identify welfare associated with the private
contribution level D by the following unweighted Utilitarian welfare function:
W (D,ω) =
∑N
i=1 Ui(D,ω) = Nei −D − T +Nv
(
DN+g
N
+ T, a
)
. (3.9)
The welfare associated with the Nash-equilibrium for a given state of the world ω is
accordingly denoted by W ∗ := W (D∗, ω). By considering the equilibrium welfare we
account for individuals’ response to changes in the state of the world.15
The following normative analysis focuses on the investigation of shocks on perceived
productivity and changes in the perceived tax system. The eects on welfare strongly
depend on whether the public good is underprovided for a given state of the world or not:
due to the imperfect salience of taxes, it is no implication of the model’s assumptions.16
We proceed as follows: in a rst step, we formally identify underprovision. To do so,
we characterize the welfare maximizing contribution for each state of the world. Based
on this, we study in a second step how underprovision itself as well as the associated
welfare loss are aected by the mentioned shocks.
Welfare maximizing private contributions and the characterization of
underprovision
The next lemma determines the ecient, i.e. welfare maximizing, private contribution
level De which gives a reference point for the identication of underprovision.
Lemma 3.4. For a given state of the world ω, the ecient private contribution De :=
arg maxD{W (D,ω)} is implicitly given by
1
N + g
= v1(D
e N+g
N
+ T, a). (3.10)
The preceding lemma enables us to phrase a formal denition of underprovision, i.e.
15While the equilibrium contribution levelD∗ is a function of perceived productivity and perceived taxes,
welfare is based on true productivity and taxes. Hence, in contrast to productivity and taxes, the
salience of both aects welfare only indirectly via its eect on individual contribution levels.
16Although its practical relevance might be questionable, consider the extreme case where government’s
behavior is completely insalient, i.e. σT = 0. If the government contributes an amount T , positive
contributions of individuals who do not take the government’s contribution into account, can result
in overprovision. In the following section we provide a formal denition of overprovision.
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of a level of private contributions that is too small compared to the welfare maximizing
level.
Denition 3.2 (Underprovision). For a given state of the world ω, the public good is
underprovided if and only if D∗ < De or equivalently if
(N + g)v1(D
∗N+g
N
+ T, a) − 1 > 0.
Note that—as typical for the voluntary provision of public goods under individually
rational behavior—underprovision of the public good is the relevant case. Though, for
the sake of completeness, the results presented in the following distinguish according to
the provision level. This distinction will be decisive for the evaluation of shocks in terms
of welfare. Intuitively, individuals respond to shocks by adjusting their donations. The
evaluation of this adjustment depends on whether higher (or lower) overall contributions
are desirable from a welfare perspective or not.
Note that in the considered setting, underprovision results as in the standard models
from free-riding but, in addition, from the imperfect salience of productivity.
The eect of changes in the state of the world on equilibrium welfare
In this section we analyze how changes in perceived productivity or perceived taxes
aect equilibrium welfare. Stating dierently, we compute the overall eect of positive
shocks on productivity and its salience as well as the tax schedule and tax salience on
utility. Section 3.2.2 described the eects of shocks on private donations. Now, we derive
the induced welfare changes.
We start with shocks on perceived productivity. These can be triggered either by
shocks on productivity or its salience. A positive shock on salience occurs if e.g. the
crisis gets in the focus of media or the accessibility of information becomes better such
that individuals’ degree of underestimated productivity decreases. Technically, an in-
crease in the productivity’s salience reduces the discrepancy between experienced and
decision utility such that the mistake individuals make when choosing their donation
gets smaller. As a result, individuals donate more such that—if there is underprovision—
underprovision due to misperception is lowered.17 With regard to welfare, this implies
that salience shocks aect welfare positively:
dW ∗
dσa
=
dD∗
dσa︸︷︷︸
>0
· ((N + g)v1(·)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ underprovision
> 0 .
The second factor is positive only if there is underprovision. It is negative, if the
17Note that we distinguish underprovision due to misperception or imperfect productivity salience from
underprovision due to free-riding.
137
Chapter 3 Public Goods and Salience
ecient aggregate contribution level is already exceeded such that the increase in D∗
induced by the salience shock is welfare harming.18
For productivity shocks, the same arguments apply as these also induce higher pri-
vate contributions which, in turn, aect welfare positively if there is underprovision.
However, compared to a crisis’ salience, productivity shocks aect welfare via a second
channel, reected in the second summand of the following equation:
dW ∗
da
=
dD∗
da︸︷︷︸
>0
· ((N + g)v1(·)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ underprovision
+ Nv2(·) > 0.
The rst component refers to the net eect of reduced underprovision: it is positive
when higher donations are desirable. The second term mirrors the increased productiv-
ity of every dollar donated. It has a positive eect on welfare itself so that the overall
welfare eect of a productivity shock can be positive even in the theoretical case of
overprovision.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a state of the world ω such that there is underprovision. Then
positive shocks on productivity a or its salience σa raise welfare, i.e.
dW ∗
da˜
> 0 .
We found that whatever raises the individuals perception of productivity leads to
higher welfare when underprovision is an issue. Moreover, both shocks lead to an in-
crease in aggregate contributions to the public good. In this sense, the discussed positive
welfare eects stated above result (partly) from reduced free-riding.
In contrast to the eects of shocks on perceived productivity, the eects of changes in
the perceived tax schedule are less clear and depend on the triggering shock: perceived
taxes can change either due to variations in the tax or its salience. We rstly focus on
the welfare eect of a tax salience shock.
Intuitively, a positive shock on tax salience makes individuals more aware of public
contributions. This induces private donors to reduce their voluntary donations such that
the aggregate contribution level decreases. If this aggregate contribution level is too
low from a welfare perspective already before the tax shock, the decrease worsens the
situation in the crisis region and lowers welfare as shown in the following expression:
dW ∗
dσT
=
dD∗
dσT︸︷︷︸
<0
· ((N + g)v1(·)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ underprovision
< 0 .
18Note that the stated expression reecting the mitigation of underprovision is a net eect and accounts
for the accompanied reduction in private consumption that is linked to higher donations.
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Note again the relevance of underprovision as a determinant for the direction of the
eect. Given underprovision, a reduction of tax salience is welfare enhancing which is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Consider a state of the world ω such that there is underprovision. Then
a positive shock on the tax salience σT lowers welfare, i.e.
dW ∗
dσT
< 0 .
A similar result regarding the welfare eect of (nonsalient) taxes is derived by Chetty
et al. (2009) for private goods and non-salient sales taxes: If taxes are not fully taken into
account by individuals when making a consumption choice, the arising distortion due
to the tax is lower the less salient the sales tax is. This, in turn, induces the dead-weight
loss to be smaller under less salient sales taxes.
Having derived the welfare eect of a shock on tax salience, we can turn to the inves-
tigation of the welfare implications of changes in the tax schedule:
dW ∗(·)
dT
=
dD∗ + T
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· ((N + g)v1(·)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ underprovision
−gv1(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
. (3.11)
As in all before mentioned cases and illustrated in the rst summand, underprovision
plays a crucial role. The rst summand of equation (3.11) reects the welfare eect of
mitigated free-riding in case of underprovision.19 Yet, there is a second eect determin-
ing the overall eect. If taxes go up, private consumption decreases as higher taxes do
not create a warm glow and, hence, are an imperfect substitute. This is mirrored by the
second summand: it reects the lost warm glow if a dollar is contributed obligatorily via
a tax and not voluntarily via private donations.20 This aects welfare always negatively.
So, the aggregate welfare eect of a tax increase is not determined unambiguously by
the occurrence of underprovision as in all before mentioned cases but also by a second
opposing eect. The benets of mitigated free-riding and the harm of a lost warm glow
which yields reductions in private consumption have to be contrasted. The relative size
of these two eects strongly depends on the state of the world such that the overall eect
of a tax increase is in general ambiguous, even if there is underprovision. We make note
of this point the following proposition and will discuss in more depth which component
of ω plays a crucial role for determining the eect.
Proposition 3.3. Consider a state of the world ω such that there is underprovision. Then
tax increases can be both welfare increasing or harming.
19In case of overprovision, a tax increase is never benecial.
20Remember that we consider tax changes that do not change the set of contributors.
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To better understand how the welfare eect of tax changes diers from other shocks’
eect it proves helpful to rewrite equation (3.11):21
dW ∗(·)
dT
= (1− σT ) N
N + g
((N + g)v1(·)− 1)− g
N + g
. (3.12)
As before, the two main forces remain recognizable: the lost warm glow by which
private consumption is reduced as reected in the second summand and, further, the
reduction of free-riding as represented by the rst summand. Regarding the latter, the
rephrased equation allows to make out a crucial determinant of the size of this eect:
the tax salience.
If taxes are not fully salient, i.e. σT < 1, individuals underestimate the increase in
taxes. This reduces the scope of crowding-out and allows the benecial mitigation of
free-riding if the public good is underprovided. The mechanism gets clear when con-
sidering the extreme case of perfectly insalient taxes, i.e. σT = 0. Here, individuals
choose a donation in anticipation of a laissez-faire economy. So, they do not respond
to changes in taxes. As a result, the aggregate contribution level D∗ + T increases by
exactly the amount of a tax increase so that underprovision can be fully eliminated by an
(appropriately chosen) tax such that the welfare maximum (see Lemma 3.4) is reached.
More generally, tax increases are more likely to raise welfare if the public good is
underprovided and the tax salience is low. Then, the positive eect of reduced free-riding
outweighs the lost warm glow. To get a better understanding, we close this section with
a discussion on the other extreme case of full tax salience which is the classic setting
Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Andreoni (1989), Andreoni (1990) study in their paper.
Full Tax Salience Under the assumption of full tax salience, σT = 1, individuals
perfectly account for taxes when making their donation decision. Hence, the utility that
is generated by the public good is constant22 such that taxes are never benecial as their
only welfare eect is a lost warm glow. This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. Consider a state of the world ω with fully salient taxes, i.e. σT = 1. Then
taxes are welfare harming: for all tax schedules T1 and T2 with T2 > T1 it holds—ceteris
paribus—thatW ∗(D∗, T1) > W ∗(D∗, T2).
The stated proposition is a direct consequence of equation (3.12) for the case of σT = 1.
It holds independently of a donation’s productivity or its salience. Moreover, equation
(3.12) implies that in the standard situation of Bergstrom et al. (1986) where g = 0 taxes
do not aect welfare at all. Then, there is one-to-one crowding-out such that individuals
completely balance the tax increase in their donation choice so that taxes do not impact
the aggregate equilibrium contribution.
21Here, we make use of the comparative static results from section 3.2.2.
22The utility generated by the public good is pinned down by the rst order condition (FOC∗) if prefer-
ences are quasi-linear.
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Contrary, if there is warm glow, as in the considered situation in proposition 3.4,
governmental intervention incompletely crowds-out private donations. The resulting
rise in the aggregate equilibrium support D∗ + T (see Lemma 3.3) comes in terms of
welfare at the cost of reduced private consumption.
The latter observation underlines that the provision level of a public good is an insuf-
cient measure for the quality of an allocation in terms of welfare. Even in the case of
underprovision, an increase in overall public good provision level can be accompanied
by a decrease in welfare, as for σT = 1, g > 0. So, the reduction of free-riding is not
sucient for a positive overall welfare eect.
Up to now, we studied welfare from a theoretical perspective. Though, we are actually
interested in linking it to real world observations. The preceding analysis has empha-
sized that the observation of a tax increase is not informative itself as welfare can be
boosted or lowered by it. However, if the tax increase is paralleled by an increase in
private contributions, there exist cases where the direction of the welfare eect can be
unambiguously identied based on concomitant changes in D∗ and T .
3.3.2 Optimal government behavior and crowding-in
We only were able to determine the sign of the welfare eect of tax changes in case
σT = 1. The aim of this section is to go one step further and to identify cases where a
tax increase is benecial or not if its salience is incomplete, σT < 1. We will link this the-
ory based question to a real world situation where tax increases are observed: there are
cases when individuals raise their private donations after shocks on perceived produc-
tivity even though public contributions have gone up as well. We call this phenomenon
crowding-in and rationalize it in our model. Based on this, we are able to specify situa-
tions in which crowding-in is informative regarding our initial question whether a tax
increase is benecial.
Optimal Government Behavior
Up to now, we put no further assumption on the specication of the tax system. In the
following we derive the optimal tax as a function of productivity, its salience and tax
salience. This is an auxiliary step as it is not possible to state in general whether tax
increases are benecial or not (see Proposition 3.3). However, if we analyze the welfare
maximizing tax, we have an anchor point for the evaluation of tax increases that allows
us to identify situations where tax changes can be evaluated in terms of welfare.
For a given level of perceived productivity and tax salience, the optimal tax T o condi-
tional on rational individual behavior is characterized as follows.
Denition 3.3 (Optimal tax). For a given level productivity a, productivity salience σa,
and tax salience σT , the optimal tax T o maximizes equilibrium welfare. It is characterized
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by the following equation:
T o = max
T
{
0, argT{dW ∗dT = 0}
}
Although not outlined explicitly, the optimal tax T o is a function of perceived produc-
tivity and tax salience as it nests the equilibrium donation. In the following we analyze
how optimal government behavior adjusts in response to changes in the state of the
world.23 The intuitions behind the formal results are then directly linked to the welfare
analysis in Section 3.3.1 which already incorporates reactions in individual behavior to
changes in the state of the world and its implications for welfare. Yet, the following
analysis goes one step further as individuals respond to changes in two dimensions of
the state of the world: the change in productivity or its salience as well as the change in
the tax system.
Proposition 3.5. Consider a given state of the worldω = (a, T o, σa, σT ) such that T o > 0.
(a) Assume there is a positive shock on productivity salience σa. Then, the optimal tax
decreases:
dT o
dσa
< 0.
(b) Assume there is a positive shock on productivity a. Then, the optimal tax can decrease
or increase dependent on ω and v(·):
dT o
da
≷ 0.
Let us shortly comment on the dierent parts of Proposition 3.5.
Proposition 3.5(a) investigates optimal taxes after a shock on productivity salience.
If salience of productivity is imperfect, individuals underestimate the positive eect of
their donations and donate too little. This underprovision is alleviated by mandatory and
not fully salient taxes. If now the underprovision shrinks due to a positive shock on the
salience of productivity, the problem that is tackled by a tax has become smaller by the
shock; by that the value of a tax in terms of welfare has been reduced. On the other hand,
the downside of taxes as given by destroyed warm glow still exists and gained relatively
more weight in terms of welfare. In other words, if public contributions increase (or stay
constant) concomitantly with the positive salience shock, the government counteracts
more a less relevant problem reducing welfare compared to welfare under governmental
inactivity. Hence, the optimal tax can neither stay constant nor increase if productivity
gets more salient.
23Obviously, the interesting part for the following comparative static analysis requires government inter-
vention itself not to be welfare harming. For that reason—even if not always mentioning it—we focus
on cases where T o > 0.
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Proposition 3.5(b) deals with the change in the optimal tax in response to an increase
in productivity. Again, to make out, whether the welfare maximizing tax decreases or
increases after a shock on true productivity, the eect on the existing underprovision,
i.e. on ((N + g)v1(·)− 1), has to be evaluated. As in part (a) of this proposition, individ-
uals donate more after the shock than before it which reduces underprovision. Though,
a shock on true productivity a has an eect on the basis of the evaluation of this as the
sub-utility function v(·, a) is aected as well. Thereby, the aggregate eect is a priori
ambiguous as both arguments of v(·) change and tear v(·) in opposite directions. Intu-
itively, this reects the contrasting eects of reduced free-riding and stolen glow in case
of raised marginal benets of donations.
These results set the stage for the next section which studies what we can conclude
from the observation of crowding-in.
What we can learn from observing crowding-in
Before we start with introducing the phenomenon of crowding-in in the following def-
inition, note that only by considering the reference case of optimal taxes, we are able
to unambiguously identify how to evaluate tax increases. This would not be possible in
case of arbitrary tax schedules, see Proposition 3.3.
Denition 3.4 (Crowding-in). Consider a change in the state of the world from ω1 =
(a1, T1, σa1, σT ) to ω2 = (a2, T2, σa2, σT ) with T1 < T2 and a˜1 < a˜2. Then, there is
crowding-in if D∗1 < D∗2 .
There is crowding-in if private donations go up after a simultaneous increase in per-
ceived productivity and public contributions. Intuitively, there is crowding-in if the pos-
itive eect of the former on private donations outweighs the negative eect of the latter
resulting from crowded-out private donations.
From the individuals’ perspective, crowding-in indicates an insucient government
response to the considered shock on a˜: the change in ω induces individuals to consider
higher aggregate contributions to the charity to be optimal. The tax increase at least
partly covers the raised requirements in contributions. Though, if crowding-in is ob-
served, the tax increase was too small to completely cover the increased demand for the
public good inducing individuals to step in and donate more to reach the new equilib-
rium. In that sense, we can interpret crowding-in as pointing to an insucient gov-
ernment response to a shock on perceived productivity from the individuals’ (distorted)
perspective.
As we will see in the following, this identication of non-optimality of governmental
behavior due to crowding-in per se does not always coincide with the optimality dis-
cussed in the last chapter, i.e. the stated welfare maximizing government behavior. To
indicate non-optimality in the sense of the previous chapter the respective trigger of
crowding-in is decisive.
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Proposition 3.6. Consider an initial state of the world ω = (a, T o, σa, σT ) with T o > 0
and a positive shock on productivity salience σa. Then, observing crowding-in is sucient
to identify non-optimal government behavior.
As the optimal, i.e. the welfare maximizing, tax decreases if the salience of the crisis
goes up (see Proposition 3.5(a)), crowding-in points to non-optimal government behav-
ior in the given setting. In particular, this implies that the induced welfare level falls
below the one that could have been reached and even under the one that resulted from
government inactivity.
With respect to the already mentioned real world situation when the photo of the
drowned boy was published, this proposition tells us that it would have been better if
the government had not raised their contributions after the photo was published—at
least under the assumption of a benevolent government before the picture’s publication.
Up to now, we found that in case of salience shocks we can unambiguously make out
non-optimal government behavior by observing crowding-in. Hence, the problem of an
ambiguous evaluation of tax increases as given in equation (3.12) is solved if the tax
increase is paralleled by a salience shock.
This is not true if we consider shocks on true productivity a.
Proposition 3.7. Consider an initial state of the world ω = (a, T o, σa, σT ) with T o > 0
and a positive shock on productivity a. Observing crowding-in is neither necessary nor
sucient to indicate optimal government behavior.
As the direction of the change in optimal taxes itself is a priori unclear after a pro-
ductivity shock, the observation of crowding-in itself not informative in this case. The
reason is that the general assumptions on ω and v(·) do not allow to draw conclu-
sions on whether underprovision under individually rational behavior as proxied by
((N + g)v1(·) − 1) increases or decreases after a productivity shock. However, this is
crucial to identify optimal government responses. If individuals ‘underesponse’ to the
productivity—reected in an increased underprovision of the public good—crowding-in
is necessary for optimal government behavior. If, in contrast, underprovision increased
in the absence of government responses to the need shock, not observing crowding-in
indicates a non-optimal government behavior.
We can show for Cobb-Douglas preferences of the form U˜i(·) = ci+a˜β
(
di(1 + g) +D−i + T˜
)γ
,
β, γ < 1 that for these the optimal tax increases in the crisis’ productivity. So in this case,
not observing crowding-in always points to a tax schedule that is not welfare maximiz-
ing for the reasons given above.
To recapitulate: the implications of the observation of crowding-in strongly depend
on the trigger. Identifying crowding-in triggered by a productivity salience shock iden-
ties non-optimal government behavior while the absence of crowding-in after a pure
productivity shock, in contrast, identies non-optimal government behavior if under-
provision (see Denition 3.2) increased ceteris paribus.
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3.4 Conclusion
Our paper is the rst tackling the yawning gap between the famous literature on public
goods provision and the more recent branch of literature on salience. We provide an
approach towards the question how the provision of public goods, in particular of char-
ity, is aected by the fact that individuals hold biased beliefs: due to imperfect salience,
they misperceive the level of public contributions and a donations’ eectiveness. Con-
sequently, the resulting equilibrium contribution remarkably diers from the one in the
full salience benchmark case.
We provide an extensive analysis on how the aggregate equilibrium donation varies in
response to changes in the circumstances, i.e. changes in perceived productivity and in
perceived taxes, and derive the respective changes in welfare. Regarding welfare which
is based on experienced utility, we nd that it is crucial for the evaluation of a given
allocation whether the public good is underprovided (compared to the welfare maximiz-
ing level). Although being the relevant case both theoretically and empirically, that the
public good is underprovided is not a technical implication of our model.
Shocks on perceived productivity raise aggregate contributions since individuals re-
spond to the shock such that those shocks are welfare enhancing if and only if the good
was underprovided before the shock.
Moreover, even if underprovision is an issue, an increase in the perceived tax sched-
ule that causes aggregate contributions go up can drag welfare in either direction. We
solve this ambiguity by considering a benevolent government as a reference point and
utilize the phenomenon crowding-in as an auxiliary tool to assess whether a tax change
was benecial or not. Based on the observation of crowding-in, we can identify a tax
change as being welfare enhancing if it counteracts a worsening underprovision due to a
shock. As this is never true if crowding-in was triggered by a salience shock, in this case
crowding-in indicates non-optimal governmental behavior. If instead a tax increase is
paralleled by a shock on true productivity such that individuals raise their contributions
as well, this can lead to higher or lower welfare.
The presented normative analysis allows to use observable changes in the state of
the world to draw conclusions about whether welfare has increased or decreased. It is
left for future research to test our results empirically to check whether the conclusions
drawn from the theoretical investigation can be proven true in practice.
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Appendix 3.A Proof of Propositions
Proposition 3.1
Proof. Equilibrium welfare is given by
W ∗ = Nei −D∗ − T +Nv
(
D∗N+g
N
+ T, a
)
The rst order conditions with respect to actual productivity or its salience are given
by
dW ∗
dσa
= −dD∗
dσa
+ Nv1(·)dD∗dσa
N+g
N
= dD
∗
dσa︸︷︷︸
>0 see (3.7)
((N + g)v1(·)− 1)
if and only if there is underprovision according to Denition 3.2.
dW ∗
da
= −dD∗
da
+ Nv1(·)dD∗da N+gN + Nv2(·)
= dD
∗
da︸︷︷︸
>0 see (3.8)
((N + g)v1(·)− 1) + Nv2(·) > 0
if there is underprovision according to Denition 3.2.
⇒ dW
∗
da˜
> 0 if there is underprovision.
Proposition 3.2
Proof. Equilibrium welfare is given by
W ∗ = Nei −D∗ − T +Nv
(
D∗N+g
N
+ T, a
)
The rst order condition with respect to tax salience is given by
dW ∗
dσT
= −dD∗
dσT
+ Nv1(·)dD∗dσT
N+g
N
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= dD
∗
dσT︸︷︷︸
<0
((N + g)v1(·)− 1) < 0
if and only if there is underprovision according to Denition 3.2.
Proposition 3.3
Proof. Equilibrium welfare is given by
W ∗ = Nei −D∗ − T +Nv
(
D∗N+g
N
+ T, a
)
The rst order condition with respect to the tax is given by
dW ∗
dT
= −dD∗
dT
− 1 + Nv1(·)
(
dD∗
dT
N+g
N
+ 1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1−σT )
=
N
N + g
σT − 1 + Nv1(·)(1− σT )
= N(1− σT )
(
v1(·)− 1N+g
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
⇔ underprovision
− g
N + g︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
Depending on the level of tax salience σT and the specic preferences v(·), this ex-
pression can be positive or negative:
If σT = 1, then dW
∗
dT
= − g
N+g
< 0 so that T o = 0.
If σT = 0, then D∗ := argD{v1(DN+gN , a˜) = 11+g} < D¯ := argD{v1(DN+gN , a) =
1
1+g
} as by assumption v12(·) > 0, v11(·) < 0, and a˜ < a.24 Moreover, as v1(·) is
decreasing, it holds that v1(D∗N+gN , a) > v1(D¯
N+g
N
, a) = 1
1+g
where the last step follows
from the denition of D¯.
So, if σT = 0, then dW
∗
dT
|T=0 = Nv1(D∗N+gN , a)− 1 > N1+g − 1 ≥ 0.
The last statement implies that T o > 0 if g ≤ N − 1 which holds as g ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 3.4
This proposition is a direct implication of the previous proposition.
24Note that (i) v12(·) > 0 implies that v1(D, a˜) < v1(D, a) for all a˜ < a. Moreover, (ii) v11(·) < 0
implies that v1(D, a) > v1(D¯, a) for all D < D¯. Combining the two implications results in the stated
inequality, i.e. D¯ > D∗:
D∗ := argD{v1(DN+gN , a˜) = 11+g}
(i)⇒ v1(D∗N+gN , a) > 11+g
(ii)⇒
(
v1(D¯
N+g
N , a) =
1
1+g ⇒ D¯ > D∗
)
.
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Proposition 3.5
Proof. The optimal tax T o is implicitly given by the following rst order condition
dW ∗
dT
= − N
N+g
σT − 1 + Nv1(D∗(T )N+gN + T, a)(1− σT ) = 0
⇔: F (σa, T (σa)) = 0.
(a) By the implicit function theorem applied to the previously stated funtion F (·), we
have
dT o
dσa
= −
dF
dσa
dF
dT
.
dF
dT
= N(1− σT )v11(·)
(
N+g
N
dD∗
dT
+ 1
)
= N(1− σT )2v11(·) < 0
⇒ sgn
(
dT o
dσa
)
= sgn
(
dF
dσa
)
.
dF
dσT
= N v11(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− σT )N+gN dD
∗
dσa︸︷︷︸
>0 see (3.7)
< 0
This implies the given statement, dT o
dσa
< 0.
(b) By the implicit function theorem applied to the previously stated funtion F (·), we
have
dT o
da
= −
dF
da
dF
dT
.
By the same arguments as before, we have(
dT o
da
)
= sgn
(
dF
da
)
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dF
da
= N(1− σT )
v11(·)N+gN dD∗da︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ v12(·)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 ≷ 0
Hence, the sign of dT o
da
is ambiguous.
Moreover, it holds that
d
da
[(N + g)v1(·)− 1] = (N + g) ·
[
v11(·)dD∗da N+gN + v12(·)
]
so that
dT o
da
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ d
da
[(N + g)v1(·)− 1] ≷ 0.
Proposition 3.6
This is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.5(a).
Proposition 3.7
This is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.5(b).
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Appendix 3.B Proof of Lemmata
Lemma 3.1
Proof. d∗i maximizes individual i’s decision utility if it maximizes
U˜(·)i = ei − di − ti + v(D−i + di(1 + g) + T˜ , a˜)
This yields the following rst order condition
dU˜
ddi
= −1 + (1 + g)v1(·) = 0 ∀i
By the concavity of v(·) the solution is in fact a maximum.
Lemma 3.2
Proof. The rst order condition stated in lemm 3.1 determines implicitly, how d∗i changes
in D−i. Rearranging the rst order condition yields
1/(1 + g) = v1(d
∗
i (D−i)(1 + g) +D−i + T˜ , a˜).
Implicitly dierentiating yields
0 = (1 + g)v11(·)
(
dd∗i
dD−i
(1 + g) + 1
)
⇒ dd
∗
i
dD−i
= − 1
1 + g
.
Lemma 3.3
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to (FOC∗) yields
dD∗(a˜, T˜ )
dT
= − (1 + g)v11(·)σT
(1 + g)n+g
N
v11(·)
= − N
N + g
σT
so that
d(D∗(a˜, T˜ ) + T )
dT
=
dD∗(a˜, T˜ )
dT
+ 1 = 1− N
N + g
σT > 0.
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Lemma 3.4
Proof. With the given denition of welfare and quasi linear preferences, the ecient
private donation has to solve
max
d1,...,dN
W (a) =
∑
i
(ei − di) +
∑
i
v
(
(1 + g)di +
∑
j 6=i
dj, a
)
.
This yields the following N identical rst-order conditions:
0 = −1 + (1 + g)v1(·) + (N − 1)v1(·) .
Using symmetry the FOCs simplify to
1 = (N + g)v1(·) ,
which is equivalent to the stated expression.
151
Chapter 3 Public Goods and Salience
Appendix 3.C Proof of Corollaries
Corollary 3.1
Proof. The following rst-order condition determines the optimal aggregate support
level S∗(·) = D∗ + T , see Lemma 3.1.
0 = −1 + (1 + g)v1(S∗(·) + gdi, a˜)
Implicitly dierentiating yields
dS∗(·)
da˜
= −v12(·)(1 +
>0︷︸︸︷
dd∗i
da˜
)
v11(·)
With da˜
da
> 0 and da˜
dσa
> 0 the corollary is a direct implication.
As T is exogenously given and xed, it holds that
dS∗(·)
da˜
=
dD∗(·)
da˜
with da˜
da
= σa,
da˜
dσa
= a.
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